Abstract
In this paper, I try to demonstrate a problem with two medieval European views of existence: The property view and the essence view. Adopting a style of reasoning employed by the Indian Madhyamaka philosopher Nāgārjuna, I argue that both the property view and the essence view understand the relation between an object and its existence in terms of difference: The former understands the difference as the difference between an object and its property of existence, and the latter, as the difference between an object’s essence and existence. Neither understanding is without problems, and both lack explanatory power. We must reject both the views.
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20 November 2020
A Correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-020-00228-0
Notes
For an English translation of Proslogion, see Charlesworth (1965). For Descartes’ version of the ontological argument, see Descartes (1996, 45–49). On the forms of the ontological argument developed by Anselm, Descartes, Malcolm, and Plantinga, see Davies (1993, 54–60). For a schematic description of Anselm’s ontological argument, see Murray and Rea (2008, 124–25).
In Hume’s view “the idea of existence is nothing different from the idea of any object, and... when after the simple conception of anything we wou’d conceive it as existent, we in reality make no addition to or alteration on our first idea” (Hume 1965, 94). Kant followed Hume and said: “By whatever and by however many predicates we may think a thing—even if we completely determine it—we do not make the least addition to the thing when we further declare that this thing is” (Kant 1929, A600/B628; original emphasis). For Hume’s rejection of the property view, see Hume (1965, 1.2.6). For Kant’s rejection of the property view, see Kant (1929, A596/B624–A602/ B630); see also Davies (1993, 62–67).
For Meinong’s defense of the property view, see Meinong (1960). For a critique of Meinong’s property view, see Russell (1905a; 1905b; 1907). For Quine’s defense of the quantifier view, see Quine (1948). For Frege’s second-order property view, see Frege (1960, 65). For McGinn’s defense of the property view, see McGinn (2000, 15–51). For a critique of McGinn’s property view, see van Inwagen (2008).
For an English translation of On Being and Essence, see Aquinas (1968).
Siderits and Katsura (2013, 8) describe the neither identical nor distinct argument thus: “This is meant to refute a hypothesis to the effect that x and y are related in some way R. If they were, then x and y would have to be either two distinct things or else really just one and the same thing (under two different descriptions). But if x and y were distinct, then x exists apart from y. And if x exists apart from y, x is not characterized by R. So it cannot be ultimately true that x bears R to y. If, on the other hand, x and y were identical, then x would bear relation R to itself, which is absurd.” For examples of Nāgārjuna’s use of the neither identical nor distinct argument, see MMK 2.18, 10.1, 18.1, 21.10, 27.15–16. References to the MMK are to the Siderits and Katsura (2013) translation.
The idea finds clear expression in Frege’s Foundations of Arithmetic, where he says: “existence is analogous to number. Affirmation of existence is... nothing but denial of the number nought” (Frege 1960, 65).
I wish to thank Malavika Kwatra and the two anonymous reviewers of the journal for their comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper.
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Jayesh, A.K. A Madhyamaka Analysis of the Property View and the Essence View of Existence. J. Indian Counc. Philos. Res. 38, 1–5 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-020-00226-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-020-00226-2