Abstract
This paper discusses Douglas Husak’s view that ignorance of the law always reduces culpability since the only fully culpable agents are those who are akratic—who act, that is, in a way that they judge to be wrongful, all things considered. The paper argues that this position is in tension with Husak’s avowed commitment to a reasons-responsiveness theory of culpability, given a plausible way of understanding what that means, and what a reason is.
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Notes
See, especially, Gideon Yaffe (forthcoming 2017) The Age of Culpability: Children and the Nature of Criminal Responsibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Chapter 3.
This list of positions is not exhaustive. One could also hold the subjective–subjective position, according to which both conduct and manifested deliberation are to be measured by the agent’s own standards; or the subjective–objective position, according to which conduct is to be measured by the agent’s own standards and deliberation is to be measured by objective standards.
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Yaffe, G. Is Akrasia Necessary for Culpability? On Douglas Husak’s Ignorance of Law . Criminal Law, Philosophy 12, 341–349 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-017-9443-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-017-9443-8