Abstract
Ned Markosian argues (Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76:213-228, 1998a; Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82:332-340, 2004a, The Monist 87:405-428, 2004b) that simples are ‘maximally continuous’ entities. This leads him to conclude that there could be non-particular ‘stuff’ in addition to things. I first show how an ensuing debate on this issue McDaniel (Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81(2):265-275, 2003); Markosian (Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82:332-340, 2004a) ended in deadlock. I attempt to break the deadlock. Markosian’s view entails stuff-thing coincidence, which I show is just as problematic as the more oft-discussed thing-thing coincidence. Also, the view entails that every particular is only contingently so. If there is a world W like our own, but with ether, then there would be only one object in W. But, since merely adding ether to a world does not destroy the entities in it, then W contains counterparts of all the entities in the actual world—they just are not things. Hence, if simples are maximally continuous, then every actual particular is only contingently so. This in turn entails the following disjunction: (i) identity is contingent or intransitive, or (ii) there are no things at all in the actual world, or (iii) the distinction between stuff and things is one without a difference. I recommend that we reject this stuff-thing dualism.
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Notes
Markosian 1998a: 214. Markosian also states that answers to the Simple Question will typically be instances of this schema: (S) Necessarily, x is a simple iff __________________; where the blank ought be filled in by a substantive criterion.
Markosian 1998a: 222. Note that Markosian’s definitions in 1998a and 2004b are based on those in Richard Cartwright’s classic ‘Scattered Objects’ (in Lehrer 1975: 153-171). But, where Markosian speaks of an object’s spatial continuity or not Cartwright speaks of its connectedness or not. Note, a spatially continuous object is one that occupies a continuous region of space, regardless of the shape. There must be no gaps.
All of the following terms have been used to indicate particular entities: thing, object, entity, being, individual, item, unity, particular, term, existent, substance, and so on. However, the term ‘substance’ (at least in its classical use) connotes independent existence, whereas ‘particular’ does not. (Tropes, if there are any, are particular, but do not have independent existence). ‘Term’, which Russell used to refer in the widest possible sense, would seem also to refer to stuff such as the gold on my finger, since the gold exists. But ‘term’, is often equated with ‘individual,’ which usually connotes particularity, thus seemingly begging the question against the stuff ontologist in regards to whether all of being might contain the non-particulate. We can see by the following how the question is begged against the stuff ontologist: “Whatever may be an object of thought, or may occur in any true or false proposition, or can be counted as one, I call a term. This, then, is the widest word in the philosophical vocabulary. I shall use as synonymous with it the words unit, individual, and entity. The first two emphasize the fact that every term is one, while the third is derived from the fact that every term has being, i.e. is in some sense. A man, a moment, a number, a class, a relation, a chimera, or anything else that can be mentioned, is sure to be a term.” (Russell 1937, p. 43). However, some stuff or process theorists use ‘individual’ to refer in the widest possible sense, so as to be neutral on the question of whether all existents or items are objects: “Dynamic masses are non-countable, non-particular individuals...” (Seibt 2000, p. 241). There is the additional problem of differentiating between what we could call the formal or logical notion of ‘thing’, and the meaty notion of thing, such as ‘physical object’ or a particular which falls under a (count) substance sortal. (Note that nothing in the following paper will depend on distinguishing between thin and thick particulars, namely, distinguishing between bare substrata alone and substrata plus their properties). There is also the problem that every seemingly grammatical way to talk about stuff or stuffs, where we pick them out with singular reference, seemingly implies that the referents of stuff-talk are particulars. This quote by Mill I think shows the difficulty with this (although with an analogue, attributes, rather than stuff):
When we shall have occasion for a name which shall be capable of denoting whatever exists ... there is hardly a word applicable to the purpose which is not also ... taken in a sense in which it denotes only substances. But substances are not all that exists; attributes, if such things are to be spoken of, must be said to exist ... . Yet when we speak of an object, or of a thing, we are almost always supposed to mean a substance ... . If, rejecting the word Thing, we endeavor to find another of more general import, a word denoting all that exists.... no word might be presumed fitter ... than being ... . But this word ... is still more completely spoiled for the purpose ... . Being is, by custom, exactly synonymous with substance ... Attributes are never called Beings ... . In consequence of this perversion of the word Being, philosophers ... laid their hands upon the word Entity ... . Yet if you call virtue an entity, you are ... suspected of believing it to be a substance ... . Every word which was originally intended to connote mere existence, seems, after a time, to enlarge its connotation to separate existence ...” . (Mill 1874, 30-31. Quote and paraphrase from Laycock 2002, fn 3).
