Abstract
In this paper, I provide a philosophical analysis of Pāli texts that treat of a special kind of mental event called bhavaṅga citta. This mental event is a primal sentient consciousness, a passive form of basal awareness that individuates sentient beings as the type of being that they are. My aims with this analysis are twofold, one genealogical and reconstructive, the other systematic. On the genealogical and reconstructive side, I argue for a distinction between two kinds of continuity that are at work in explaining the temporal structure of experience in Pāli Buddhist philosophy. Call these two forms of continuity ‘diachronic’ and ‘affective-motivational’ continuity, respectively. In my analysis of these two forms of continuity, I will focus on the coherence of bhavaṅga citta in its Abhidhammic context. My contention is that the commentarial account of bhavaṅga citta has the resources to explain diachronic continuity but struggles to give a fully workable account of affective-motivational continuity. I argue that the novel view of mental continuity offered by the early twentieth century Burmese monastic exegete Ledi Sayadaw (1846–1923) offers another intriguing account of mental continuity, one that can help to explain affective-motivational continuity. Systematically speaking, in spelling out the dynamics of this distinction between types of mental continuity in connection with bhavaṅga, I offer a cross-cultural philosophical analysis of the deep structure of the mind and how affective processes below the threshold of ordinary habits of attention have a profound conditioning effect on our conscious relationship with the world.
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Notes
The Paṭṭhāna and Milinda Pañha were probably composed some time in the 2nd century CE. Buddhaghosa is thought to have been active during the fifth century CE, thus we can date the Visuddhimagga and the other commentaries around this time. The Sangaha is thought to have been composed in the eleventh or twelfth century CE (see Cousins 1981 for more). For a recent and exceptional treatment of Buddhaghosa’s commentarial approach to the Pāli canon, see Heim (2018).
In the main, I will focus on Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga, but I also make reference to the Atthasālinī. I refer to the commentarial tradition in general in terms of Buddhaghosa’s authorship, but it is important to note that even though most of these works are attributed to Buddhaghosa, von Hinüber (2000, 151) has argued convincingly that Buddhaghosa is probably not the sole author of the Atthasālinī. That being said, several scholars have been content to attribute the Asl to Buddhaghosa (e.g. Heim 2018; Ganeri 2017).
My analysis closely follows Seven Collins’s chapter on bhavaṅga in Selfless Persons (1982, 240 ff.). I will take some issue with Collins's analyses in §§3.2 and 3.3.
See Harvey (1995, 145-6) for a summary and visual representation of this process.
Gethin (1994, 29) points out that it’s not entirely clear why perceptual clusters would have gaps in the first place. Why not just have each cluster be continuous with the next? Why posit a lull between each? Gethin’s proposal is to think of bhavaṅga citta as individuating subjects as psychologically specific persons and members of their species. On this reading, there are specifically human bhavaṅga citta-s. The idea here is that with every act of perception and cognition, the mind relaxes back into a passive state of mind that makes one the person and type of being that they are. As will become clear, my view is friendly to Gethin’s.
The full passage reads: ‘When the rebirth-linking consciousness has ceased, then, following on whatever kind of rebirth-linking it may be, the same kinds, being the result of that same kamma whatever it may be, occur as life-continuum consciousness with that same object; and again those same kinds. And as long as there is no other kind of arising of consciousness to interrupt the continuity, they also go on occurring endlessly in periods of dreamless sleep, etc., like the current of a river.’ Here, I follow Ñāṇamoli’s (2000) translation verbatim. In Pāli: paṭisandhiviññāṇe pana niruddhe taṃ taṃ paṭisandhiviññāṇamanubandhamānaṃ tassa tasseva kammassa vipākabhūtaṃ tasmiññeva ārammaṇe tādisameva bhavaṅgaviññāṇaṃ nāma pavattati, punapi tādisanti evaṃ asati santānavinivattake aññasmiṃ cittuppāde nadīsotaṃ viya supinaṃ apassato niddokkamanakālādīsu aparimāṇasaṅkhyampi pavattatiyevāti.
