Abstract
We find that E. J. Lowe’s resolution to David Lewis’s problem of temporary intrinsics is wrong, but not quite for the reasons adduced by Lewis himself. Our discussion hinges on a connection between state-independent properties and intrinsic properties.
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Notes
In fact this is not quite right. Our best physical theory teaches us things are really patterns of excitation in (continuous) quantum fields, the excitations of which are manifested as (discrete) particles in measurement situations. However, I leave this point aside, for Lowe’s solution can be dealt on his own terms. It appears that Lowe intends a classical account too, since on a quantum account the uncertain trajectories of particles introduce their own thorny problems to do with persistence.
In fact, Lewis is only presenting Lowe’s position here; but he does appear to endorse this point nonetheless—at least, he appears to accept it as a contingent feature of reality.
The reviewer also rightly pointed out that Lowe’s own (admittedly much later) view of persons (e.g., in Lowe 2006) conflicts with the Democritean resolution, since he views persons as simple (non-composite) substances that nonetheless have temporary intrinsics (e.g., feeling pain at one time and not at another).
References
Lewis, D.K. (1983). Extrinsic properties. Philosophical Studies, 44, 197–200. Reprinted in his Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, Cambridge University Press (pp. 111–115).
Lewis, D.K. (1988). Rearrangement of particles: Reply to Lowe. Analysis, 48, 65–72. Reprinted in his Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, Cambridge University Press (pp. 187–195).
Lowe, E.J. (1987). Lewis on perdurance versus endurance. Analysis, 73(3), 152–154.
Lowe, E.J. (2006). Non-Cartesian substance dualism and the problem of mental causation. Erkenntnis, 65(1), 5–23.
Sklar, L. (1974). Space, time, and spacetime. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Weyl, H. (1952). Symmetry. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
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Rickles, D. Lowe vs Lewis vs Lowe on Temporary Intrinsics. Acta Anal 37, 173–177 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-021-00472-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-021-00472-2