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Optimal insurance coverage of low-probability catastrophic risks

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Abstract

Catastrophic risks are often characterised by a low probability, a high severity and a large number of affected individuals. Taking these specificities into account, we analyse the capacity of insurance contracts to provide coverage for those risks, independently from the market failures frequently observed in practice. On the demand side, we characterise individual preferences under which the willingness to pay for the coverage of large losses remains significant, although their occurrence probability is very small. On the supply side, the correlation between individual losses affects the insurance pricing through the insurers’ cost of capital. Analysing the interaction between demand and supply yields the key determinants of insurability and of a socially optimal risk sharing strategy.

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Notes

  1. The classification follows Munich Re NatCat Service and is based on the World Bank’s Gross National Income (GNI) measure. Countries with GNI below 1045 US dollars are classified as low income and countries with GNI above 12,736 US dollars are classified as high income. Other countries are considered medium income.

  2. Important aspects of the US N.F.I.P. are illustrative of this approach, by facilitating the underwriting of flood policies, (e.g. the “write your own policy”), and through ground intervention of F.E.M.A agents in the case of a flood.

  3. We have \(\varepsilon (w) = w/{\mathbb {E}}{\tilde{\ell }}\) and \(\varepsilon (x) \rightarrow + \infty\) when \(x \rightarrow w-{\bar{L}}\). Hence, the monotonicity assumption made in the proposition guarantees \(\varepsilon (x) > w/{\mathbb {E}}{\tilde{\ell }}\) for all x. If this monotonicity assumption is not made, Proposition  2 holds under \({\bar{\gamma }} < \min \{\varepsilon (x),x \in [w-{\bar{L}},w]\}\).

  4. For the sake of numerical illustration, consider the case of a large-scale nuclear disaster that may occur with probability \(p=10^{-5}\), with expected total losses of $100b evenly spread among 1 million inhabitants (think of people living in the neighbourhood of the nuclear plant). In the case of an accident, each inhabitant would suffer a loss of expected value \({\mathbb {E}}{\tilde{\ell }}=\$100,000\). The unconditional expected loss \(p{\mathbb {E}}{\tilde{\ell }}\) equals $1, and the certainty equivalent is less than \(1+2\theta<\) $3 or \(1+3\theta<\) $4, which is negligible, say as a proportion of their annual electricity expenses. Assuming larger but still realistic values of the index of relative risk aversion would not substantially affect this conclusion. If we assume \(w = \$2M\), then the condition \({\bar{\gamma }} \le w/{\mathbb {E}}{\tilde{\ell }}\) is written as \({\bar{\gamma }} \le 20\).

  5. See Eeckhoudt et al. (2000) and Weitzman (2009) for examples of this sensitivity issue, and Ikefuji et al. (2015) for a formal analysis of the conditions under which the problem arises.

  6. This can be obtained either by using Eq. (23) in the proof of Proposition 1 with \(F(\ell ) = 0\) if \(\ell < {\bar{L}}\) and \(F(\ell ) =1\) if \(\ell >{\bar{L}}\), or equivalently, by directly establishing Proposition 1 in this simpler case.

  7. Note that R(x) is increasing in the HARA case, and assuming \(R(x)>1\) when x is large requires \(\gamma >1\).

  8. Indeed, if the individual prefers full coverage to no coverage, extending his opportunity set does not make him switch to zero coverage. It is easy to check that the optimal limit cover (denoted \(I^*\) below) is positive when \(d(0_+,L)<[u'(w-L)-u'(w)]/u'(w)\) and that this condition is implied by \(\theta (0_+,L)L\ge d(0_+,L)\).

  9. Section 4 will be dedicated to analysing the supply side of the market and will derive a pricing function.

  10. See Schlesinger (2013).

  11. When \(\pi >0\), this corresponds to the degenerate case where the catastrophe may be completely harmless. Only two events are then relevant : either there is a catastrophe that affects all individuals, either nobody suffers a loss, hence the perfect correlation.

  12. This paper abstracts from the possibility of default, examined in Charpentier and Le Maux (2014) and Zanjani (2002) for example. In other words, we consider unlimited liability for all agents in the economy and in particular for the insurance provider.

