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Notes
For the purposes of this paper, I assume that genuine dispositional properties possess dispositional essences which include dispositions to give characteristic manifestations in response to characteristic stimuli.
Characteristic example is the Regress of Powers objection: in a dispositional monistic world, each dispositional property owes its identity to another in a way that generates either a vicious infinite regress or a vicious circle (Lowe 2006, 138).
Dispositional realists are all those philosophers who admit the existence of fundamental properties and/or relations which are genuinely and irreducibly dispositional.
Since I assume that the dispositional/categorical distinction is exhaustive, all non-dispositional features are categorical.
Symmetries can be local or global depending on whether the corresponding transformation (for instance, the angle of rotation for the symmetries in question) is a function of spacetime points or not, respectively. The local versions of the symmetries U(1), SU(2) and SU(3) (the so-called gauge symmetries) are, according to the Standard Model for the fundamental interactions, central elements for the theoretical explanation of the dynamical behaviour of elementary physical systems. For a readable and (to a certain extent) non-technical introduction to the notion of symmetry, see Rosen (2008).
The Categorical-Dispositional distinction is about properties (and relations). Given that the majority of metaphysicians assume that properties (if instantiated) are instantiated by objects, the whole debate largely concerns the properties of objects. Nevertheless, Schaffer (2003) discusses the possibility of ‘free-floating’ properties (not instantiated by objects), while ontic structural realists debate about the dispositionality of fundamental structures (see French (forthcoming) and Esfeld (2009); see also Lyre (2012) and Livanios (2014)). It seems then that there is conceptual room for the debate to take place outside the context of objects’ properties. Both Schaffer’s possibility and the ontic structuralistic thesis are interesting in their own right, but Molnar is explicit (2003, 160–1) that he argues for the non-dispositionality of some of the properties of objects. Hence, in this paper, the discussion is limited to the latter. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for provoking me to clarify this point. (Incidentally, if we take seriously the ‘free-floating’ possibility, haecceity is not an S-property after all. The relevant S-operation (permutation of particles) do not apply in that case.)
The metaphysical view of Monadicism (as I here define it) is not equivalent to relation-internalism. The latter view consists in the claim that all relations between objects are grounded in the monadic intrinsic properties of their bearers. Monadicism, however, allows the possibility of relations being grounded in extrinsic monadic properties. This is allegedly the case with the spatiotemporal relations and their associated locations.
Bird thinks that one kind of manifestation is privileged among the others. It is the one that is related to the law of gravitation. In his own words, ‘…given the general theory of relativity, it is natural to see gravitational force as participating in the essence of spatial properties and relations’. (2007a, 162). Bird’s choice is clearly justified in the context of science-informed metaphysics because Einstein’s masterpiece is the best spacetime theory we currently have. It also grounds an alternative way of defence of the dispositionality of spatiotemporal relations.
Here and below, when I talk about different and same powers, respectively, I refer to types. I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to clarify that.
Assumption (ii) implicitly introduces a powers-insensitive element to the nature of dispositional properties and raises problems for the epistemic individuation of properties having the same powers.
The appeal to these properties is justified given that (a) they are plausible candidates for the fundamental features of our world, and (b) the issue of the truth of Dispositional Monism concerns only the fundamental properties and relations. For arguments in favour of the existence of extrinsic, but most probably non-fundamental, dispositional properties, see McKitrick (2003).
In spite of his claim that he will defend the intrinsicness conjecture mainly by a posteriori reasons, Molnar eventually offers only an explanation of why we can truly predicate extrinsic dispositional predicates though in fact there are no extrinsic dispositional properties (2003, 109–10).
A reviewer has noticed that a continuously and necessarily manifested dispositional property is in fact a categorical one. In my view, however, the definitional characteristic of a dispositional property has nothing to do with the possibility of its manifestation. As I have previously remarked, a dispositional property is a constituent of an appropriate state of affairs which is by itself (part of) a minimal truthmaker for the truths associated with its causal roles.
Of course, one might reject the metaphysical necessity of field-generation by the properties in question and claim that in other possible worlds with alien laws those properties can exist unaccompanied. Or, she might deny that the manifestation of, e.g. electric charge is the generation of an electromagnetic field around it. In any case, however, the issue remains controversial.
Of course, here I presume, for the sake of the discussion, that talking about physical intentionality does make sense.
An alternative account could be to interpret a necessarily and continuously manifested dispositional property as a four-dimensional structural property containing temporal parts corresponding to its manifestation. For example, in Esfeld and Sachse’s proposal, one of those parts would be the event of the generation of the corresponding field, while the others would be the (complex) events of the field being ‘there’ (in a certain state) in all future moments. According to such an account, in each moment of its existence, a necessarily and continuously manifested property, though (‘partially’) manifested, can ‘point’ to the future parts of its manifestation. For the inspiration for this proposal, see Tugby’s (2013) comments on the manifestations as structural constituents.
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I would like to thank an anonymous referee for her/his useful comments on earlier versions of this paper.
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Livanios, V. The Categorical-Dispositional Distinction, Locations and Symmetry Operations. Acta Anal 32, 133–144 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-016-0303-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-016-0303-2