All translations from the Pāli are my own, unless otherwise indicated. I provide PTS pagination in my referencing as is standard and to facilitate reference to extant English translations where necessary. When citing the Visuddhimagga, I include first the PTS page number followed by the chapter and paragraph numbers from Ñāṇamoli’s (2000) translation. I have included references to available English translations in my references at the end of the paper. I have consulted the CST4 edition of the tipiṭaka for the Romanized Pāli text in conjunction with the Digital Pāli Reader and suttacentral.net.
yo so, mahārāja supinaṃ passati, na so niddāyanto passati, nāpi jāgaranto passati. api ca okkante middhe asampatte bhavaṅge etthantare supinaṃ passati. middhasamārūḷhassa, mahārāja, cittaṃ bhavaṅgagataṃ hoti, bhavaṅgagataṃ cittaṃ nappavattati, appavattaṃ cittaṃ sukhadukkhaṃ nappajānāti, appaṭivijānantassa supino na hoti, pavattamāne citte supinaṃ passati. yathā, mahārāja, timire andhakāre appabhāse suparisuddhepi ādāse chāyā na dissati, evameva kho, mahārāja, middhasamārūḷhe citte bhavaṅgagate tiṭṭhamānepi sarīre cittaṃ appavattaṃ hoti, appavatte citte supinaṃ na passati. yathā, mahārāja, ādāso, evaṃ sarīraṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ; yathā andhakāro, evaṃ middhaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ; yathā āloko, evaṃ cittaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ.
Collins points out that there is a natural tendency to associate meditative cessation and dreamless sleep (1982, 245). From a more general Indian philosophical context, this association tends to be quite close (Thompson 2015, 8). Nevertheless, as will become clear presently, the Theravāda texts maintain that there is good reason to think that these two states are importantly divergent.
athekaṃ vā dve vā cittavāre atikkamitvā acittako hoti, nirodhaṃ phusati.
For more, See Griffiths (1986, ch. 1).
This raises a question as to how this citta should be characterized first-personally which I address in §3.1.
This translation follows Bhikkhu Bodhi’s (2012) English edition of the AN.
“pabhassaramidaṃ, bhikkhave, cittaṃ. tañca kho āgantukehi upakkilesehi upakkiliṭṭhaṃ. taṃ assutavā puthujjano yathābhūtaṃ nappajānāti. tasmā ‘assutavato puthujjanassa cittabhāvanā natthī’ti vadāmī”ti.
“pabhassaramidaṃ, bhikkhave, cittaṃ. tañca kho āgantukehi upakkilesehi vippamuttaṃ. taṃ sutavā ariyasāvako yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti. tasmā ‘sutavato ariyasāvakassa cittabhāvanā atthī’ti vadāmī”ti.
It is important to note that in the sutta literature there is no single account of what liberating insight consists in. There are many overlapping accounts of how the Buddha became enlightened and how he instructs his disciplines to work for enlightenment. For a philosophically sophisticated analysis of these complexities, see Shulman (2014). An earlier and important treatment of this topic can be found in Schmithausen (1981).
tameva parisuddhaṭṭhena paṇḍaraṃ. bhavaṅgaṃ sandhāyetaṃ vuttaṃ.
Ven. Anālayo Bhikkhu points out (in personal correspondence, see also Anālayo 2017) that these references to luminosity are not present in the āgama parallels. He takes this lack of parallelism to indicate that luminosity should not be associated with awakening in early Buddhism but only with the later commentarial tradition. This is plausible if we confine our analysis of luminosity to the literal sense of the mind being luminous, but perhaps not so if we keep to the figurative sense of luminosity as a metaphor for knowledge. This is because awakening is preceded by various knowledges and itself is a special kind of knowledge of the unconditioned element (nibbāna). For an alternative view that preserves the association of luminosity between the Pāli texts and their Chinese parallels, see Cousins (1981).
As a developed theory, the bhavaṅga citta is clearly a phenomenon of the commentaries. However, there is quite a bit of evidence to suggest that at least some of its conceptual origins are to be found in the Sutta material. I will treat of this evidence in the current section. For an argument that there is a developed theory of bhavaṅga in the pre-commentarial abhidhamma itself, see Cousins (1981).
