Abstract
Properties and concepts are similar kinds of thing in so far as they are both typically understood to be whatever it is that predicates stand for. However, they are generally supposed to have different identity criteria: for example, heat is the same property as molecular kinetic energy, whereas the concept of heat is different from the concept of molecular kinetic energy. This paper examines whether this discrepancy is really defensible, and concludes that matters are more complex than is generally thought. The distinction between canonical and non-canonical designators, as applied to such entities as propositions, properties and concepts, is examined, as are causal realist accounts of the semantics of such terms as ‘electricity’ and ‘mass’.
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Notes
Kripke (1980) himself defines heat as whatever it is that typically causes heat sensations. But it is better to talk of overt thermal phenomena in general, rather than specifically phenomenological features, if only so as to preserve the analogy with Putnam’s discussion of water. It may be wondered whether (3) could possibly be definitional given that (2) is contingent. But we could rectify the problem by insisting that in a possible world where something other than molecular kinetic energy underlies overt thermal phenomena it is equally the case that it is not heat that so underlies it. Rather, we have ‘fools’s heat’. The point is that ‘that property which underlies overt thermal phenomena’ can be understood as a rigid designator (perhaps replacing ‘that’ by Kaplan’s ‘dthat’ would make it clearer). If ‘hot’ is defined in that way, then (2) is arguably a necessary truth. See also below.
Kripke himself simply made a mistake when he attempted to define rigidity of ‘X’ in terms of whether X might not have been X. If ‘X’ is ‘the mother of Mary’, then it is true that X might not have been X—for this woman (St Anne) was not forced to have children. However, nobody else could have been X if we accept Kripke’s story about the necessity of biological origin (a story that, incidentally, is now less plausible given what we know about genetic engineering), thus making ‘X’ rigid. For further examination of Kripke and the essential/accidental distinction, see Unwin 2020.
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