Abstract
Constitutivism is a family of theories of normativity, especially in metaethics, that rely on the concept of constitutive norms: norms that are grounded in constitutive features of the kind of thing to which they apply. In this paper, I present two conditions that any constitutivism must meet in its account of constitutive norms, if it is to remain true to its motivations: the constitutivity and broad normativity conditions. I argue that all extant accounts of constitutive norms fail to meet these conditions due to making constitutive norms either inviolable or in need of some external ground of normativity. I then propose a new account of constitutive norms that is better fitted to meet these conditions. This account relies on an analysis of constitutive norms in terms of a specific kind of generic generalization, the “generic proposition”. I explain how norms of this form can be constitutive of a kind, while also allowing for violability.
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Notes
This definition is based on the domain-neutral definition of constitutivism presented in Lindeman (2017). I have added that the norms might be identical with the constitutive features of the kind to avoid ruling out views on which the norms themselves are features of the kind, in case such an identification does not count as a form of grounding, strictly speaking.
This formula originates with Searle (1970).
Note that these do not have a one-to-one correspondence with the three motivations.
For instance, perhaps the norms have relative weightings or conditional relationships, such that something has to meet any 5 out of 10 norms, or if sharpness increases, safety becomes more important.
Lindeman suggests such an account at the end of her (Lindeman 2017).
To address a potential objection to Moravcsik here, I think 1 and 2 could be interpreted as making the statistical claim, in which case they would be false in the stated circumstances. However, I also think that another interpretation is clearly possible that is not equivalent to this claim.
For instance, Matt Teichman (2015, 2016) and David Liebesman (2011) provide accounts of characterizing generics as directly characterizing kinds, which is quite germane to their being interpreted as GPs. However, more popular accounts, such as that of Sarah-Jane Leslie (e.g. Leslie 2007), take generics to involve a form of quantification.
The connection between characterizing generics and our psychological tendencies has been theorized by Leslie (e.g. Leslie 2008).
Furthermore, Thompson, Moravcsik and Sebastian Rödl (2012) all argue that Aristotle’s frequent phrase “hôs epi to polu”, or “for the most part”, is used to flag that a predication is to be read as a GP.
Kieran Setiya (2012, 142) considers the metaethical position of Natural Constructivism: “For a trait to be a virtue is for creatures of one’s life form to believe that it is a virtue.” The clause “Creatures of one’s life form believe that (some trait) is a virtue” is understood to be a generic proposition. Karl Schafer (2015) considers “Generic Rationalist Constructivism” as a possible constitutivist account of rationality in terms of what considerations a rational being would be moved by (generically).
We might just as well speak of Aristotelian potency and actuality.
Because they both rely on individuals having a certain history, both the etiological proper function account and the generic account are subject to Swampman-like objections. That is, they are bound to say that freaks of nature like Davidson’s (1987) Swampman that do not come about in the normal way but pop into existence, physically identical to members of a kind like human beings, are nonetheless not real members of the kind. In fact, they must say they have none of the organs, functions, or vital processes characteristic of the kind they resemble. Lindeman addresses these “swampobjections” in her defense of the proper functionalist account by explaining away the appearance of normativity in terms of Swampman’s interests (Lindeman 2014, 75–81). Even though his organs don’t have proper functions, their operations may serve his interests and thus may be judged better or worse for that. I, on the other hand, am inclined to say that on our intuitive understanding of living kinds, a creature that comes about in a completely different way from normal is a borderline case of belonging to the kind, and the norms for it do not clearly apply or fail to apply.
Korsgaard (2019) has addressed the possible convergence of constitutivism and Aristotelianism, holding that the latter can meet what she calls the “constitution” requirement but not what she calls the “self-constitution” requirement. These roughly correspond to my constitutivity and strict normativity conditions on accounts of constitutive norms. Regarding the first condition, Korsgaard argues that the Aristotelian virtues can count as constitutive standards (though not necessarily on the neo-Aristotelian account of the virtues). However, she holds that only a Kantian account of reason can meet the second condition. Her contentions here are compatible with my conclusions in this paper, since she does not disagree on the matter of constitutivity and I have not addressed the matter of strict normativity. I have argued that constitutive norms should take the form of GPs, much like neo-Aristotelian norms, because they can meet the constitutivity condition and avoid the violability challenge to broad normativity. Whether the generic account can meet the strict normativity condition is a separate question, though I think the chances of constitutivism in metaethics depend on it. And more importantly, as far as this paper is concerned, this account of constitutive norms may yet provide the foundation for a Kantian account of reason, an Aristotelian virtue ethics or something else. Nothing that has been said here entails the introduction of a virtue ethics down the line.
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Gavin, S. Constitutivism and Generics. Philosophia 48, 1015–1036 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00120-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00120-5