Abstract
Habitual actions have a history of practice and repetition that frees us from attending to what we are doing. Nevertheless, habitual actions seem to be intentional. What does account for the intentionality of habitual actions if they are automatically performed and controlled? In this paper, we address a possible response to a particular version of this issue, that is, the problem of understanding how the intention to execute a habitual action, which comes in a propositional format, interlocks with motor representations, which come in a motoric-pragmatic format. In order to solve this issue, we propose an account according to which the propositional intentions and the motor representations related to our habitual actions interlock through executable action concepts. This allows us to maintain that habitual actions can be, at the same time, automatically initiated, performed, and controlled and, still, intentional.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Ryle’s crucial objection to the intellectualistic view is that it suffers from a regress argument. Here is the argument in Ryle’s words: “The consideration of propositions is itself an operation the execution of which can be more or less intelligent, less or more stupid. But if, for any operation to be intelligently executed, a prior theoretical operation had first to be performed and performed intelligently, it would be a logical impossibility for anyone ever to break into the circle” (Ryle 1949, p. 30).
To provide the reader with a taste of the sophistication of the kinematics underlying the execution of manual actions, consider that hand movement requires the coordinated interplay of 39 intrinsic and extrinsic muscles acting on 18 joints, and that from a kinematic point of view the hand has over 20 degrees of freedom, which gives to this structure an astonishing biomechanical complexity (Raos et al. 2006: 709). At present, however, there is no evidence that the kinematic information related to the computational mechanism at the basis of the motor command for moving the entire plethora of muscles, bones and joints comprising the hand is finely grained represented by distinctive propositional states in natural cognitive systems (Rizzolatti et al. 1988). It should be noted, indeed, that an adequate propositional representation of the kinematical properties of manual actions may lead to a proliferation of mental states involved in practical knowledge, with the consequence of overloading the computational process. The fact that propositional states cannot capture the complexity of motor commands, which require representations with a motor format, has been, indeed, recently established, with several arguments, in the literature on the interface problem (Butterfill and Sinigaglia 2014: see esp. Sect. 3, A Motor Format for Representation), as well as on motor representations (Ferretti 2016a, b, c, d, 2020; Ferretti and Zipoli Caiani 2018, 2019; Pacherie 2000; Jacob and Jeannerod 2003).
A reader should have in mind what Searle (1983) originally noted about the relation between prior-intentions and intentions-in-action. In brief, for a generic intention to give course to an action, it must be completed with an ordered series of intentions each of which prescribe how to execute one of the individual motor acts needed to perform that action. What is interesting here is that, while a prior intention alone is not able to prescribe the execution of the series of particular motor acts needed to execute the related action, the intentions in actions cannot be ordered in a suitable manner without a prior intention. This last point allows us to understand why an action cannot be programmed entirely by downstream states of the motor system. Indeed, it would be as if the action were entirely directed by particular intentions in action as a sequence of disjoined motor acts. Of course, this is not the case with habitual actions like brushing the teeth or filling a glass of water. This interplay between prior intentions and intentions in action is also reflected by the philosophical study of action drawn from empirical research showing that the neural correlates at the basis of these two aspects of our intentions interlock in skilled action (Briscoe and Schwenkler 2015; Ferretti 2016a, b, c, d, 2017, 2019, 2020; Zipoli Caiani and Ferretti 2018; Ferretti and Zipoli Caiani 2019; Brozzo 2017; Pacherie 2000).
According to Shepherd (2017), we can solve the interface problem by suggesting that intentions have a double life, as they can have both propositionally formatted contents that are integrated within propositional reasoning and motorically formatted contents that directly exchange information with motoric processing. We agree with Shepherd about the double life of intentions, but there are some differences with his account, as, according to Shepherd, intentions are not confined to be only propositional mental items, as endorsed within the interface problem. According to our account, however, it is a specific component we can find within the propositional structure of an intention, namely the executable action concept, which can be structured with a motor format. So, we take that intentions, qua involved in reasoning, have a propositional format, which can, however, contain mental items, such as action concepts, built in a motor format. And for this peculiarity of action concepts, intentions can interlock, via their processing, to appropriate MRs. Accordingly, since action concepts activate the same motor responses related to MRs, differently from Shepherd, we are not suggesting the need for any translation process. This is the ‘motor bridge’ between intentions and MRs: action concepts are ‘motor mediators’. That said, our proposal is similar to Shepherd’s in that we recognize that intentions and MRs partially share the same motor format, thanks to this motor mediation offered by action concepts, contained in the intention, but motorically interlocking with MRs. So, the idea proposed here is precisely that we have one mental entity, i.e. the intention, structured in a propositional format, and another mental entity, the motor representation, structured in a motor format, and they interlock via a third mental entity, i.e. an executable action concept, which has a motor format, but it is still contained in a propositional structure. Indeed, when we form an intention, which contains an executable action concept, the latter then properly interlocks with a specific motor representation, which permits satisfying the action. So, propositional structures as intentions and motor structures as motor representations can indeed interlock thanks to action concepts, which constitute a motor bridge between intentions and motor representations.
