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Gandhi Beyond Public Reason Liberalism

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Abstract

Since contemporary societies are deeply multicultural and plural, the partisan ideological politics obviously animate conflict of opinions and hard bargains that brings coercion into play. Thus political power is exercised to establish legitimacy and stability in the polity. The use of public reason as a tool of public inquiry is considered as most effective in deciding upon the outcomes of laws and policies. The idea of public reason is one of the contemporary innovations of liberal thinking in democracy and has gained a wider currency among the political theorists after John Rawls adoption of it into his political thinking. On this background, my concern is to see the feasibility of public reason alone into democratic outcomes through coercive use of power provided that this is widely accepted among the epistemic peers in a democracy. I propose that the exclusiveness of public reason is inadequate to arbitrate on fundamental questions of politics in situations where disagreement becomes acute because of the adversary positions held by citizens. And hence love and truth add to the rigorousness of reason as strong ideals to combat an insurgency of deadly disagreements. It is an attempt to engage love and truth to public reason to make public deliberations more productive in the arena of law making and policy outputs. The strengthening of this democratic process is pioneering effort of M. K. Gandhi.

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Notes

  1. Jurgen Habermas (1993), “Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics”; John Rawls, “Political Liberalism”; Joshua Cohen (1989), “Deliberation and democratic legitimacy”. For institutional proposals, see James Fishkin (1999), “Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform” (Yale University Press, 199); for a historical approach and a case study see Joseph Bessette (1994), The Mild Voice of Reason, University of Chicago Press, 1 994.

  2. see T. M. Scanlon (1982), “Contractualism and utilitarianism”.

  3. See Cohen, “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy,” pp. 24–25.

  4. For the deliberative theory of representation in the U.S. Constitution, see Bessette, “The Mild Voice of Reason”.

  5. Rawls, Public Reason and those who believe in this idea.

  6. Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited.

  7. Rawls (1994, 2001), Nagel (1987), Macedo (1990), D’Agostino (1996), (1991: 390–414), Gaus (1996), and MacGilvray (2004). Also see D’Agostino and Gaus (1998), D’Agostino (1990). See Ackerman (1980), Why Dialogue? (1989: 5–22), Waldron (1987: 127–50), Larmore, (1987), (1990:339–60) and Macedo (1990). For other solid criticisms, see William Galston, Liberal Purposes (New York: Cambridge, (1991: 98–117). Rorty (1989: 44–69), Gray (1989: 217–66).

  8. See Rawls (1993: 213).

  9. Habermas (1990, 1996).

  10. See Habermas (1998: 42).

  11. Rawls, Supra note, 227.

  12. Larmore (1999: 608).

  13. Larmore (1999: 607). Also see Larmore (2002), Nagel (1987).

  14. Gaus (2011: 341–46).

  15. Bird (2014), Quong (2013).

  16. Lister (2010, 2013).

  17. Rawls (1996: 213, 1999b: 573).

  18. Rawls (1999a, 1999b, 1999c b:74).

  19. Quong (2013), Rawls (1996).

  20. Rawls (1996: 9).

  21. Quong (2013).

  22. Rawls (1999a, 1999b, 1999c, a).

  23. Rawls, Political Liberalism, Supra Note -2.

  24. Ibid.

  25. Rawls (1993, 2007: 224).

  26. Rawls, (1999a, 1999b, 1999c, a: 134).

  27. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 2, at 249.

  28. Rawls, Overlapping Consensus, 9.

  29. Rawls, IPRR, supra note, 7.

  30. Rawls ‘On Public Reason’ (1994).

  31. See Rawls, supra note 2, at 133–72.

  32. Rawls, The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus, (1989: 238–9). See Political Liberalism (1993: 54–8) the burdens of reason and latter “the burdens of judgment.”.

  33. Scanlon, The Significance of Choice, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values (1987: 151).

  34. Horton (2003), de Marneffe (1994), Reidy (2000), Sandel (1998). See Wenar (1995: 32–62), Erin Kelly and Lionel McPherson (2001: 38–55), Sandel (1998: 202–210. See Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift (1996: 234–235), Simon Clarke (1999: 627–642), and Joseph Chan (2000: 5–42.).

  35. See Wolterstorff, (1997: 67–120). Also see Weithman (2002), Christopher Eberle (2002).

  36. Greenawalt (1995).

  37. Waldron (1990: 817–848).

  38. Ackerman (1994: 364–386.).

  39. Schwartzman (2004), The Completeness of Public Reason.

  40. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993: 54–58).

  41. See Cohen, If You’re an Egalitarian, How Come You’re So Rich? (2000: 171).

  42. Gaus, Justificatory Liberalism, p. 155.

  43. For the idea of a ‘sufficiently credible belief’, see Gerald Gaus, ‘The Rational, the Reasonable, and Justification’, (1995: 250–252).

  44. Hampton (1989: 806–07).

  45. Raz (1998: 42).

  46. Raz (1990: 23) cited by Quong.

  47. Parekh (1997).

  48. Gandhi, xlviii. 189, Cited in Parekh.

  49. Gandhi (1988). Hind Swaraj or Indian Home Rule.

  50. Iyer (1973, 1986), Parekh (1987, 1989), Parel (2006), Terchek (1998), Godrej (2006, 2011), Jahanbegloo (2013), Bondurant (1967), Gier (2003).

  51. Parekh (1989), Jahanbegloo (2013), Chandhoke (2008), Godrej.

  52. Bilgrami (2008).

  53. Ibid.

  54. Puri (2020) Faith and Reason: an Alternative Gandhian Understanding.

  55. Chandhoke (2008). The Quest for Justice, Economic and Political Weekly, 43(18).

  56. Parekh (1989).

  57. Young India, December 12, 1924, p.424.

  58. Gier (2003: 88–89).

  59. Harijan, July 21, 1940, cited in Terchek, p. 182.

  60. His insistence is on conversion not coercion, Young India, January 12, 1228; Young India, June 21, 1925; and Harijan, July 8, 1939 and February 10, 1946, Cited in Terchek, p. 183.

  61. Young India, November 5, 1931.

  62. Young India, September 18, 1924.

  63. Joan Bondurant, The Conquest of Violence.

  64. Young India, 5 November 1931.

  65. Parekh, p.146.

  66. Parekh, p147.

  67. Parekh, p.147.

  68. Parekh, p. 148.

  69. Parekh.

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Acknowledgements

I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. Ashok Acharya for able guiding and critical comments.

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  1. Department of Political Science, Dyal Singh College, University of Delhi, New Delhi, India

    Karunakar Patra

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Patra, K. Gandhi Beyond Public Reason Liberalism. J. Indian Counc. Philos. Res. 38, 423–444 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-021-00259-1

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