With this stew of usage, we can do two things—despair, or stipulate. I choose the latter. More ideally, I think, the stuff/thing distinction should be in large part constrained by the mass-noun/count-noun distinction. But, in Markosian’s work on stuff, he does not really track this distinction. ‘Portions’ can be pluralized, counted, and in many ways act exactly the same as the referents of count-nouns, namely, things. For some of the best work on the mass-noun/count-noun distinction, see Pelletier and Schubert (1989). For the implicit commitment by most metaphysicians to the ‘object-thesis’, or the notion that all of being is ultimately particular, see Laycock (2002).
I believe Laycock first uses the term ‘concrete non-particulars’ in Laycock (1975).
See, for instance, the Metaphysics 1019a3-14. Aristotle, however, is far more ambivalent about potential parts in On Generation and Corruption 315b24-317a18. In regards to Hobbes, see De Corpore i.95-7, 108 in Molesworth (1992), and Thomas White’s ‘De Mundo’ Examined, in Whitmore Jones (1976), p. 29. My source for Hobbes on this topic is Holden (2004), where one will find an excellent treatment of the debate between actual and potential parts theorists in the Early Modern period.
Markosian 1998a: 224. Note some similarities of conceptual parts with what Hume in the Treatise calls mere ‘distinctions of reason.’ (1.1.7)
Note that this use of ‘portion’ is intended to be semi-stipulative, not part of an analysis of ‘portion’.
Actual parts theorists, in the Early Modern period, include Reid, Descartes, Charleton, Galileo, Clarke, and many more. (see Holden 2004: chapter 2). For a direct statement, here is Thomas Reid: 'There seems to be nothing more evident than that all bodies must consist of parts, and that every part of a body is a body, and a distinct being, which may exist without the other parts. .. .when (matter) is divided into parts, every part is a being or substance distinct from all the other parts, and was so even before the division.' (Reid 1863 edn: i323). Most current analytic metaphysicians either explicitly avow actual parts doctrine, or at least implicitly support it. This seems to be the default position. For a current statement of the view, see Zimmerman 1996: 8.
Namely, ‘(2) For every object, and for every time at which that object is present, there is exactly one portion of matter that constitutes that object at that time.’ Markosian 2004b: 409, italics his.
Actually, Markosian himself embraces a principle even stronger than DAUPO in 2004a. He accepts the “Doctrine of Wholly Arbitrary Portions” (DWAP), which states ‘For every region of space, R, such that every point in R is filled with matter, there is a portion of matter that exactly fills R’ (2004a: 337).
Alternatively, we could assume, incorrectly, I think, that being an object is a qualitative property. Thanks go to Kris McDaniel for some help and suggestions on this section.
I think this is partly because McDaniel does not make it crystal clear that DAUPO is an essential part of his argument.
See, for instance, Burke 1994, section VI. Also, Henry Laycock in his 2006, shows his relative insouciance about the stuff-thing coincidence issue, since his position entails a thoroughgoing coincidence of stuff and things, but he does not much discuss it.
Markosian happily embraces coincidence. See 2004b: 408-9. Also, in 2004b, section 4, Markosian often asserts that we can (relatively) unproblematically have the coincidence between a person and some non-particular stuff which constitutes them.
See esp. Zimmerman 1995 and Burke 1994. Of course, some think that coincidence, and the supervenience objection in particular, is not necessarily a problem for the three dimensionalist (see Wasserman 2002 and Sider 2008a, b). I’m not convinced, but tackling this issue would take us outside of the scope of this paper.
See Burke (1994) for arguments like this.
Later I will discuss the nearest principle to this one that has some plausibility, which is that what kind of thing a thing is is extrinsic. This is somewhat reasonable, but it does not support Markosian’s principle, which states that it is extrinsic whether an entity is a thing at all.
When we suppose that at least part of the persons body comes into perfect contact with at least some of the water.
Note that I am skipping over a lot of interesting detail, in order to get to the parts salient for the too-many-thinkers objection.
And, if the mass of matter is a person—who would it be except Queen Elizabeth?
Of course, if stuff Juliet scratches her nose, she goes out of existence too. It’s pretty rough, and short, being Juliet on Markosian’s account. Of course, if he wants to say that Juliet will continue existing even if she touches Romeo while scratching her nose, then there must be at least three people in the same place at the same time. Thanks to Kris McDaniel for help and suggestions on this point.
I apologize for the ugly usage here and in what follows. I do not know how to improve on this.
