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“Having Respect for” and “Being Respectful”: A Comparison between the Kantian Conception and the Confucian Conception of Respect

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Abstract

The notion of respect is central to many moral requirements in daily life. In the Western philosophical tradition, there is a tendency to explore the nature of respect based on the nature of the object of respect. The Kantian account of respect for the moral law is one representative of this approach. In contrast, the classical Confucian notion of jing 敬 not only has a meaning similar to the Western notion of respect but also emphasizes the value of having a respectful state of mind. Both Sin Yee Chan and Pengbo Liu argue that jing, the Confucian conception of respect, has significant theoretical and practical value for obtaining an adequate understanding of the role of respect in moral life (Chan 2006, Liu 2019). However, their discussions primarily focus on the distinction between Western and Eastern views of respect. In this essay, I will focus on revealing the theoretical and practical value of combining the two perspectives on respect. I aim to demonstrate that by borrowing insights from each side, we will gain a deeper understanding of the nature of respect and what it requires in terms of proper treatment of other individuals.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Minnesota, 831 Heller Hall, 271 19th Ave S, Minneapolis, MN, USA

    Qiannan Li

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Li, Q. “Having Respect for” and “Being Respectful”: A Comparison between the Kantian Conception and the Confucian Conception of Respect. Dao 22, 1–21 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11712-022-09864-6

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