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The effects of uncertainty on the WTA–WTP gap

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Abstract

We analyze the effects of uncertainty on WTA, WTP and the WTA–WTP gap. Extending the approach of Weber (Econom Lett 80:311–315, 2003) to the case of lotteries, we develop an exact expression for the WTA–WTP gap that allows identification of its magnitude under different utility specifications. Reinterpreting and extending results by Gabillon(Econom Lett 116:157–160, 2012), we also identify generally the relationship between an agent’s utility of income and the gap’s algebraic sign, as well as the effects of risk increases on WTA and WTP. Finally, we derive the limit behavior of the gap as income or risk increase.

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  1. Moreover, Horowitz and McConnell (2003) show that the typical WTA–WTP disparity is too large to reasonably be explained by income effects.

  2. Neilson et al. (2012) provide a clean statement of the effects of changes in uncertainty on the WTA–WTP gap for both a binary and uniformly distributed lottery under loss aversion, as well as for a binary lottery under rank dependent utility theory. In all cases Neilson, McKee and Berrens show that increases in uncertainty raise the WTA–WTP gap. We observe, however, that their treatment involves the special case of utility that is linear both above zero and below zero. Thus, all positive gambles are simply evaluated at their expected value, a consequence that abstracts from any possible effects of risk aversion.

  3. Isik (2004) uses Taylor’s series expansions to assess the effects of uncertainty regarding an environmental quality enhancement on the WTA–WTP gap. He errs with inconsistencies in his selection of reference income levels. Davis and Reilly (2012) detail the errors in this development. Okada (2010) studies the way uncertainty impacts buyer–seller interactions. Among other issues, to generate her principal results, Okada posits a negative marginal utility of income, which is of course fundamentally inconsistent with standard analysis.

  4. Gabillon (2012) establishes several important properties of risk-avoiding and risk-taking premia in lotteries under expected utility. The former is what is commonly referred to simply as the risk premium (the expected value minus the certainty equivalent) and the latter is the difference between the expected value and the WTP.

  5. In what follows we use the terms WTA and \(E\left( {y_0 ,z}\right) \), and the terms and WTP and \(C\left( {y_0 ,z}\right) \) interchangeably. Also, DARA, CARA, and IARA refer to decreasing, constant, and increasing absolute risk aversion.

  6. For example, consider the DARA utility function \(u\left( y\right) =ln\left( y\right) \) in combination with the lottery form \(z=\left( {x_1 ,x_2 ,0.5}\right) \). For any initial income \(y_{0},\,E\left( {y_0 ,z}\right) =\sqrt{y_{0}^{2} +x_{1} y_{0} +x_{2} y_{0} +x_{1} x_{2}} - y_{0}\), and \(C\left( {y_0 ,z}\right) =\frac{\left( {2y_0 +x_1 +x_2}\right) -\sqrt{\left( {2y_0 +x_1 +x_2}\right) ^{2}-4\left( {x_1 y_0 +x_2 y_0 +x_1 x_2}\right) }}{2}\). Given the specific lottery \(z=\left( {5,40,0.5}\right) \) and initial income \(y_0 =20,\,E\left( {y_0 ,z}\right) -C\left( {y_0 ,z}\right) =2.805198\). Further, for this utility function, we can verify the equality in (7). For any income \(y,\,\frac{\partial E(y,z)}{\partial y}=\frac{\left( {2y+x_1 +x_2}\right) }{2\sqrt{y^{2}+x_1 y+x_2 y+x_1 x_2}}-1\) , and the inverse function for \(\delta =y_0 +E\left( {y_0 ,z}\right) \) is given by \(g\left( \delta \right) =\frac{-\left( {x_1 +x_2}\right) +\sqrt{\left( {x_1 +x_2}\right) ^{2}-4\left( {x_1 +x_2 -\delta ^{2}}\right) }}{2}\). Using these expressions for \(\frac{\partial E}{\partial y}\) and \(g\left( {\bullet }\right) \) in the right hand side of (7) and employing numerical integration in the open-source \(R\) statistical programming language, the right hand side of (7) yields the same 2.805198.

