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Notes
See, further, Ends ch. 6.
Although, see my response to Uniacke below.
I critique some of the arguments that Jeff McMahan offers for it in Ends ch. 8.
Ends 192.
For defence of a more complex counterfactual account of compensation, see V Tadros ‘What Might Have Been’ in J Oberdiek Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (Oxford, forthcoming).
See Ends 95–102.
See Ends 284–285.
See Ends ch. 5.
Ends 288.
Ends 290–291.
See, further, my response to Liat Levanon in ‘Replies’ (2012) 5 Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies 89.
For my criticisms of a Kantian approach to moral and political philosophy, see V Tadros ‘Independence Without Interests?’ (2011) 31 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 193, which is a review of A Ripstein’s Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 2009).
Kant, Groundwork, 4:421, italics removed; compare Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 6:226.
For an excellent critical examination of various interpretations of CI, see D Parfit On What Matters vol. 1 (Oxford, 2011) ch. 9.
Kantians, of course, say ‘merely’ as a means. ‘Merely’ seems unhelpful, for reasons excellently set out in D Parfit On What Matters vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) ch. 9.
I consider this issue in Ends ch. 9.I.
See chs. 6 and 7.
For further discussion of problems for Kantians of this kind, see V Tadros ‘Independence without Interests?’.
See Ends 305–307.
See Ends 304–305.
For further analysis of the problem of punishment of the innocent, see ‘Replies’.
Arthur Riptstein, for example, believes that the right of bodily integrity, but not property rights, is enforceable in the state of nature. See Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009) ch. 2. This view also seems much too limited. For criticism, see V Tadros ‘Independence Without Interests?’.
Kantians typically think that actual consent is not required. What is required is that they are subject to a law that is governed by an ‘omnilateral will’. See Ripstein Force and Freedom ch. 7. I have never seen a clear elaboration of what this means, or a forceful argument as to why it is sufficient for state authority.
For more on the relationship with retributivism, see ‘Responses’(2013) 32 Law and Philosophy 251–282.
See, further, my response to Uniacke, below, and ‘Responses’ 322–324.
See, also, my responses to Farrell and Uniacke, above and below, as well as ‘Responses’ 313–316.
See my discussion of Hitler’s Island in ‘Responses’ 256–259.
Ends 58.
This hunch has recently been empirically confirmed. See O Deery, M Bedke and S Nichols ‘Phenomenal Abilities: Incompatibilism and the Experience of Agency’ in D Shoemaker Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
Others also claim that this may be the appropriate response to wrongdoing in a deterministic world. See, for example, D Pereboom Living Without Free Will (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 200. I don’t, I should add, endorse all of Pereboom’s views about the implications of a lack of contra-causal free will. See, further, ‘Responses’ 252. T M Scanlon also suggests that sadness, rather than resentment, might be the proper reaction to wrongdoing. See Moral Dimensions: Meaning, Permissibility, Blame (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 2008) 136.
For the most recent defence of this view, see W J Fitzpatrick ‘Intention, Permissibility, and Double Effect’ in M Timmons (ed) Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics (Oxford, 2012).
See Ends 158–160. Also see ‘Responses’.
See, further, Ends 127.
See, further V Tadros ‘Resource Wars’ Law and Philosophy, forthcoming.
I leave aside his discussion of barbaric punishments at the end of his essay. I agree with much of what he says there. See, further, ‘Replies’ Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies.
See, further, V Tadros ‘Harm, Sovereignty, and Prohibition’ (2011) 17 Legal Theory 35.
See, further, Ends 354–356.
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I am grateful to Massimo Renzo for comments and suggestions.
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Tadros, V. Answers. Criminal Law, Philosophy 9, 73–102 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-013-9292-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-013-9292-z