We thank an anonymous Reviewer for asking of offering these clarifications.
We would like to warmly thank two anonymous reviewers for addressing important comments, which allowed us to improve the first version of this article. Gabriele Ferretti was supported by a NOMIS Fellowship, awarded by the Eikones—Center for the Theory and History of the Image at the University of Basel, Switzerland. We would like to thank Bence Nanay, Pepa Toribio and Joshua Shepherd for discussing with us about the topics of this article.
References
Andres M, Finocchiaro C, Buiatti M, Piazza M (2015) Contribution of motor representations to action verb processing. Cognition 134:174–184
Bach K (1978) A representational theory of action. Philos Stud 34:361–379
Bak TH, Chandran S (2012) What wires together dies together: verbs, actions and neurodegeneration in motor neuron disease. Cortex 48(7):936–944. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2011.07.008
Barsalou LW (1999) Perceptual symbol systems. Behav Brain Sci 22(4):577–660
Barsalou LW (2008) Grounded cognition. Annu Rev Psychol 59(1):617–645. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093639
Beilock SL, Lyons IM, Mattarella-Micke A, Nusbaum HC, Small SL (2008) Sports experience changes the neural processing of action language. Proc Natl Acad Sci 105(36):13269–13273. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.080342410
Bidet-Ildei C, Meugnot A, Beauprez S, Gimenes M, Toussaint L (2017) Short-term upper limb immobilization affects action-word understanding. J Exp Psychol 43(7):1129–1139
Borra E, Ichinohe N, Sato T, Tanifuji M, Rockland KS (2010) Cortical connections to area TE in monkey: hybrid modular and distributed organization. Cereb Cortex 20(2):257–270. https://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhp096
Boulenger V, Roy AC, Paulignan Y, Deprez V, Jeannerod M, Nazir TA (2006) Cross-talk between language processes and overt motor behavior in the first 200 msec of processing. J CognNeurosci 18(10):1607–1615. https://doi.org/10.1162/jocn.2006.18.10.1607
Boulenger V, Hauk O, Pulvermuller F (2009) Grasping ideas with the motor system: semantic somatotopy in idiom comprehension. Cereb Cortex 19(8):1905–1914. https://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhn217
Boulenger V, Shtyrov Y, Pulvermüller F (2012) When do you grasp the idea? MEG evidence for instantaneous idiom understanding. NeuroImage 59(4):3502–3513. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2011.11.011
Bratman M (1987) Intentions, plans, and practical reasoning. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA
Bratman ME (1999) Intention, plans, and practical reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford, Calif
Briscoe R (2009) Egocentric spatial representation in action and perception. Res 79:423–460
Briscoe R, Schwenkler J (2015) Conscious vision in action. Cogn Sci 39(7):1435–1467
Brozzo C (2017) Motor intentions: how intentions and motor representations come together. Mind Lang 32(2):231–256
Buccino G, Riggio L, Melli G, Binkofski F, Gallese V, Rizzolatti G (2005) Listening to action-related sentences modulates the activity of the motor system: a combined TMS and behavioral study. Cogn Brain Res 24(3):355–363. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogbrainres.2005.02.020
Burnston DC (2017) Interface problems in the explanation of action. Philos Explor 20(2):242–258
Butterfill SA, Sinigaglia C (2014) Intention and motor representation in purposive action: intention and motor representation in purposive action. Philos Phenomenol Res 88(1):119–145. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00604.x
Carota F, Moseley R, Pulvermüller F (2012) Body-part-specific representations of semantic noun categories. J CognNeurosci 24(6):1492–1509. https://doi.org/10.1162/jocn_a_00219
Casile A, Giese MA (2006) Nonvisual motor training influences biological motion perception. Curr Biol 16(1):69–74. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2005.10.071
