Abstract
LaPorte examines the dynamics of semi-presidentialism in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan’s regime is a curious hybrid, in which semi-presidential institutions operate in the larger context of authoritarianism. The author compares formal Constitutional provisions with the practice of politics in the country, suggesting that formal and informal sources of authority come together to enhance the effective powers of the presidency. In addition to the considerable formal powers laid out in the Constitution, Azerbaijan’s president also benefits from the support of the ruling party and informal family and patronage networks. LaPorte concludes by discussing the theoretical implications of this symbiosis between formal and informal institutions in Azerbaijan’s semi-presidential regime.
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Notes
- 1.
It is unclear on when and why the position title was changed. Most sources use the terms interchangeably with little further explication. Some imply the position was closely connected with the establishment of a presidency. Bulakbasi (2011, p. 160), for example, notes that Hasanov “became Mutallibov’s Prime Minister.” Wikipedia suggests that Hasanov’s position switched from Chairman of the Council of Ministers to Prime Minister on February 7, 1991, coinciding with the convocation of the new, directly elected Supreme Soviet on February 5. This suggests that the prime minister position was closely linked to the calling of multiparty elections, and the inauguration of the new Soviet, but documentary evidence is scant.
- 2.
Fish (2003: 200) describes super-presidentialism in more detail as including “an apparatus of executive power that dwarfs all other agencies in terms of size and the resources it consumes; a president who enjoys decree powers; a president who de jure or de facto controls most of the powers of the purse; a relatively toothless legislature that cannot repeal presidential decrees and that enjoys scant authority and/or resources to monitor the chief executive; provisions that render impeachment of the president virtually impossible; and a court system that is controlled wholly or mainly by the chief executive and that cannot in practice check presidential prerogatives or even abuse of power.” Fish (2005, p. 205) further clarifies that these categories are not mutually exclusive; a regime may be simultaneously semi-presidential and super-presidential.
- 3.
Parliamentary elections also occur every 5 years but in the off years between presidential elections.
- 4.
All deputies of the Milli Majlis and the Supreme Court have equal powers in this realm. In each case, bills are “submitted . . . for discussion and put to vote the way they are presented. The changes in the draft laws shall be introduced by consent of the organ that has used the right of legislative initiative” (Article 96).
- 5.
Heydar Aliyev established the ruling YAP in 1991 to support his return to power. It functions much as the Communist Party did during the Soviet era—as an organizational, mobilization, and administrative support for the ruler. The party enjoys significant access to state administrative and financial resources. Membership in the YAP is a precondition for state employment.
- 6.
Author’s Interview, February 2009, Baku, Azerbaijan.
- 7.
As elaborated further below, Jalal Aliyev fell from grace in 2005. However, as a member of the Aliyev family, he is effectively immune from prosecution and continues to hold a parliamentary seat.
- 8.
Author’s interview, February 2009, Baku, Azerbaijan.
- 9.
Author’s interview, February 2009, Baku, Azerbaijan.
- 10.
Author’s interview, March 2009, Tbilisi, Georgia.
- 11.
The following discussion draws on the insights of the International Crisis Group’s 2010 report, “Azerbaijan: Vulnerable Stability.” Political experts also shared much of this information with me during personal interviews in Azerbaijan in 2008–2009.
- 12.
Talibov and Eyyubov are brothers-in-law. Their wives are siblings.
- 13.
The 1995 election gave Heydar Aliyev a “handpicked parliament” (Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 1996). Observers lamented after the 2000 election, “the vote count was completely flawed” (OSCE/ODIHR 2001). In 2005, the government demonstrated “a failure to ensure equitable conditions for all candidates,” while “the election day process deteriorated progressively during the count and, in particular, the tabulation of votes” (OSCE/ODIHR 2006). By 2010, election monitors sounded a note of despair: “the conduct of these elections overall was not sufficient to constitute meaningful progress in the democratic development of the country” (OSCE/ODIHR 2011).
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LaPorte, J. (2016). Semi-presidentialism in Azerbaijan. In: Elgie, R., Moestrup, S. (eds) Semi-Presidentialism in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-38781-3_4
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