  13. In an economy with complete financial markets, \(D = {\mathbb {E}}{\tilde{y}} + \text{ cov }({\tilde{y}},\frac{u'({\tilde{z}})}{{\mathbb {E}}u'({\tilde{z}})})\) defines the price of the asset \({\tilde{y}}\) (see Gollier 2004). Without loss of generality, we use the normalisation \({\mathbb {E}}u'({\tilde{z}}) = 1\).

  14. Note that the right-hand side of (14) depends on \(\pi , L\) and on the distribution of \({\tilde{\kappa }}\). In what follows, L and \({\tilde{\kappa }}\) are considered as given and we analyse the effect of a change in the probability of a catastrophe \(\pi\), that affects the individual probability \(p=\mu _{\kappa } \pi\) of being a victim.

  15. When we consider economies that differ through the value of \(\pi\), we maintain the normalising assumption \({\mathbb {E}}u'({\tilde{z}}) = 1\) for the economy. The utility functions therefore depend on \(\pi\) and \(u'(w) \rightarrow 1\) when \(\pi \rightarrow 0\) for any random variable \({\tilde{\kappa }}\).

  16. Equation (19) is an approximation of \(\psi (0)\) by default when \(u'''>0\) that would lead to over-estimate the coverage rates. Numerical simulations, not reported here for the sake of brevity but available from the authors upon request, show that approximating the true price with (19) produces reasonable levels of errors (a few percentage points) for the calibrations considered in the next section.

  17. This restriction on the size of the catastrophe need not be as restrictive as it seems. For example, the Japanese government expects the total cost of the Fukushima-Daiichi accident in 2011 to amount to a 177 billion euros bill. An important part of this cost is systemic since it affects many people at once, but its size, when compared to a 4300 billion euros annual GDP, remains limited.

  18. Considering higher levels of loss probability would indeed give rise to higher errors. Considering \(\pi = 0.1\) instead of \(\pi =0.01\) for, would results in approximation errors lower than \(8.55\%\) and lower than \(2\%\) in 17 out of the 20 scenarios of Table 1.

  19. In addition, large catastrophes often affect people with sometimes widely different (but small) probabilities. Our result suggests that such differences in risk exposure may actually result in very limited differences in optimal coverage values. Similarly, conflicting expert opinions concerning the true probability of a catastrophe would also be irrelevant for the choice of an optimal level of coverage, as long as experts agree that the probability \(\pi\) is very small.

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Acknowledgements

Alexis Louaas gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the EIT Climate-KIC. EIT Climate-KIC is supported by EIT, a body of the European Union. Pierre Picard gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Labex ECODEC

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Correspondence to Pierre Picard.

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The original online version of this article was revised due to corrections in equation 1, propositions 1&2, the proofs of propositions 1&2 and corollary 2.

Appendix: Proofs

Appendix: Proofs

1.1 Proof of Proposition 1

We have

$$\begin{aligned} C_{p}^{\prime }(0_+,{\tilde{\ell }})=\frac{u(w)-{\mathbb {E}}u(w-{\tilde{\ell }})}{u^{\prime }(w)}={\mathbb {E}}\left[ \int _{w-{\tilde{\ell }}}^{w}\frac{ u^{\prime }(x)}{u^{\prime }(w)}{\text{d}}x\right] . \end{aligned}$$

Since

$$\begin{aligned} u^{\prime }(x)=u^{\prime }(w)-\int _{x}^{w}u^{\prime \prime }(t){\text{d}}t, \end{aligned}$$

for all \(x\in [w-{\bar{L}},w]\), we may write

$$\begin{aligned} C_{p}^{\prime }(0_+,{\tilde{\ell }})\,= & {} {\mathbb {E}}{\tilde{\ell }}-{\mathbb {E}} \left[ \int _{w-{\tilde{\ell }}}^{w}\left[ \int _{x}^{w}\frac{u^{\prime \prime }(t)}{u^{\prime }(w)}{\text{d}}t\right] {\text{d}}x \right] \\\,= & {} {\mathbb {E}}{\tilde{\ell }}+ {\mathbb {E}}\left[ \int _{w- {\tilde{\ell }}}^{w}\left[ \int _{x}^{w}A(t)\frac{u^{\prime }(t)}{u^{\prime }(w)}{\text{d}}t\right] {\text{d}}x \right] , \end{aligned}$$

