Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Précis of Metaphysics of States of Affairs

  • Published:
Philosophia Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This précis provides a chapter-by-chapter summary of Metaphysics of States of Affairs (Springer, 2018).

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. A further point of general resemblance is that the state of affairs ontology I develop is quite congenial to logical atomism, though it does share more with Wittgenstein’s version of logical atomism than with Russell’s and Armstrong’s (cf. Simons, 2003).

  2. For a criticism of this notion, see the commentary by De Rizzo & Schnieder in this book symposium, as well as Zhao (2021).

  3. I now think I should have adhered more to the terminology of the standard distinction and called internal relations ‘strongly internal relations’ and grounded relations ‘weakly internal relations’, as does Johansson (2014).

References

  • Armstrong, D. M. (1978). Universals and scientific realism (2 vols.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

  • Armstrong, D. M. (1997). A world of states of affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Ehring, D. (2002). Spatial relations between universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 80, 17–23

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Johansson, I. (2014). All relations are internal—the new version’. In A. Reboul (Ed.), Mind, Values, and Metaphysics: Philosophical Essays in Honor of Kevin Mulligan (vol. 1, 225–240). Dordrect: Springer

  • Lewis, D. (1973). Counterfactuals. Oxford: Blackwell

    Google Scholar 

  • Meinertsen, B. R. (2018). Metaphysics of states of affairs: Truthmaking, universals, and a farewell to Bradley’s regress. Singapore: Springer

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Simons, P. (2003). Logical atomism. In T. Baldwin (Ed.), The Cambridge history of philosophy 1870-1945 (pp. 383–390). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Vallicella, W. F. (2004). Bradley’s regress and relation-instances. The Modern Schoolman, LXXXI(3), 159–183

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zhao, X. (2021). No case against disjunctive properties. Philosophia. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-021-00346-2

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, The University of Sheffield, 45 Victoria St, S3 7QB, Sheffield, United Kingdom

    Bo R. Meinertsen

Authors
  1. Bo R. Meinertsen
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Bo R. Meinertsen.

Ethics declarations

Conflict of Interest

Author declares no conflict of interest.

Additional information

Publisher’s Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Meinertsen, B.R. Précis of Metaphysics of States of Affairs. Philosophia 51, 405–410 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-022-00473-4

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Revised:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-022-00473-4

Keywords

Search

Navigation