Abstract
On occasion of Hans Albert’s 100-th anniversary the paper addresses a wider audience of philosophers, political scientists and economists who are broadly interested in critical rationalism but not well acquainted with Albert’s systematization of the Popperian philosophical program. Laying out Albert’s intellectual career and his critical realism, fallibilism and methodological revisionism puts him on the present intellectual PPE map as a philosopher-economist in his own right. Beyond contributions to the “Positivismusstreit” and his seminal work on “Model Platonism” in economics, in particular his views on technological thinking and the role of institutions in science have wide ranging, still underappreciated implications.
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Notes
Albert is known as Streiter (“fighter”), who loves being part of Kontroversen (“disputes”) or Auseinandersetzungen (“polemics”). See Zimmer and Morgenstern (2011).
Already in Treatise on Critical Reason, Albert criticizes “the idea of a double truth” (i.e. scientific and religious) as “dualistic metaphysic” (i.e. realistic and transcendent). Albert points out that “the motive for choosing such a strategy is easy to see: although one is in certain possession of the truth, one has a fear of critical examination and would rather sacrifice the elementary morality of thought—that is, logic—than risk the loss of this presumably certain possession” (Albert 1985, p. 133–134). For the latest detailed criticism of religion see: Albert (2013).
See Münchhausen trilemma below.
Albert considers Heidegger’s initial question about being (Seinsfrage)—or about the meaning of being—to be completely unclear. To answer this question, Heidegger created the so-called fundamental ontology, which makes “being” the foundation of everything. Albert considers Heidegger’s fundamental ontology to be a misunderstanding of the nature of logic, and thus a “fundamental error” (Grundirrtum). Furthermore, Albert uncompromisingly criticizes Heidegger’s way of expression, which he considers “empty music of words” (begriffslose Wortmusik). See: Albert (2000), p. 121. Speaking of music in this context Hans Albert is particular fond of the musical comment on Heidegger: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3goPOfcu-JI.
English translation Treatise on Critical Reason by Mary Varney Rorty, published in 1985.
Albert was in contact with other critical rationalists like John Watkins, Imre Lakatos, Alan Musgrave and Joseph Agassi. Critical rationalists whom he directly influenced as professor in Mannheim are e.g. Alfred Bohnen, Axel Bühler, Volker Gadenne and Herbert Keuth.
The young Popper was also strongly influenced by Kant—see his first unpublished writing Die beiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntnistheorie (1931–1933). See Popper (1994), resp. 2008.
Wootton (2016) confirms that a critical realist conception of science was underlying the so called „scientific revolution“ that preceded the Enlightenment.
The trilemma is inspired by Jakob Friedrich Fries (who is also mentioned by Popper in his Logic of Scientific Discovery). Fries formulated a trilemma in which statements can be accepted either: dogmatically, supported by infinite regress or based on perceptual experience. Fries rejected the first two possibilities and chose the third option. For more see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M%C3 %BCnchhausen_trilemma.
See also Albert (1985, p. 98).
Albert refers to Popper’s term “myth of framework”, because pure theory of knowledge is based on assumptions that determine the framework of the preferred form of thought. Such frameworks seem inviolable only because they rule out methodological revisionism.
For more see Adorno et al. (1972).
For example, the lack of self-criticism of critical rationalism is blamed by the prominent critic of Albert in the German speaking countries—Gerhard Ebeling who devoted an entire book Kritischer Rationalismus? (1973) to the critique of Albert’s Traktat über kritische Vernunft. And Hans Albert replied in a similarly detailed way: in the book Theologische Holzwege. Gerhard Ebeling und der rechte Gebrauch der Vernunft (1973).
Hans and Gretel Albert translated Musgrave (1993) into German. Since Hans Albert thinks of it as presenting critical rationalism at its best, Alan Musgrave’s arguments are prominently invoked subsequently.
Andersson further argues that in principle, logic remains open to criticism; see Andersson (1998).
See Popper (2005, p. 3). Musgrave (2009, p. 205) sees it more comprehensively: “We need a logic of discovery, a logic of justification, and a logic of criticism.” “The logic of” is here meant loosely as “the way things work”. Of course, the workings of science involve also logic in a strict sense, but not only logic.
See footnote 3.
Alluding to the title of an early book in the field; (Lumsden and Wilson 2005).
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This study was funded by Grantová Agentura České Republiky (Grant number 18-08239S).
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Paitlová, J. Hans Albert’s Systematic Approach to Critical Rationalism. Homo Oecon 39, 3–24 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s41412-021-00107-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s41412-021-00107-2