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A Historical Perspective in Support of Direct Realism

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Abstract

In this paper I argue that Direct realism is less prone to internal incoherence as a theory of knowledge than alternative theories. The theory of Direct realism best grounds our capacity for cognition of the external world, whereas other epistemological theories claim to ground our capacity for cognition, but end in skepticism in the final analysis. I propose to show this contrast by bringing in different theories of a well-known Indirect realist, Bertrand Russell.  Illustrating this point mainly through Russell makes the approach purely historical in nature even when the paper includes a brief discussion of two theories in the current debate that support Direct realism.

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Notes

  1. The Problem of Philosophy, (1988 [1912]).

  2. Other Indirect realists would save themselves from this situation by saying that although we cannot have absolute certainty about the external world, our senses cohere as well as coordinate the involuntary nature of our experiences; it works as evidence for an external world causing our sense-data.

  3. The Problems of Philosophy, (1988 [1912]).

  4. This was the position in The Principles of Mathematics (1903).

  5. The Problems of Philosophy (1988 [1912]).

  6. It is precisely what Newman (1928) also tries to conclude in his objection to Russell. It is, therefore, reasonable to say that Russell’s structuralism presupposes his analysis of knowledge of things (by acquaintance and description). It is also shown that an objection about his knowledge of things (Abraham Lincoln) is equally applicable to his structuralism.

  7. Analysis of Matter (1992 [1927]) Russell shows structuralist tendencies, at various stages, between 1905–1927. The type of structuralism or structural realism that Russell pursued is Epistemic Structural Realism also called as Restrictive Structural realism  by Psillos (2001). A detailed discussion of this is out of the scope of this paper.

  8. Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, (1993 [1919]).

  9. Newman (1928) raises his famous objection to Russell. Also see Demopoulose & Freidman, (1985).

  10. Analysis of Matter (1992 [1927]. Also a stand that he kept believing for many years, including in his Inquiry into Meaning and Truth (1940).

  11. GD Hick (1913/14), and Demopoulos (2003) question Russell at this point.

  12. The Problems of Philosophy, (1988 [1912]).

  13. This is opposed to the general tendency exhibited in ‘The Problem of Philosophy’ (1912), ‘Analysis of Matter’(1927), and even in ‘Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits’ (1948), towards representationalism or causal theory of perception in line with Locke.

  14. ‘The relation of sense-data to physics’ (1914) claims the physical world can be understood through inductive inference & ‘Our knowledge of the External world’ (1914) argues that just like the physical world, other minds are also speculative hypotheses.

  15. Hinton (1973), Snowdon (1980, 1990).

  16. Hinton (1967, 1973), Martin (2004), and Fish (2008). Major opponents of Metaphysical disjunctivism includes Johnston (2004) and Siegel (2008).

  17. The tradition of theory of intentionality treats it as non-relational. Husserl (1900/1901).

  18. Martin (1997).

  19. Tye (2000), Byrne (2001).

  20. McDowell (1987).

  21. Davies (1992.

  22. Martin (2002).

  23. Intentionalist theory of perception holds the view that perceptual experience is a relation to the properties of the external world and not to the properties of the experience itself. Also see Harman (1990).

  24. Martin (2002, 2004).

  25. There are many other ways in which the context of experience is often thought to be different from that of belief, thereby further distinguishing the two states. A detailed discussion of this is outside the scope of the paper.

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    KS Sangeetha

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Sangeetha, K. A Historical Perspective in Support of Direct Realism. Topoi 43, 115–125 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-023-09991-6

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