Abstract
The emergence of China as a great power, and its implications for International Relations, especially with regard its relations with the United States and the prospects for conflict between the two powers, is one of the most pressing problems in world politics. Unfortunately, two of the most prominent contributions, which have gained widespread attention and popularity—Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? by Graham Allison, and John Mearsheimer’s The Tragedy of Great Power Politics—are fundamentally flawed in their analytical approach and dangerous in their policy advice. In this paper I will review the problematic aspects of these influential arguments, and argue that a perspective grounded in classical realism, more closely associated with the work of Robert Gilpin, offers a more productive approach to understanding this enormous challenge.
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Notes
“The Spartans out of fear of you want war” (1.33.3); The Spartans chose war “because they feared the growth of the power of the Athenians” (1.88.1). Hornblower (1991: 78, 65, 133) argues that the “clear echo” at 1.33.3 is “decisive against attempts” to dispute this conclusion.
It should be noted that the logic of even this basic motivation has been challenged. See, for example, Lee (2019).
For a recent discussion of some of these issues, see Jaffe (2017).
Thucydides claims otherwise: “I lived through the whole of it, being of an age to comprehend events, and giving my attention to them” (5.25.5). For a more elaborate accounting of these errors, see Kirshner (2019).
As Thucydides describes, “In the former war, [the Spartans] considered that the offense had been more on their own side,” in particular due to “their own refusal to listen to the Athenian offer of arbitration, in spite of the clause in the former treaty that where arbitration should be offered there should be no appeal to arms” (7.18.2). See also Hornblower (2008: 373), Mynott (2013: 462).
Thucydides described Pericles among the Athenians the “ablest alike in counsel and action,” (1.139.4) and “the best man for all the needs of the state” (2.65.4)—and, note the importance of individuals, not structural power, as Thucydides thought that the loss of his leadership contributed directly to Athens’ ultimate defeat (2.65.7).
This was a mistake the Athenians would repeat. When fortune turned in Athens’ favor once again, Sparta again reached out with an offer to negotiate, but once again the Athenians “kept grasping at more,” (4.41.4). On the importance of this episode, and Thucydides’ emphasis on this point, see Rawlings (1981); de Romilly (1963/1947).
As Thucydides describes, the Athenians “were now bent upon invading [Sicily]; being ambitious in real truth of conquering the whole” (6.5.1).
On numerous occasions votes on momentous issues are very close—and at times decisions reached are reversed, which certainly suggests that either result was possible. Similarly, blind chance plays an outcome in many consequential military campaigns.
“A general theory of international politics is necessarily based on the great powers” (Waltz 1979: 73). Note that Mearsheimer’s book is explicitly about “great power” politics.
Similarly Kennan (1951: 47, 50) hoped the “recognition of power realities” would encourage “the gentle civilizer of national self-interest.”.
See also Spykman (1942: 20): “the number of cases in which a strong dynamic state has stopped expanding or has set modest limits to its power aims has been very few indeed.”.
See also Kupchan (1994) on British retrenchment before World War I.
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Kirshner, J. Offensive realism, thucydides traps, and the tragedy of unforced errors: classical realism and US–China relations. China Int Strategy Rev. 1, 51–63 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s42533-019-00013-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s42533-019-00013-y