Abstract
According to an important analogy between knowledge and action, as proposed by Timothy Williamson, intention aims at (intentional) action just as belief aims at knowledge. This paper investigates the analogy and discusses three difficulties that it has to face. The key is to distinguish between two different norms of intention and to see that the knowledge-action analogy is concerned with one of them only, namely, the realization norm: one ought to intentionally act if one intends to act in a certain way. A modification will be proposed that replaces intention by correct intention, and some work will be done with the aim of uncovering a frame for how to properly understand the analogy and what it ultimately is grounded on, namely, the normativity of capacities that are in the business of generating various states (beliefs, intentions) and of realizing one’s correct intentions. Thus, a modified knowledge-action analogy will be vindicated in the end.
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Notes
Cf. Sosa (2015).
Following Williamson, the implicit assumption here will be that action is meant to be intentional action. The attribute ‘intentional’ will therefore often be left out. Cf. Williamson (2018), p. 127.
Cf. Bratman (1987), for example.
Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing me to this distinction.
Congenially with the present considerations, Julian Fink has argued that the proper conclusion of practical reasoning is an intention to act in a certain way. Cf. Fink (2013). There are, of course, alternative views. Dancy (2018) argues that (intentional) action is the proper conclusion of practical reasoning.
Please note that it is entirely compatible with the proposed line of thought to think that reasons for intentions are reasons for the intended action. Cf. Shah (2008) on this kind of ‘transparency’.
Here, I am assuming, with Williamson, that the content of an intention is a course of action and not a state. Intention is more intimately tied to action than desire. Williamson has acknowledged that he has changed his view on what is analogous to belief: earlier, in Williamson (2000), he thought it is desire, now he thinks it is intention. Cf. Williamson (2018), pp. 127–129. I am also taking the liberty to use different verbs like ‘ought to’ or ‘should’ or ‘is supposed to’ in a basically synonymous way. This is meant to be just a bit of convenient linguistic variation, no difference in the concept expressed.
Cf. Foot (1972).
I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pushing me to include these clarifications on the various notions of ought.
Cf. Broome (2013), ch. 2, where Broome convincingly argues that normative oughts can be characterized as ‘owned oughts’. Joseph Raz has observed that there is a notion of responsibility that, roughly, means obligation or ought. Cf. Raz (2011), pp. 227–228. Having a responsibility and being subject to an ought are thus basically the same thing, in the relevant sense of ‘responsibility’. (Moral accountability is something different.) Interestingly, Williamson himself speaks of ‘responsibility’ and ‘discharging responsibility’ in his Williamson (2000), pp. 268–269. To prevent possible misunderstandings, please keep in mind that in this context, no assumption of voluntary control over beliefs has to be made.
Cf. Williamson (2000), pp. 238–241.
Presumably, the same point could be made by using the vernacular of normative reasons. Cf. Hofmann (2020) for an account of how correctness and normative reasons might be related. The guiding idea is John Broome’s: normative reasons are explainers of some normative standing, such as correctness or ought. Cf. Broome (2004).
Many thanks to an anonymous referee who asked me to describe the case of Judy more clearly.
It is plausible to think that the executional capacity comprises the agent’s abilities to directly realize her intentions. The actions that the agent is able to directly perform are often called ‘simple actions’.
It is a further and interesting question with of these capacities can count as ‘rational’. In my view, the theoretical capacity to form belief (knowledge) and the practical capacity to form intention (correct intention) clearly count as rational since they are in the business of responding to reasons. Perception is rather concerned with detecting (representing) the facts that are the reasons (assuming factualism about reasons). Prima facie, at least, the executional capacity does not seem to be a rational capacity. In general, things are complicated by the fact that the rational capacities remain in control of the execution of action by allowing the agent to revise her intention at any point. For lots of insights on these complex matters, see, for example, Soteriou (2020).
The excuse strategy has become quite prominent recently. Among the authors which have discussed or appealed to it are Alvarez and Littlejohn (2017), Boult (2017), Brown (2020), Littlejohn (forthcoming), and Williamson (forthcoming).
Note that in teleofunctionalist thinking, the frequent occurrence of mistakes is a common theme. Things have to go well sufficiently often, but this can be rather rarely. No problem if we think of epistemic normativity as grounded in teleofunctions. For such a teleofunctionalist view, see, e.g., Graham (2019). Of course, the idea could be generalized: perhaps practical normativity is also grounded in teleofunctions. For an account along these lines, see Bloomfield (2018), for example.
If Judy did not know of any means to realize her intention to phi, not even the illegitimate way of psi-ing, the situation would be essentially the same. An unfortunate mistake that she cannot be held accountable for (at least as long as she is not negligent about finding proper means for phi-ing).
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Acknowledgements
“I am grateful to the participants of the conference “Norms and Reasons” that took place at the Institute of Philosophy of the University of Zurich, organized by Eva Schmidt and Hans-Johann Glock, in November 2018 where I presented an earlier version of this paper.”
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Hofmann, F. Two Norms of Intention: a Vindication of Williamson’s Knowledge-Action Analogy. Acta Anal 36, 563–572 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-021-00465-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-021-00465-1