See also, SN II 104 and Thompson (2015, 24)
‘viññāṇapaccayā nāmarūpan’ti iti kho panetaṃ vuttaṃ, tadānanda, imināpetaṃ pariyāyena veditabbaṃ, yathā viññāṇapaccayā nāmarūpaṃ. viññāṇañca hi, ānanda, mātukucchismiṃ na okkamissatha, api nu kho nāmarūpaṃ mātukucchismiṃ samuccissathā”ti? “no hetaṃ, bhante”. “viññāṇañca hi, ānanda, mātukucchismiṃ okkamitvā vokkamissatha, api nu kho nāmarūpaṃ itthattāya abhinibbattissathā”ti? “no hetaṃ, bhante”. “viññāṇañca hi, ānanda, daharasseva sato vocchijjissatha kumārakassa vā kumārikāya vā, api nu kho nāmarūpaṃ vuddhiṃ virūḷhiṃ vepullaṃ āpajjissathā”ti? “no hetaṃ, bhante”. “tasmātihānanda, eseva hetu etaṃ nidānaṃ esa samudayo esa paccayo nāmarūpassa—yadidaṃ viññāṇaṃ.
‘nāmarūpapaccayā viññāṇan’ti iti kho panetaṃ vuttaṃ, tadānanda, imināpetaṃ pariyāyena veditabbaṃ, yathā nāmarūpapaccayā viññāṇaṃ. viññāṇañca hi, ānanda, nāmarūpe patiṭṭhaṃ na labhissatha, api nu kho āyatiṃ jātijarāmaraṇaṃ dukkhasamudayasambhavo paññāyethā”ti? “no hetaṃ, bhante”. “tasmātihānanda, eseva hetu etaṃ nidānaṃ esa samudayo esa paccayo viññāṇassa yadidaṃ nāmarūpaṃ. ettāvatā kho, ānanda, jāyetha vā jīyetha vā mīyetha vā cavetha vā upapajjetha vā. ettāvatā adhivacanapatho, ettāvatā niruttipatho, ettāvatā paññattipatho, ettāvatā paññāvacaraṃ, ettāvatā vaṭṭaṃ vattati itthattaṃ paññāpanāya yadidaṃ nāmarūpaṃ saha viññāṇena aññamaññapaccayatā pavattati.
vedanā, saññā, cetanā, phasso, manasikāro—idaṃ vuccati nāmaṃ. cattāro ca mahābhūtā, catunnañca mahābhūtānaṃ upādāyarūpaṃ. idaṃ vuccati rūpaṃ. iti idañca nāmaṃ, idañca rūpaṃ. idaṃ vuccati, bhikkhave, nāmarūpaṃ.
In contemporary discussion, this kind of mentality has been called 'the feeling of being alive'. This latter term refers to a general sense of awareness, often thought to be grounded in our sense of affective bodily subjectivity (Craig 2010; Damasio 1999; Thompson 2007). The comparison here is apt insofar as both notions refer to a basic sentience. The comparison is a stretch insofar as for Buddhist philosophers, primal viññāṇa is not physical in any way. From an abhidhammic perspective, it would probably be fair to call the Buddhists event or trope dualists. However, the contemporary notion of the 'feeling of being alive' is intrinsically linked to the body.
For a systematic analysis of the concept of anusaya in Pāli Buddhism see Smith (2019).
This translation follows Bodhi (1995): vedanāya rāgānusayo anuseti, dukkhāya vedanāya paṭighānusayo anuseti, adukkhamasukhāya vedanāya avijjānusayo anusetī”ti
viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ anantaṃ sabbato pabhaṃ
kattha āpo ca pathavī, tejo vāyo na gādhati | kattha dīghañca rassañca, aṇuṃ thūlaṃ subhāsubhaṃ | kattha nāmañca rūpañca, asesaṃ uparujjhati ||
Norman (1987) points out that it is likely that pabhaṃ or ‘luminous’ is transformed from pahaṃ, ‘to give up’. Anālayo (2017) argues that the explicit association of luminosity and consciousness can be questioned from the standpoint of trying to articulate the early Buddhist position. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the Buddhaghosa took this association to be absolutely central. My thanks to Anālayo Bhikkhu for discussion on this matter.
There is more that could be said here but I cannot delve into this issue further because of constraints of space and relevance.