  7. Corollary 1 reinterprets Gabillon’s Proposition 3 to corresponding properties of WTA and WTP, and reinterprets and extends that portion of her Corollary 3 relating to risk premia in favorable lotteries to the properties of WTA and WTP under DARA, CARA, and IARA utility functions. Corollary 2 recasts the strict form of Gabillon’s Corollary 1 to focus on WTA and WTP for a single individual over two different lotteries rather than on the risk premia for two different individuals on a single lottery. Since these corollaries are relatively straightforward extensions of Gabillon (2012), we relegate their proofs to appendices.

  8. For example, it can be shown in all three cases analyzed in Neilson et al. (2012) that uncertainty causes WTA to increase above and WTP to fall below a lottery’s expected value.

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Acknowledgments

Financial assistance from the National Science Foundation (SES 1024357) is gratefully acknowledged.

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Correspondence to Douglas D. Davis.

Appendices

Appendix 1

1.1 Proof of corollary 1

Proof of part (i)

(a) was established as Eq. (4) above. For (b), define \(y_2 =y_0 -C(y_0 ,z)\). By definition of \(C(y_0 ,z),\,v(y_0 )=\nu \left( {y_2 ,z}\right) \). Further, by definition of \(E(y_2 ,z),\,v(y_2 ,z)=v\left[ {y_2 +E(y_2 ,z)}\right] \), Hence \(v(y_0 )=v\left[ {y_0 -C(y_0 ,z)+E(y_2 ,z)}\right] \), and so \(C(y_0 ,z)=E(y_2 ,z)\). \(\square \)

Proof of part (ii)

Theorem 2 in Pratt (1964) establishes the equivalence between strict DARA and a strictly decreasing risk premium, between CARA and a constant risk premium, and between strict IARA and a strictly increasing risk premium. Denoting the expected value of lottery \(z\) by \(\mu _z\) and recalling that the risk premium is defined as \(\mu _z -E(y,z)\), Pratt’s theorem establishes (ii) for \(E(y,z)\). \(\square \)

From part 1.i.b., \(C(y_0 ,z)=E(y_2 ,z)\), so,

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial C\left( {y_0 ,z}\right) }{\partial y_0}=\frac{\partial E\left[ {y_2 ,z}\right] }{\partial y_0}\!=\!\frac{\partial E\left[ {y_2 ,z}\right] }{\partial y_2}\frac{\partial y_2}{\partial y_0}\!=\!\frac{\partial E\left[ {y_2 ,z}\right] }{\partial y_2}\left( {1-\frac{\partial C\left( {y_0 ,z}\right) }{\partial y_0}}\right) .\qquad \end{aligned}$$
(9)

Since by definition \(\nu \left( {y_0}\right) =\nu \left[ {y_0 -C\left( {y_0 ,z}\right) ,z}\right] \) holds for all \(y_{0}\), we may differentiate it with respect to \(y_{0}\) to obtain

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \nu \left( {y_0}\right) }{\partial y_0}=\frac{\partial \nu \left( {y_2 ,z}\right) }{\partial y_2}\left( {1-\frac{\partial C\left( {y_0 ,z}\right) }{\partial y_0}}\right) . \end{aligned}$$

Note that positive marginal utility of income (or alternatively, stochastic dominance) implies that both \(\frac{\partial \nu \left( {y_0}\right) }{\partial y_0}>0\) and \(\frac{\partial \nu \left( {y_2 ,z}\right) }{\partial y_2}>0\). Thus from the above equality, \(\left( {1-\frac{\partial C\left( {y_0 ,z}\right) }{\partial y_0}}\right) > 0\).

This result, together with \(\frac{\partial E\left[ {y_2 ,z}\right] }{\partial y_2}>(=,<)0\) under DARA (CARA,IARA) established for the \(E(y,z)\) part of (ii), guarantees that the right hand side of Eq. (9) \(>(=<)0\) under DARA (CARA,IARA). Hence \(\frac{\partial C\left( {y_0 ,z}\right) }{\partial y_0} >(=<) 0\) under DARA (CARA,IARA), establishing the \(C(y_0 ,z)\) part of (ii).

