Abstract
That we shape our beliefs to align with our actions should be of interest within philosophy of religion and philosophy generally. Cognitive dissonance, a psychological state in which an individual’s beliefs and actions do not conform with each other, presents just such a situation. The idea that cognitive dissonance, by strict evidentialist standards, compromises our epistemic integrity since cognitive dissonance causes us to hold beliefs for which we do not have evidence, recalls the exchange between William Clifford and William James in which they discuss evidentialism, the idea that we should hold no beliefs for which we do not have evidence. In this paper I draw upon extant published research concerning cognitive dissonance theory and religion. I also survey the Clifford–James debate, applying considerations from their exchange to cognitive dissonance and (religious) belief. I conclude by showing how cognitive dissonance can have ambiguous results as concerns the justification of beliefs and that philosophy could benefit from attending to factors impacting empirical aspects of belief formation such as cognitive dissonance.
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Notes
Though Barrett distinguishes between reflective and non-reflective beliefs, it is still apt to characterize belief as an elemental mental representation within the context of academic psychology.
See also: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/. The online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and Blackburn’s book both have the interesting status of being technically rigorous in their presentation of ideas while nevertheless being largely accessible to a non-specialized audience. For these reasons I regard them as good sources from which to draw what I present as a characterization of belief that is representative of how the term is used in academic philosophy.
Given the definitions of belief I stipulated for this paper, both of which emphasized the elemental nature of belief, I need to adapt the language employed in Barrett’s finding to the language of this paper in the service of clarity. That is, if belief is elemental, it is something that one either has or does not, something that cannot be strengthened or weakened. So to adapt Barrett’s findings to the language of this paper, I should say that the mid-point of psychic stress he describes strengthens the inclination to hold the beliefs one already does.
While I might have been prudentially justified in making such a wager, I still would not have been epistemically justified in doing so.
Simon Blackburn (2007) holds the former view and Richard Hall the latter in his “The Clifford/James Debate” Analytic Teaching and Philosophical Praxis pp. 79–88 (Vol. 31, no. 1), p. 82, 2010.
The one published study I was able to find, “Appraisal Distortions And Intimate Partner Violence: Gender, Power, and Interaction.” Whiting, Jason, Oka, Megan, Fife, Stephen, Journal of Marital & Family Therapy. Jun2012, Vol. 38 Issue Supp S1, pp. 133–149, on cognitive dissonance and abusive relationships was not dedicated to this topic.
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Hilberg, N. Cognitive Dissonance and “The Will to Believe”. Fudan J. Hum. Soc. Sci. 10, 87–102 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40647-016-0130-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40647-016-0130-2