Abstract
In this paper I argue against a criticism by Matthew Weiner to Grice’s thesis that cancellability is a necessary condition for conversational implicature. I argue that the purported counterexamples fail because the supposed failed cancellation in the cases Weiner presents is not meant as a cancellation but as a reinforcement of the implicature. I moreover point out that there are special situations in which the supposed cancellation may really work as a cancellation.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Austin, J. L. (1962). How to Do Things with Words. Reprinted, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, second edition 1975.
Borge, S. (1997). The Rationale of Communication. In P. Weingartner, G. Schurz & G. Dorn (Eds.), The Role of Pragmatics (pp. 77–82). Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Cappelen, H., & Lepore, E. (1997). On the Alleged Connection Between Indirect Speech and the Theory of Meaning. Mind and Language, 12, 278–296.
Grice, H. P. (1989a). Logic and Conversation. In Studies in the Way of Words (pp. 24–40). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Grice, H. P. (1989b). Further Notes on Logic and Conversation. In Studies in the Way of Words (pp. 41–57). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Larson, R., & Segal, G. (1995). Knowledge of Meaning: An Introduction to Semantic Theory. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
Neale, S. (1992). Paul Grice and the Philosophy of Language. Linguistics and Philosophy, 15, 509–559.
Weiner, M. (2006). Are All Conversational Implicatures Cancellable? Analysis, 66(2), 127–130.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Borge, S. Conversational Implicatures and Cancellability. Acta Anal 24, 149–154 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-009-0049-1
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-009-0049-1