Chinellato E, del Pobil AP (2016) The visual neuroscience of robotic grasping, Achieving sensorimotor skills through dorsal-ventral stream integration. Springer, Switzerland
Coello Y, Fischer MH (2015) Perceptual and emotional embodiment: foundations of embodied cognition. Routledge, Abingdon
Cohen NR, Cross ES, Tunik E, Grafton ST, Culham JC (2009) Ventral and dorsal stream contributions to the online control of immediate and delayed grasping: a TMS approach. Neuropsychologia 47(6):1553–1562. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2008.12.034
Davidson D (1963) Actions, reasons and causes. J Philos 60:685–700
Decety J, Grèzes J (2006) The power of simulation: imagining one’s own and other’s behavior. Brain Res 1079(1):4–14. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brainres.2005.12.115
Desai RH, Binder JR, Conant LL, Seidenberg MS (2010) Activation of sensory-motor areas in sentence comprehension. Cereb Cortex 20(2):468–478. https://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhp115
Desai RH, Conant LL, Binder JR, Park H, Seidenberg MS (2013) A piece of the action: modulation of sensory-motor regions by action idioms and metaphors. NeuroImage 83:862–869. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.07.044
Desai RH, Herter T, Riccardi N, Rorden C, Fridriksson J (2015) Concepts within reach: action performance predicts action language processing in stroke. Neuropsychologia 71:217–224. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2015.04.006
Di Nucci, E. (2011). Mind out of action: the intentionality of automatic actions (SSRN Scholarly Paper No. ID 1931638).
Douskos C (2017a) Deliberation and automaticity in habitual acts. Ethics Prog 9(1):25–43
Douskos C (2017b) Habit and intention. Philos Philos (United States) 45:1–20
Fargier R, Paulignan Y, Boulenger V, Monaghan P, Reboul A, Nazir TA (2012) Learning to associate novel words with motor actions: language-induced motor activity following short training. Cortex 48(7):888–899. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2011.07.003
Fernandino C, Binder B, Hiner S, Desai, (2013a) Where is the action? Action sentence processing in Parkinson's disease. Neuropsychologia 51(8):1510–1517
Fernandino L, Conant LL, Binder JR, Blindauer K, Hiner B, Spangler K, Desai RH (2013b) Parkinson’s disease disrupts both automatic and controlled processing of action verbs. Brain Lang 127(1):65–74
Ferretti G (2016a) Visual feeling of presence. Pac Philos Q. https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12170
Ferretti G (2016b) Neurophysiological states and perceptual representations: the case of action properties detected by the ventro-dorsal visual stream. In: Magnani L, Casadio C (eds) Model-based reasoning in science and technology, studies in applied philosophy, epistemology and rational ethics, vol 27. Springer, Cham, pp 179–203
Ferretti G (2016c) Pictures, action properties and motor related effects. Synth Spec Issue 193(12):3787–3817. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1097-x
Ferretti G (2016d) Through the forest of motor representations. Conscious Cogn 43:177–196
Ferretti G (2017) Two visual systems in molyneux subjects. Phenom Cogn Sci 17(4):643–679. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-017-9533-z
Ferretti G (2018) The neural dynamics of seeing-in. Erkenntnis 84(6):1285–1324. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-0060-2
Ferretti G (2019) Visual phenomenology versus visuomotor imagery: how can we be aware of action properties? Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02282-x
Ferretti G (2020) Anti-intellectualist motor knowledge. Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02750-9
Ferretti G (forthcoming) A distinction concerning vision-for-action and affordance perception. Conscious Cogn
Ferretti G, Chinellato E (2019) Can our robots rely on an emotionally charged vision-for-action? An embodied model for neurorobotics. In: Vallverdú J, Müller V (eds) Blended cognition, The robotic challenge. Springer Series in Cognitive and Neural Systems, vol 12, Springer, Cham.