I do argue for a position like this in Steen (2008).
‘every portion of matter has each of its sub-portions essentially’ (Markosian 2004b: 411).
‘there is some matter such that that matter constitutes that object at that time and for any other matter it is not the case that...’ Ibid., p. 409, emphases mine.
‘When a name is first introduced, it is introduced in connection with an episode of some sortal property...sooner or later, the name comes to be correlated with an episode of some sortal, with the correlation working as follows. For any time at which the name has a referent, the referent of the name at that time is whatever portion of stuff happens to be involved in the episode in question at that time.’ Markosian 2004b: 421-422.
‘the relation of parthood that relates a thing to a thing and the relation of parthood that relates a portion of stuff to a portion of stuff are the same relation.’ Ibid., p. 411.
Markosian 2004a: 339-40.
I assume that our world is not already like this.
This is much like Spinoza (and Descartes) thought the world is.
‘Albert Michelson...and Edward Morley...argued that if we were drifting through a sea of ether, like a fish in water, then, if light was a wave in the ether, a light beam shining in the direction of the Earth’s motion should behave slightly differently from a beam traveling at right angles to the motion. Using extremely sensitive methods, they found no difference whatsoever. This was one of the great null experiments of all time.’ Silver 1998: 198.
For an interesting discussion of the possibility of a plenum world, see Rea (2001). It should be noted that there Rea's treatment is kinder to Markosian's analysis of simples (2001: 141-2). Rea, however, uses Markosian's analysis of what it takes to be a simple, in combination with Rea's other principles which can be used to establish that there is a Plenum World, to support the idea that our world is one simple object, which Markosian does not endorse. Since Rea's arguments for believing that the world is one single object also supports the idea that there is non-particular stuff, namely, any smaller-than-whole-world-sized portions of matter, it behooves me to say something about his paper. First, if Rea is right, then all the criticisms I rally against Markosian in section 4 based on the idea of 'contingent particularity' also count against Rea's proposal. Furthermore, crucial to getting Rea’s argument off the ground is what he calls the “Plenum Principle,” which is the principle that 'Spacetime is a connected set of points, and every region of spacetime, no matter how small, is filled by matter,' (2001: 130). He gives no argument for this very controversial principle, except by noting that it is consistent with contemporary physical theory and is often 'taken for granted as an idealizing assumption.' (2001: 130). The fact that it is an ‘idealized’ assumption actually undermines the notion that we should take it as strictly speaking true, since idealizing assumptions are usually regarded as useful fictions, such as how formalist mathematicians regard limits and actual infinite collections. Furthermore, it is dogma that what made the revolutionary Michelson-Morley experiment of 1887 revolutionary is that it proved that the Plenum Principle is false. (See the previous footnote). Since the Plenum Principle is a crucial premise that is foundational for all of the arguments in Rea’s paper, we can safely ignore that something like Eleatic Monism has been established there (see pp 130-1). Note, however, that Rea in this article is not quite attempting to prove that Eleatic Monism is true, but merely that it is reasonable to believe, or at least not obviously false. In that respect, he succeeded. If the Plenum Principle is true, as well as Rea’s other premises, then Eleatic Monism is reasonable to believe. Also, if MaxCon is true, and the Plenum Principle is true, then we should believe in Eleatic Monism. But, since Eleatic Monism is unreasonable to believe, because of the problems of contingent particularity I talk about in section 4, then it must be that at least one of MaxCon or the Plenum Principle is false. I believe they both are. Much work on these issues has come out after the writing of this paper, but before it was published (see Eklund (2008), Horgan and Potrč (2008), Schaffer (2010a, b, 2009) and Sider (2008a, b).
Thanks to Irem Kurtsal Steen for some very helpful comments and suggestions on the foregoing section.
Note, he doesn’t actually maintain this. He doesn’t talk about Plenum World at all. But, he would have to, if he wanted to hold on to MaxCon.
Many thanks go to Andre Gallois, Mark Heller, Kris McDaniel, Tom McKay, Adam Sennet, Irem Kurtsal Steen, and Dean Zimmerman for reading earlier drafts of this material, and, again to Tom McKay, for reading and commenting on a later draft. I would especially like to thank Kris McDaniel for his very helpful and extensive comments and suggestions. Also, thanks go to a referee for many helpful suggestions, including pointing out how Markosian's account threatens the transitivity of identity.
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Steen, M. More Problems for MaxCon: Contingent Particularity and Stuff-Thing Coincidence. Acta Anal 26, 135–154 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-010-0109-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-010-0109-6