and thus,

$$\begin{aligned} \theta (0+, {\tilde{\ell }})= & {} \frac{C'_p(0_+,{\tilde{\ell }}) - {\mathbb {E}}{\tilde{\ell }}}{{\mathbb {E}}{\tilde{\ell }}^2} \\= & {} \frac{1}{{\mathbb {E}}{\tilde{\ell }}^{2}}{\mathbb {E}} \left[ \int _{w-{\tilde{\ell }}}^{w} \left[ \int _{x}^{w} A(t) \frac{u'(t)}{u'(w)}{\text{d}}t\right] {\text{d}}x\right] \end{aligned}$$

Integrating by parts three times and making the change of variable \(x = w-\ell\) gives

$$\begin{aligned} \theta (0_+,{\tilde{\ell }})= & {} \frac{1}{{\mathbb {E}}{\tilde{\ell }}^{2}}\int _{0}^{{\bar{L}}}\left[ \int _{w-\ell }^{w} (x-w+\ell )A(x)\frac{u^{\prime }(x)}{u^{\prime }(w)}{\text{d}}x\right] f(\ell ) {\text{d}}\ell \end{aligned}$$
(22)
$$\begin{aligned}= & {} \frac{1}{{\mathbb {E}}{\tilde{\ell }}^{2}}\left\{ \int _{w-{\bar{L}}}^{w} (x-w+\ell )A(x)\frac{u^{\prime }(x)}{u^{\prime }(w)}{\text{d}}x \right. \nonumber \\&\qquad \qquad \left. -\int _{0}^{{\bar{L}}} F(\ell )\left[ \int _{w-\ell }^{w} A(x) \frac{u^{\prime }(x)}{u^{\prime }(w)} {\text{d}}x \right] {\text{d}}\ell \right\} \nonumber \\= & {} \frac{1}{{\mathbb {E}}{\tilde{\ell }}^{2}} \left\{ \int _{w-{\bar{L}}}^{w} \left[ x-w+{\bar{L}} - \int _{w-x}^{{\bar{L}}} F(\ell ){\text{d}}\ell \right] A(x) \frac{u'(x)}{u'(w)}{\text{d}}x \right\} . \end{aligned}$$
(23)

Using

$$\begin{aligned} u'(x) = u'(w) \exp \left\{ \int _x^w{A(x) {\text{d}}x} \right\} , \end{aligned}$$

completes the first part of the proof. Integrating by parts twice then gives

$$\begin{aligned} \int _{w-{\bar{L}}}^{w} \left[ x-w+{\bar{L}} - \int _{w-x}^{{\bar{L}}} F(\ell ){\text{d}}\ell \right] {\text{d}}x = \frac{1}{2} {\mathbb {E}}{\tilde{\ell }}^2, \end{aligned}$$

hence

$$\begin{aligned} \int _{w-{\bar{L}}}^{w} k(x) {\text{d}}x = 1. \end{aligned}$$

1.2 Proof of Corollary 1

The corollary follows straightforwardly from

$$\begin{aligned} \exp \left\{ \int _x^w{A(t) {\text{d}}t}\right\} \ge 1. \end{aligned}$$

1.3 Proof of Proposition 2

Let \(\nu (x) = x - w + {\bar{L}} - \int _{w-x}^{{\bar{L}}}{F(\ell ) {\text{d}}\ell }> 0\) for all \(x \in [w-{\bar{L}},w]\), with \(\nu (w) = {\bar{L}} - \int _0^{{\bar{L}}}{F(\ell ){\text{d}}\ell } = {\mathbb {E}}{\tilde{\ell }}\) and \(f'({\bar{L}})<0\). Equation (23) is therefore written as

$$\begin{aligned} \theta (0_+,{\tilde{\ell }}) = \frac{1}{{\mathbb {E}}{\tilde{\ell }}^2} \int _{w-{\bar{L}}}^w{\nu (x)A(x) \frac{u'(x)}{u'(w)}{\text{d}}x}. \end{aligned}$$