Ferretti G, Zipoli Caiani S (2018) Solving the interface problem without translation: the same format thesis. Pac Philos Q. https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12243
Ferretti G, Zipoli Caiani S (2019) Between vision and action. Introduction to the special issue. Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02518-w
Fodor J (1983) Modularity of mind: essay on faculty psychology. Bradford Books, Cambridge
Fridland E (2014) They’ve lost control: reflections on skill. Synthese 91(12):2729–2750
Fridland E (2016) Skill and motor control: intelligence all the way down. Philos Stud. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0771-7
Fridland E (2019) Longer, smaller, faster, stronger: on skills and intelligence. Philos Psychol 32(5):759–783. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2019.1607275
Glenberg AM, Kaschak MP (2002) Grounding language in action. Psychon Bull Rev 9(3):558–565
Glenberg AM, Sato M, Cattaneo L (2008) Use-induced motor plasticity affects the processing of abstract and concrete language. Curr Biol 18(7):R290–R291. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2008.02.036
Glover S, Dixon P (2002) Semantics affect the planning but not control of grasping. Exp Brain Res 146(3):383–387. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00221-002-1222-6
Glover S, Rosenbaum DA, Graham J, Dixon P (2004) Grasping the meaning of words. Exp Brain Res 154(1):103–108. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00221-003-1659-2
Hauk O, Johnsrude I, Pulvermüller F (2004) Somatotopic representation of action words in human motor and premotor cortex. Neuron 41(2):301–307
Hoshi E, Tanji J (2007) Distinctions between dorsal and ventral premotor areas: anatomical connectivity and functional properties. CurrOpinNeurobiol 17(2):234–242. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.conb.2007.02.003
Ibáñez A, Cardona JF, Dos Santos YV, Blenkmann A, Aravena P, Roca M, Bekinschtein T (2013) Motor-language coupling: direct evidence from early Parkinson’s disease and intracranial cortical recordings. Cortex 49(4):968–984. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2012.02.014
Innocenti A, De Stefani E, Sestito M, Gentilucci M (2014) Understanding of action-related and abstract verbs in comparison: a behavioral and TMS study. Cogn Process 15(1):85–92. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10339-013-0583-z
Jacob P, Jeannerod M (2003) Ways of seeing: the scope and limits of visual cognition. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Jeannerod M (2006) Motor cognition: what actions tell the self. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Kemmerer D, Castillo JG, Talavage T, Patterson S, Wiley C (2008) Neuroanatomical distribution of five semantic components of verbs: evidence from fMRI. Brain Lang 107(1):16–43. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bandl.2007.09.003
Kemmerer D, Rudrauf D, Manzel K, Tranel D (2012) Behavioral patterns and lesion sites associated with impaired processing of lexical and conceptual knowledge of actions. Cortex 48(7):826–848. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2010.11.001
Klepp A, Niccolai V, Sieksmeyer J, Arnzen S, Indefrey P, Schnitzler A, Biermann-Ruben K (2017) Body-part specific interactions of action verb processing with motor behavior. Behav Brain Res 328:149–158
Leshinskaya A, Caramazza A (2014) Nonmotor aspects of action concepts. J CognNeurosci 26(12):2863–2879. https://doi.org/10.1162/jocn_a_00679
Levy N (2015) Embodied savoir-faire: knowledge-how requires motor representations. Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0956-1
Lindemann O, Stenneken P, van Schie HT, Bekkering H (2006) Semantic activation in action planning. J Exp Psychol Hum Percept Perform 32(3):633–643. https://doi.org/10.1037/0096-1523.32.3.633
Locatelli M, Gatti R, Tettamanti M (2012) Training of manual actions improves language understanding of semantically related action sentences. Front Psychol. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00547
Mahon BZ, Caramazza A (2008) A critical look at the embodied cognition hypothesis and a new proposal for grounding conceptual content. J Physiol-Paris 102(1–3):59–70. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jphysparis.2008.03.004
Makris S, Hadar AA, Yarrow K (2013) Are object affordances fully automatic? A case of covert attention. Behav Neurosci 127(5):797–802. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0033946
McIntosh RD, Schenk T (2009) Two visual streams for perception and action: current trends. Neuropsychologia 47(6):1391–1396. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.02.009
Mele AR (1992) Springs of action. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Mele AR, Moser PK (1994) Intentional action. Noûs 28(1):39–68. https://doi.org/10.2307/2215919
Mylopoulos M, Pacherie E (2016) Intentions and motor representations: the interface challenge. Rev Philos Psychol. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-016-0311-6
Nanay B (2013) Between perception and action. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Nazir TA, Boulenger V, Roy A, Silber B, Jeannerod M, Paulignan Y (2008) Language-induced motor perturbations during the execution of a reaching movement. Q J Exp Psychol 61(6):933–943. https://doi.org/10.1080/17470210701625667
Norman DA (1981) Categorization of action slips. Psychol Rev 88(1):1–15. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.88.1.1
Pacherie E (2000) The content of intentions. Mind Lang 15:400–432
Pacherie E (2006) Towards a dynamic theory of intentions. In: Pockett S, Banks WP, Gallagher S (eds) Does consciousness cause behavior? An investigation of the nature of volition. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp 145–167
Pacherie E (2008) The phenomenology of action: a conceptual framework. Cognition 107(1):179–217. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2007.09.003
Pacherie E (2011) Non-conceptual representations for action and the limits of intentional control. Soc Psychol 42(1):67–73
Papineau D (2013) In the zone. R Inst Philos Suppl 73(175):196
Pavese C (2019) The psychological reality of practical representation. Philos Psychol 32(5):784–821. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2019.1612214
Pollard B (2006a) Actions, habits and constitution. Ratio 19(2):229–248
Pollard B (2006b) Explaining actions with habits. Am Philos Q 43(1):57–69
Pollard B (2010) Habitual actions. In: TO of Philosophy & CSS Lecturer (Eds), A companion to the philosophy of action (pp. 74–81).
