Abstract
We present a well-defined generalisation of the core to coalitional games with externalities, where the value of a deviation is given by an endogenous response, the solution (if nonempty: the core) of the residual game.
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Open Access This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License ( https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0 ), which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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Kóczy, L.Á. A recursive core for partition function form games. Theor Decis 63, 41–51 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9030-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9030-x