Abstract
Richard Holton has argued that the traditional account of intentions—which only posits the existence of all-out intentions—is inadequate because it fails to accommodate dual-plan cases; ones in which it is rationally permissible for an agent to adopt two competing plans to bring about the same end. Since the consistency norms governing all-out intentions prohibit the adoption of competing intentions, we can only preserve the idea that the agent in a dual-plan case is not being irrational if we attribute to them a pair of partial intentions. I argue that, contrary to initial appearances, (i) Holton has yet to offer us an actual account of partial intentions, and (ii) that the traditional account of intentions already has the resources necessary to accommodate dual-plan cases.
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Notes
Among action theorists, the expression “plan” is a term of art, with various technical meanings and applications. I do not wish to invoke any of these technical notions. My use of the word “plan,” here, is meant to simply stand proxy for whatever attitude Richard has towards the ends of returning the books and renewing the books online.
Holton (2008: 28–29).
I will henceforth leave the “so long as he continues to have the dual plans” qualification implicit.
Holton (2008: 39)
Holton (2008: 40–43).
Holton (2008: 41).
Holton (2008: 47).
Indeed, according to the additivity axiom for credences (understood as probability functions), it would be irrational to intend P or ¬P to a degree less than or greater than the sum of the degree to which one intends P and one intends ¬P. This means that one is not only rationally permitted to have a credence of 0.45 towards P if one’s credence in ¬P is 0.55. One is rationally required to do so.
I should register that I have misgivings about the claim that partial intentions are subject to Means-End Coherence, given that they’re not subject to Intention Consistency. Indeed, it seems to me that these two norms stand and fall together, so that any attitude that is subject to the one requirement will be subject to the other. However, this is not a line of argument I will attempt to develop here.
I wish to remain neutral on the question of whether the preface paradox is best explained in terms of partial beliefs. My claim, here, is simply that a partial belief should not be identified with the phenomenon it is employed to explain. Presumably, this point also applies to would-be partial intentions.
Michael Bratman (1984) employs a similar strategy to deal with his video game case. I add an important qualification in the final section of this paper.
According to the conception of trying I defend, trying only requires that one do what one truly believes is within one’s power. On this view, one may count as trying to X at T even though one fails to do something one believes to be necessary to X at T, so long as that thing is either outside of one’s power or one believes it is outside one’s power. Henceforth, I will leave this additional qualification implicit.
For a defence of the idea that trying to X entails doing everything one can to X, see Hornsby (2010).
Holton (2008: 29).
References
Bratman, M. (1984). Two faces of intention. The Philosophical Review, 93(3), 375–405.
Holton, R. (2008). Partial belief, partial intention. Mind, 117(465), 27–58.
Hornsby, J. (2010). Trying to Act. In T. O’Connor & C. Sandis (Eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action (pp. 18–25). Malden: Wiley Blackwell.
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Archer, A. Do We Need Partial Intentions?. Philosophia 45, 995–1005 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9835-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9835-y