Pulvermüller F (2013) Semantic embodiment, disembodiment or misembodiment? In search of meaning in modules and neuron circuits. Brain Lang 127(1):86–103. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bandl.2013.05.015
Raos V, Umiltà MA, Murata A, Fogassi L, Gallese V (2006) Functional properties of grasping-related neurons in the ventral premotor area F5 of the macaque monkey. J Neurophysiol 95:709–729
Rizzolatti G, Camarda R, Fogassi L et al (1988) Functional organization of inferior area 6 in the macaque monkey. Exp Brain Res 71:491
Rowe PJ, Haenschel C, Kosilo M, Yarrow K (2017) Objects rapidly prime the motor system when located near the dominant hand. Brain Cogn 113:102–108. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bandc.2016.11.005
Rueschemeyer S-A, Lindemann O, van Rooij D, van Dam W, Bekkering H (2010) Effects of intentional motor actions on embodied language processing. Exp Psychol 57(4):260–266. https://doi.org/10.1027/1618-3169/a000031
Ryle G (1949) The concept of mind. Hutchinson, London
Searle JR (1983) Intentionality: an essay in the philosophy of mind. Cambridge University Press, New York
Shepherd J (2017) Skilled action and the double life of intention. Philos Phenom Res 98:1–20. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12433
Stanley J (2011) Know how. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Stanley J, Krakauer JW (2013) Motor skill depends on knowledge of facts. Front Hum Neurosci. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2013.00503
Stanley J, Williamson T (2001) Knowing how. J Philos 98(8):411–444. https://doi.org/10.2307/2678403
Tettamanti M, Buccino G, Saccuman MC, Gallese V, Danna M, Scifo P, Fazio F, Rizzolatti G, Cappa SF, Perani DJ (2005) Listening to action-related sentences activates fronto-parietal motor circuits. J CognNeurosci 17(2):273–281
Thill S, Caligiore D, Borghi A, Ziemkea T, Baldassarre G (2013) Theories and computational models of affordance and mirror systems: an integrative review. NeurosciBiobehav Rev 37:491–521
Tomasino B, Maieron M, Guatto E, Fabbro F, Rumiati RI (2013) How are the motor system activity and functional connectivity between the cognitive and sensorimotor systems modulated by athletic expertise? Brain Res 1540:21–41. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brainres.2013.09.048
van Dam WO, van Dongen EV, Bekkering H, Rueschemeyer S-A (2012) Context-dependent changes in functional connectivity of auditory cortices during the perception of object words. J CognNeurosci 24(10):2108–2119. https://doi.org/10.1162/jocn_a_00264
van Elk M, van Schie HT, Bekkering H (2008) Conceptual knowledge for understanding other’s actions is organized primarily around action goals. Exp Brain Res 189(1):99–107. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00221-008-1408-7
van Elk M, van Schie HT, Zwaan RA, Bekkering H (2010) The functional role of motor activation in language processing: motor cortical oscillations support lexical- semantic retrieval. NeuroImage 50(2):665–677. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2009.12.123
Wu H, Mai X, Tang H, Ge Y, Luo Y-J, Liu C (2013) Dissociable somatotopic representations of Chinese action verbs in the motor and premotor cortex. Sci Rep. https://doi.org/10.1038/srep02049
Zipoli Caiani S, Ferretti G (2017) Semantic and pragmatic integration in vision for action. Conscious Cogn 48:40–54. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2016.10.009
Zipoli Caiani S (2018). Intensional biases in affordance perception: an explanatory issue for radical enactivism. Synthese, pp. 1–21, ISSN:0039-7857
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Publisher's Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Ferretti, G., Zipoli Caiani, S. Habitual Actions, Propositional Knowledge, Motor Representations and Intentionality. Topoi 40, 623–635 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-020-09723-0
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-020-09723-0