Abstract
In this piece I respond to commentaries by Julio De Rizzo & Benjamin Schnieder, Erwin Tegtmeier and William Vallicella on my book Metaphysics of States of Affairs (Springer, 2018).
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19 May 2022
A Correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-022-00530-y
Notes
Ironically, from quite early on in his middle period, Armstrong occasionally – and incoherently – construed his states of affairs as if he wanted them to be fundamental in the strict sense. For example, just as De Rizzo & Schnieder consider objects and properties to be mere ‘abstractions’ from the ‘states’ of their factalism, so he would describe particulars and universals as being ‘abstractions’ from states of affairs (see e.g. 1983, p. 84).
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Meinertsen, B.R. Replies to De Rizzo & Schnieder, Tegtmeier and Vallicella. Philosophia 51, 437–447 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-022-00472-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-022-00472-5