What this distinction actually amounts to is not agreed upon by philosophers. Some think this distinction marks a difference between kinds of mental states and how they are individuated (Chalmers 1996). Others think that the difference is superficial and that phenomenality can ultimately be reduced to access (Dennett 1991). In the case of access consciousness, mental states are individuated according to their causal role in the information processing of a mind-realizing system like the human brain. By contrast, with phenomenal consciousness, such mental states are individuated by the way it feels to have them for subjects that experience the world in virtue of being in such states. A fuller analysis of these important notions is beyond the scope of this paper.
Collins goes on to differentiate his ambiguous notion of unconscious from a Freudian use of the term. The main conceptual axis he uses to effect this distinction is one between motivation and mere continuity. He claims that the bhavaṅga citta has no motivational role to play, which makes it importantly distinct from its Freudian counterpart. I will have an occasion to return to this point in §3.3.
This final remark about bhavaṅga citta having an object is a bit quick. The question of whether or not bhavaṅga is properly an intentional mental state with an object is a difficult question. I address it below.
This translation follows Ñāṇamoli (2000): paṭisandhiviññāṇe pana niruddhe taṃ taṃ paṭisandhiviññāṇamanubandhamānaṃ tassa tasseva kammassa vipākabhūtaṃ tasmiññeva ārammaṇe tādisameva bhavaṅgaviññāṇaṃ nāma pavattati
ārammaṇaṇ cintetī ti cittaṃ
For an extended critical analysis of Ganeri’s (2017) account of Buddhaghosa’s philosophy, see Smith (forthcoming).
This translation and the two below from the same sutta follow Bodhi (2000): “nāhaṃ, bhikkhave, gamanena lokassa antaṃ ñāteyyaṃ, daṭṭheyyaṃ, patteyyanti vadāmi. na ca panāhaṃ, bhikkhave, appatvā lokassa antaṃ dukkhassa antakiriyaṃ vadāmī”ti.
yena kho, āvuso, lokasmiṃ lokasaññī hoti lokamānī—ayaṃ vuccati ariyassa vinaye loko.
Cited by Coseru (2015, 229)
kena cāvuso, lokasmiṃ lokasaññī hoti lokamānī? Cakkhunā kho, āvuso, lokasmiṃ lokasaññī hoti lokamānī Sotena kho, āvuso…ghānena kho, āvuso…jivhāya kho, āvuso...kāyena kho, āvuso…manena kho, āvuso lokasmiṃ lokasaññī hoti lokamānī.
The Abhidharmikas would of course have no objection to this reading of the basic thrust of Buddhist soteriology. The issue at hand is whether their fully worked out taxonomy of causally connected mental events is capable of adequately explaining the Buddhist view when it is framed in this way. I am arguing that they cannot. However, there is textual evidence against my claim. For example, the seventh book of the canonical Pāli Abhidhamma, the Paṭṭhāna enumerates twenty-four types of causal conditions (paccya) that certainly are concerned with affective-motivational continuity. However, all the mentions of the bhavaṅga citta that we find in the Paṭṭhāna are very precise about the kinds of paccaya associated with it. Specifically, the bhavaṅga only seems to enter into the anantara-paccaya or ‘succession’ condition (Cousins 1981, 40-41). This kind of relation seems to be devoid of the kind of affective and motivational connections that I am concerned with here. Further, even though a proper consideration of the totality of the conditional relations (not just the ones that pertain to bhavaṅga), of the Paṭṭhāna surely shows that the Abhidhamma commentators were concerned with what I am calling ‘affective-motivational’ continuity of mind, it is not clear that a) their specific work on how this continuity is at play with respect to bhavaṅga can be made fully workable and b) this Abhidhamma view of punctate mind-moments can do the work of explaining the non-linear dynamics of kamma. I return to these points below.
“assāsapassāsā kho, āvuso visākha, kāyasaṅkhāro, vitakkavicārā vacīsaṅkhāro, saññā ca vedanā ca cittasaṅkhāro”ti.
Anālayo (2006) points out that the notion of saṅkhāra appears in at least three different contexts in the suttas. The first is as the fourth of the five aggregates, the second is as the second link in the twelve-point formulation of dependent origination — it is here, that saṅkhāra is mentioned explicitly as being a condition for the arising of consciousness — and third, as a general notion for anything conditioned. I understand these differences in terms of emphasis and context rather than as kinds. Thus, even though the threefold schema I cite from MN I 301 does not explicitly mention the conditional relation between saṅkhāra and consciousness, it is common sense that when saṅkhāras arise at the level of body, speech, or mind, subsequent moments of consciousness will be conditioned by those reactions.
