Abstract
We sketch the view we call contextual semantics. It asserts that truth is semantically correct affirmability under contextually variable semantic standards, that truth is frequently an indirect form of correspondence between thought/language and the world, and that many Quinean commitments are not genuine ontological commitments. We argue that contextualist semantics fits very naturally with the view that the pertinent semantic standards are particularist rather than being systematizable as exceptionless general principles.
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Horgan, T., Potrč, M. Particularist semantic normativity. Acta Anal 21, 45–61 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-006-1014-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-006-1014-x