Hence

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{{\text{d}}[\nu (x) u'(x)]}{{\text{d}}x}= & {} u'(x)\nu '(x) + \nu (x) u''(x) \\= & {} u'(x) \left[ \nu '(x) - \frac{\nu (x)}{x} R(x)\right] \qquad x \in [w-{\bar{L}},w]. \end{aligned}$$

\({\text{d}}[\nu (x) u'(x)]/{\text{d}}x >0\) if \(\varepsilon (x) \equiv \frac{\nu '(x)x}{\nu (x)}>R(x)\), and

$$\begin{aligned} \varepsilon (x) = \frac{x[1-F(w-x)]}{\int _{w-x}^{{\bar{L}}}{[1-F(\ell )]{\text{d}}\ell }}. \end{aligned}$$

Since \({\mathbb {E}}{\tilde{\ell }} = {\bar{L}} - \int _0^{{\bar{L}}}{F(\ell ){\text{d}}\ell }\), we have \(\varepsilon (w) = w/{\mathbb {E}}{\tilde{\ell }}\). Assuming \(f(\ell )\rightarrow 0\) when \(\ell \rightarrow {\bar{L}}\) and \(f'({\bar{L}}) < 0\) and applying L’Hôpital’s rule twice, we obtain \(\varepsilon (x) \rightarrow +\infty\) when \(x\rightarrow w-{\bar{L}}\). Assuming that \(\varepsilon (x)\) is monotonic, and therefore decreasing, implies

$$\begin{aligned} \varepsilon (x)> & {} \varepsilon (w) \qquad \text{ if } \quad x<w. \\= & {} \frac{w}{{\mathbb {E}}{\tilde{\ell }}} \end{aligned}$$

A sufficient condition for \({\text{d}}[\nu (x) u'(x)]/{\text{d}}x >0\) is therefore

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{w}{{\mathbb {E}}{{\tilde{\ell }}}} > {\bar{\gamma }}, \end{aligned}$$

where \({\bar{\gamma }} = \max \{R(x),x\in [w-{\bar{L}},w]\}\). In this case, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \nu (x)u'(x)< & {} \nu (w) u'(w) \qquad \text{ if } \quad x\in [w-{\bar{L}},w] \\\,= & {} {\mathbb {E}}{\tilde{\ell }}u'(w), \end{aligned}$$

and consequently

$$\begin{aligned} \theta (0_+,{\tilde{\ell }})<\frac{{\mathbb {E}}{\tilde{\ell }}}{{\mathbb {E}}{\tilde{\ell }}^2}\int _{w-{\bar{L}}}^w{A(x){\text{d}}x}. \end{aligned}$$

Let \({\bar{A}} = 1/\bar{L}\int _{w-{\bar{L}}}^w{A(x){\text{d}}x}\). We then obtain

$$\begin{aligned} \theta (0_+,{\tilde{\ell }}) < \frac{\bar{L}{\mathbb {E}}{\tilde{\ell }}}{{\mathbb {E}}{\tilde{\ell }}^2} {\bar{A}}. \end{aligned}$$

Using \(C_{p}^{\prime \prime }<0\) and \(C (0_+,{\tilde{\ell }})=0\) with Eq. (1) allows us to write

$$\begin{aligned} C (p,{\tilde{\ell }})< & {} C^{\prime }(0_+,{\tilde{\ell }})p \\= & {} p{\mathbb {E}}{\tilde{\ell }}[1 + \theta (0_+,{\tilde{\ell }}){\mathbb {E}}{\tilde{\ell }}]\\< & {} p{\mathbb {E}}{\tilde{\ell }}\left[ 1+{\bar{L}}{\bar{A}}\right] . \end{aligned}$$

1.4 Proof of Corollary 3

A simple calculation shows that Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 can be re-written as

Corollary 4

When \({\tilde{\ell }} =L\) with probability 1, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \theta (0_+,{\tilde{\ell }}) =\frac{1}{2} \int _{w-L}^{w}{\left[ k(x) A(x) \exp \left\{ \int _{x}^{w}{A(t){\text{d}}t} \right\} \right] {\text{d}}x} > \frac{1}{2} \int _{w-L}^{w}{k(x) A(x) {\text{d}}x} \end{aligned}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} k(x) = \frac{2[x- (w-L)]}{L^2} > 0 \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} \int _{w-L}^{w}k(x){\text{d}}x=1. \end{aligned}$$