This line of reasoning of course cuts against many developments in later Buddhist philosophy, but it is enough to show that it is philosophically consistent with this stratum of texts.
no ce, bhikkhave, ceteti no ce pakappeti, atha ce anuseti, ārammaṇametaṃ hoti viññāṇassa ṭhitiyā. ārammaṇe sati patiṭṭhā viññāṇassa hoti… evametassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa samudayo hoti.
I follow U Tin OO’s (2000) English translation of Ledi’s work from the Burmese. I have included the relevant Pāli words for ease of reference to previous discussion that treats of these concepts.
It is important to note that in this context, Husserl's explanatory target is somewhat different from ours. Husserl is here analyzing the intentional structure of occurrent conscious experience, while we are talking about the diachronic unity of the mind. However, both points converge on the idea that our present experience of the world is deeply tied up with our capacity to retain and be influenced by the recent past.
There is considerable scholarly disagreement about what this ‘idealism’ consists in. For an attempt to construe Yogācāra idealism as a kind of transcendental Phenomenology, see Anacker (2013) and Lusthaus (2002). For a Kantian idealistic reading, see Garfield’s (1997) excellent commentary on Vausbandhu’s Trisvabhāvanirdeśa. For a defense of a more robust idealistic reading of Yogācāra focused on Vasubandhu’s Viṃśikā, see Kellner and Taber (2014).
Schmithausen (1987) is the locus classicus for contemporary scholarship on the ālaya-vijñāna. Waldron (2003) is also exceptional for it emphasizes the continuity of the Yogācāra philosophical project with the Pāli tradition. I rely on this text extensively in the present section. For an astute analysis of Vasubandhu’s contributions evolution toward and contributions to Yogācāra philosophy, see Gold (2015).
That being said, in the opening chapter of his Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Msg), Asaṅga argues that the Yogācāra view of eight consciousnesses is part of the original teaching of the Buddha (cf. Keenan 2003, 13 ff).
Additionally, the metaphor equating the bhavaṅga with darkness is inapt because of Buddhaghosa’s previous identification with the mind's luminosity. Though, this identification seems in line with the passage from the Milinda Pañha cited earlier (Mil VIII, 5).
I am assuming (charitably), that Ledi is here referring to dreamless sleep.
One might object that we should not take Ledi's account too seriously in that it is obviously tailored to the needs of a householder and therefore his answers are probably not philosophically mature and have been neutered for the benefit of those who might end up reading it. I think this objection would be misplaced. It is true that Ledi had a special relationship with the lay community of Buddhist devotees. However, this relationship was one of rigorous tutelage. Not only did he introduce many householders to the depths of Buddhist contemplative practice, but he was also largely responsible for the lay study of the abhidhdamma-piṭaka. In the case of the Uttamapurisa Dipani, part of his stated reasons for such a thorough, book-length response was the precision and depth of the questions themselves. Thus, I think it safe to say that Ledi's answers in this manual represent his considered views. Though, this of course does not speak to the inconsistencies I mentioned above (Braun 2013).
This paper has had a very long gestation process from first conception to publication. I owe many debts of gratitude. To begin, my sincere thanks to Evan Thompson and Christoph Emmrich for comments on this paper’s earliest drafts. I am also much indebted to Monima Chadha and the Philosophy Department at Monash University for inviting me to present an earlier version of this paper at a conference on Mind and Attention in Indian Thought systems. Thanks also to Anand Vaidya, Purushottama Billamoria, and Arindam Chakrabarti for encouragement and feedback. I also owe thanks to the Venerable Ānalayo Bhikkhu who read the manuscript carefully and gave incisive criticisms that helped me get my argument much clearer. I was fortunate enough to give a version of this paper as a job talk at the University of Hawai’i at Mānoa. I am grateful to everyone there for the helpful engagement and for giving me the job! Finally, my thanks to two anonymous referees who both gave uncommonly helpful and thorough feedback. The paper has been massively improved on account of that rigorous exchange.
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Smith, S.M. A Pāli Buddhist Philosophy of Sentience: Reflections on Bhavaṅga Citta. SOPHIA 59, 457–488 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-019-00749-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-019-00749-5