Proof of part (iii)

In the proof of Lemma 2 it was established that for any initial income \(y_0 ,\,1+\frac{\partial E\left( {y_0 ,z}\right) }{\partial y_0}>0\). Thus the denominator of the integrand on the right hand side of (7) is positive for all \(\delta \) in the interval of integration.

Theorem 2 in Pratt (1964) establishes the equivalence between strict DARA and a strictly decreasing risk premium, and between strict IARA and a strictly increasing risk premium. In the development here, the risk premium of the lottery \(z\) at initial income \(y_{0}\) is the expected outcome of the lottery minus its certainty equivalent. For a risk averter, the certainty equivalent of lottery \(z\) is necessarily less than its expected outcome. As noted earlier, the certainty equivalent of the lottery at initial income \(y_{0}\) is the willingness to accept, \(E\left( {y_0 ,z}\right) \).

Consider first the case of DARA. A decreasing risk premium for \(z\), together with a constant expected value, implies a rising certainty equivalent, i.e., that \(\frac{\partial E\left( {y_0 ,z}\right) }{\partial y_0}>0\). Thus, the numerator of the integrand on the right hand side of (7) is positive for any initial income \(y_{0}\). Hence, the integrand is positive across the entire interval of integration. This implies that the integral itself is necessarily positive. Thus, under DARA, the right hand side of (7) is positive.

Matters are reversed in the case of IARA. An increasing risk premium combined with a positive expected value implies a falling certainty equivalent, that is, \(\frac{\partial E\left( {y_0 ,z}\right) }{\partial y_0}<0\) and thus the numerator of the integrand on the right hand side of (7) is negative. Using the same logic as in the case of DARA the integrand across the entire interval of integration is negative, meaning that the right hand side of (7) is negative.

Under CARA, the risk premium is constant and thus \(\frac{\partial E\left( {y_0 ,z}\right) }{\partial y_0}=0\). Hence, the numerator of the integrand on the right hand side of (7) is identically zero, and thus the integral is zero as well, establishing that the equivalent and compensating variations are equal in that case. \(\square \)

Appendix 2

1.1 Proof of corollary 2

Proof

Consider first the inequality on the left hand side. In their Theorem 2, Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) establish, that given an income level \(y_0 , \nu \left( {y_0 ,z_2}\right) <\nu \left( {y_0 ,z_1}\right) \). Hence, \(\nu \left( {y_0 +E\left[ {y_0 ,z_2}\right] }\right) <\nu \left( {y_0 +E\left[ {y_0 ,z_1}\right] }\right) \), and so by \(\nu _y >0,\,E\left( {y_0 ,z_1}\right) >E\left( {y_0 ,z_2}\right) \).

Now consider the right hand inequality. Suppose that \(C\left( {y_0 ,z_1}\right) <C\left( {y_0 ,z_2}\right) \). Then \(\nu \left( {y_0}\right) \!=\!\nu \left( {y_0 \!-\!C\left[ {y_0 ,z_1}\right] ,z_1}\right) \ge \nu \left( {y_0 \!-\!C\left[ {y_0 ,z_2}\right] ,z_1}\right) >\nu \left( {y_0 -C\left[ {y_0 ,z_2}\right] ,z_2}\right) = \nu \left( {y_0}\right) \) where the strict inequality is again implied by Theorem 2 of Rothschild and Stiglitz. Thus \(\nu \left( {y_0}\right) >\nu \left( {y_0}\right) \), a contradiction. Hence \(C\left( {y_0 ,z_1}\right) >C\left( {y_0 ,z_2}\right) \). \(\square \)

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Reilly, R.J., Davis, D.D. The effects of uncertainty on the WTA–WTP gap. Theory Decis 78, 261–272 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-014-9414-7

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