Using Lemma 1 then shows that

$$\begin{aligned} d(0_+,L)\le & {} \frac{L}{2} \int _{w-L}^{w}{ \frac{k(x)}{x} R(x){\text{d}}x} \end{aligned}$$

is a sufficient condition for insurance take-up to be positive. If R(x) is non-decreasing, then

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{L}{2}\int _{w-L}^{w}{ \frac{k(x)}{x} R(x){\text{d}}x}\ge & {} \frac{L R(w-L)}{2}\int _{w-L}^{w}{ \frac{k(x)}{x} {\text{d}}x} \\ \,= & {} \frac{ R(w-L)}{L}\int _{w-L}^{w}{ \frac{x-(w-L)}{x} {\text{d}}x} \\ \,= & {} R(w-L) \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{w-L}{L}\right) \ln {\frac{w}{w-L}}\right] \\\equiv & {} \Psi (L) \quad L \in [0,w]. \end{aligned}$$

Noticing that \(\lim _{L\rightarrow w}{\psi (L)} = \lim _{x\rightarrow 0}{R(x)}\) provides the result.

1.5 Coefficient of correlation \(\rho\)

Let \({\tilde{L}}_i\) and \({\tilde{L}}_j\) be two random variables that represent the losses of individuals i and j. Conditionally on a realisation \(\kappa\) of the random variable \({\tilde{\kappa }}\), losses are assumed identically and independently distributed, hence

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{L_i}\tilde{L_j} | \kappa = \left\{ \begin{array}{cl} L^2 &{} \text{ with } \text{ probability } \quad \pi \kappa ^2 \\ 0 &{} \text{ with } \text{ probability } \quad 1 - \pi \kappa ^2 \end{array} \right. . \end{aligned}$$

As a consequence \({\mathbb {E}}(\tilde{L_i} \tilde{L_j}|\kappa ) = L^2 \pi \kappa ^2\) and \({\mathbb {E}}(\tilde{L_i} \tilde{L_j}) = L^2 \pi {\mathbb {E}}{\tilde{\kappa }}^2\). Similarly,

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{L_i} | \kappa = \left\{ \begin{array}{cl} L &{} \text{ with } \text{ probability } \quad \pi \kappa \\ 0 &{} \text{ with } \text{ probability } \quad 1 - \pi \kappa \end{array} \right. , \end{aligned}$$

for all i, hence \({\mathbb {E}}\tilde{L_i} = L\pi \mu _{\kappa }\) and \({\mathbb {E}}\tilde{L_i} {\mathbb {E}}\tilde{L_j}= (L\pi \mu _{\kappa })^2\). The co-variance between two losses is therefore written as

$$\begin{aligned} \text{ cov }(\tilde{L_i},\tilde{L_j}) = L^2\pi [ {\mathbb {E}}{\tilde{\kappa }}^2 - \pi \mu _{\kappa }^2 ]. \end{aligned}$$

Also, since

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{L_i}^2 | \kappa = \left\{ \begin{array}{cl} L^2 &{} \text{ with } \text{ probability } \quad \pi \kappa \\ 0 &{} \text{ with } \text{ probability } \quad 1 - \pi \kappa \end{array} \right. , \end{aligned}$$

implies \({\mathbb {E}}(\tilde{L_i}^2) = \pi L^2 \mu _{\kappa }\), we find the variance of \(\tilde{L_i}\)

$$\begin{aligned} \text{ Var }(\tilde{L_i}) = L^2 \pi \mu _{\kappa } (1- \pi \mu _{\kappa }). \end{aligned}$$

Since \(\text{ Var }(\tilde{L_i}) = \text{ Var }(\tilde{L_j})\) for all i, the coefficient of correlation is finally equal to

$$\begin{aligned} \rho= & {} \frac{\text{ cov }(\tilde{L_i},\tilde{L_j})}{\text{ Var }(\tilde{L_i})}\\= & {} \frac{{\mathbb {E}}{\tilde{\kappa }}^2 - \pi \mu _{\kappa }^2}{ \mu _{\kappa } (1- \pi \mu _{\kappa } )} \\= & {} \frac{ \sigma ^2_{\kappa } + \mu _{\kappa }^2 (1-\pi )}{ \mu _{\kappa } (1- \pi \mu _{\kappa } )}, \end{aligned}$$

where the last line is obtained using \(\sigma ^2_{\kappa } = {\mathbb {E}}{\tilde{\kappa }}^2 - \mu _{\kappa }^2\).

