Abstract
This article addresses two questions: How should a ‘practical political theory’ approach the ideological struggle between advocates of critical social justice and defenders of free speech? And, what does this conflict tell us about the deficits of one particular tradition of practical political theory — namely, agonistic democracy? The paper’s purpose, then, is to illuminate a concrete contemporary phenomenon (i.e., the struggle between advocates of critical social justice and defenders of free speech) through the lens of agonistic theory and, conversely, to use this struggle as an impetus to carve out and address weaknesses in the theory of agonism.
I defend an ‘agonistic approach’ to the struggle against two alternatives — first, the claim that there is, conceptually, no ‘real’ conflict between social justice and free speech, and second, the strategy to ‘take sides’ in the conflict. By taking seriously the agonistic core idea that struggle and conflict can be valuable and productive expressions of plurality and inclusivity, I argue that this struggle should be approached as an agonistic conflict — as the welcome and important expression of a diversity of views on central social, moral and political questions.
I also show, however, how retaining the focus on the real-life struggle between advocates of critical social justice and free-speech sheds light on the inconsistencies of much agonistic thought. In particular, I will criticize those agonists who limit their conception of the ‘agon’ to respectful struggles (agonistic respect), and those who see the agon merely as a tool of emancipation for oppressed groups. Against these visions of agonism, I develop an anti-perfectionist, yet radical, account of agonism with the potential to serve as a guide in complex social and political conflicts.
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Notes
I stress ‘critical’ as the article does not engage with ‘social justice’ more generally, but a particular understanding of it. Advocates and opponents alike seem to agree on the label ‘critical social justice’. Robin diAngelo and Ozlem Sensoy — two advocates — define it as follows: ‘We use the term critical social justice. We do so in order to distinguish our standpoint on social justice from mainstream [social justice] standpoints. A critical approach to social justice refers to specific theoretical perspectives that recognize that society is stratified (i.e., divided and unequal) in significant and far-reaching ways along social group lines that include race, class, gender, sexuality, and ability. Critical social justice recognizes inequality as deeply embedded in the fabric of society (i.e., as structural), and actively seeks to change this’ (2017: xx).
It is not my intention to treat these camps as homogenous groups as it is true that we find a variety of different voices within the camps. It is equally true, though, that there is a struggle between a group that strongly advocates ideals of social justice and one that seeks to defend free speech against what they see as the dangerous excesses of the former. The distinction between two camps is, thus, not only heuristically useful but also reflected on the ‘rough ground’ of politics.
I think it is safe to assume that the readers of this journal are familiar with the basic tenets of agonism: Far from being a coherent theory, agonism is a tradition of thought that emphasizes the ethical and political value of certain forms of conflict (the agon), insists on the importance of human plurality, and adopts a tragic vision of politics. This triumvirate of plurality, struggle and tragedy leads, in the eyes of agonists, to non-domination: plurality creates perpetual agonistic struggles that are both an indicator and a creator of freedom. For book-length overviews of agonism, see Wingenbach (2011); Wenman (2013); for shorter introductions, Schaap (2007); Fossen (2008).
Admittedly, I use McNay’s phrase here out of context; I will, however, engage with her potential objection in the Conclusion.
This is certainly true for liberals. John Rawls, for instance, enumerates and staunchly defends ‘freedom of speech’ as a basic liberty (1999: 53, 178, 195, 197). The Letter, too, ‘refuse[s] any false choice between justice and freedom, which cannot exist without each other’. Advocates of critical social justice, however, are highly critical of liberalism and argue that free speech can be a tool of domination and oppression.
The fact that both camps tend to couch the conflict in these terms is simply a testament to its ideological nature.
This is true even for radical authors such as Gavin Titley, who concludes that free speech ‘as it is currently understood functions as a structure of racialized coercion’ (2020: 137; emphasis added).
I say one of the reasons as I will return to this point in the final section.
Admittedly, Mouffe is attentive to the passions that shape political life and agonistic conflict (2005: 30; also Mihai 2014) and has even directly criticized Connolly’s conception of agonistic respect (2013: 13–14). Perhaps the objection I am levelling against agonists has the least force against Mouffe’s account. I cannot pursue this question further here; suffice it to say that I am sceptical of Mouffe’s particular claim that agonistic conflict should be imagined as ‘legitimate dissent among friends’.
I respond to this objection in the Conclusion.
My criticism here chimes with Teresa Bejan’s point that ‘modern civil silencers… set the deliberative bar quite high, placing constraints not only on the manner in which fundamental disagreements are conducted but also on what kinds of disagreements can take place, where, and with whom (2017: 148).
Admittedly, not all agonists employ the idea of agonistic respect (or at least not explicitly); but this does not change the fact that many agonists do (either implicitly or explicitly). It is also worth mentioning that my argument differs from those who criticize the concept of ‘agonistic respect’. Mouffe, for instance, reprimands the idea of agonistic respect as too inclusive since it has — allegedly — precious little to say on exclusion (2013: 13–14). My point, however, is the exact opposite: I assert that the idea of agonistic respect is not inclusive enough. More fruitful, I think, is Mark Wenman’s critique that ‘the implication [of agonistic respect is] that we might find solutions to our present predicament in the civic virtues of agonistic respect and critical responsiveness, rather than in, say, a radical transformation of the present system of global inequality and domination’ (2013: 123). Now, Wenman’s call for a radical transformation of global structures is beyond the scope of this article; but I do insist that Connolly’s ethos of agonistic respect is counterproductive to the radical agonism I lay out.
I say ‘many’, not ‘all’ because there are, undoubtedly, conflicts where the roles are seemingly more obvious; what I am talking about here are the countless ‘complex social conflicts’ in which a ‘good vs evil’ approach is simplistic, counterproductive, and dangerous. In this context, I should mention that a discussant who commented on a draft of this paper at a workshop urged me to ‘take sides with the oppressed’. This, however, presupposes that in the conflict between advocates of critical social justice and defenders of free speech, one side is oppressed and the other is the oppressor — it suggests, in other words, that this is not a ‘complex social conflict’. And, as stated, I strongly believe that this is a simplistic position.
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Acknowledgements
I have presented earlier versions of this paper to the POLEMO research group on legal, political, and social theory at Central European University as well as at the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory at the University of Belgrade. I am grateful to the participants for their feedback, ideas, and criticism. Moreover, I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers of Jus Cogens for their feedback. The usual disclaimer applies.
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Royer, C. Ideological Struggle as Agonistic Conflict (Anti)Hypocrisy, Free Speech and Critical Social Justice. Jus Cogens 3, 257–278 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s42439-021-00046-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s42439-021-00046-1