1.6 Proof of Proposition 4

When \(\lambda =0\), inequality (16) is rewritten as

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{{\mathbb {E}}[{\tilde{\kappa }} u'(w - {\tilde{\kappa }}L)]}{\mu _{\kappa }} \le u'(w-L). \end{aligned}$$
(24)

Since \(u''<0\), we have

$$\begin{aligned} u'(w- \kappa L) < u'(w-L) \quad \text{ for } \text{ all } \quad \kappa \in [0,1], \end{aligned}$$

and hence

$$\begin{aligned} {\mathbb {E}}[{\tilde{\kappa }} u'(w-{\tilde{\kappa }}L)] < \mu _{\kappa }u'(w-L), \end{aligned}$$

which gives (24). (16) also holds when \(\lambda\) is not too large.

1.7 Proof of Proposition 5

Using Proposition 3 with Eqs. (16) and (19) gives \(I^*>0\) if

$$\begin{aligned} \varphi (L) \equiv u'(w-L) - x(L,\lambda ,\rho ) > 0, \end{aligned}$$

where \(x(L,\lambda ,\rho ) \equiv (1+\lambda )(1 + A(w)L \rho )\). Using \(u'(w) = 1\), we obtain \(\varphi (0) = u'(w) - x(0,\lambda ,\rho ) = - \lambda <0\), and

$$\begin{aligned} \varphi '(L)= & {} -u''(w-L) - (1+\lambda ) A(w)\rho \\ \varphi ''(L)= & {} u'''(w-L) >0 \end{aligned}$$

The function \(\varphi (L)\) is therefore convex with \(\varphi (0)<0\) and \(\varphi ({\bar{L}})>0\) if \(u'(w-{\bar{L}}) > (1+\lambda )[1 + A(w) {\bar{L}} \rho ]\). \(\varphi (L) = 0\) hence defines \({\underline{L}}(\lambda ,\rho )\) with \({\bar{L}}(\lambda , \rho )=0\) if \(\lambda =0\) and \({\bar{L}}(\lambda , \rho )>0\) if \(\lambda >0\). When \(L>{\underline{L}}(\lambda ,\rho )\), (i.e. \(I^*>0\)), Equation (17) gives

$$\begin{aligned} \beta ^* = 1 + \frac{u'^{-1}(x(L)) - w}{L}, \end{aligned}$$
(25)

for given values of \(\lambda\) and \(\rho\). Let \(z(L) = u'^{-1}(x(L))\). Since DARA implies \(u'''>0\), \(u'^{-1}\) is decreasing and convex and since x(L) is linear, z(L) is also decreasing and convex. From (25), we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \beta ^*}{\partial L}= & {} \left[ \frac{Lx'(L)}{u''(u'^{-1}(x(L)))} - u'^{-1}(x(L)) + w \right] /L^2 \\= & {} \frac{Lz'(L) - z(L) + w}{L^2}. \end{aligned}$$

Using \(w>=z(0)\) and the convexity of function z(L) yields

$$\begin{aligned} Lz'(L)-z(L)+w>=Lz'(L)-z(L)+z(0)>0, \end{aligned}$$

which gives \(\partial \beta ^*/\partial L >0\) when \(L\ge {\bar{L}}(\lambda , \rho )\). The comparative statics \(\partial \beta ^*/\partial \rho < 0\) and \(\partial \beta ^*/\partial \lambda < 0\) are obtained by noticing that an increase in either \(\lambda\) or \(\rho\) translates into an increase in x(L). \(u'^{-1}\) decreasing then provides the results.

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Louaas, A., Picard, P. Optimal insurance coverage of low-probability catastrophic risks. Geneva Risk Insur Rev 46, 61–88 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1057/s10713-020-00049-w

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/s10713-020-00049-w

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