Abstract
This paper examines the philosophy of Jean-Francois Lyotard in relation to the analytic philosophy of deep disagreement. It argues not just that his work has relevance for this debate, but that it offers a challenge to the ‘epistemic paradigm’ present in its academic literature, represented by the two most prominent sets of theories within it – the ‘fundamental epistemic principle’ and ‘hinge epistemology’ views, arguably most strongly represented by Michael Lynch and Duncan Pritchard, respectively. Focussing on Lyotard’s text ‘The Differend’, I show how its conceptual framework and philosophy of language locates the cause of deep disagreement not in the epistemic realm, but in things which do not fully submit to epistemic evaluation: the radically incomplete and open nature of language, and our increasingly politically pluralistic world full of incommensurable differences that do not always admit of rational resolution. Lyotard’s work calls for us to conceptualize deep disagreements as problems of politics, not epistemology, and to find new ways of dealing with disagreements that do not force a solution on them (which often comes at the cost of one party being wronged, or worse) and to create new ways of speaking so that our collective conceptual resources can be increased to better deal with specific cases of dispute. Lyotard’s relevance for the philosophy of deep disagreement is also further discussed with references to Miranda Fricker’s work on ‘epistemic injustice’, which Lyotard, in a different vocabulary, is also concerned with and analyses in ‘The Differend’.
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Notes
Fogelin, Robert J. ‘The Logic of Deep Disagreements’ Informal Logic. Vol. 25 no. 1. 2005. p. 3–11. p. 8. (First published in Informal Logic. Vol. 7 no. 1. 1985. p. 1–8.)
Turner, D. and Wright, L. ‘Revisiting Deep Disagreement’. Informal Logic vol. 25, no. 1, 2005, p. 25–35. p. 25. Emphasis added.
Lavorerio, V. ‘The Fundamental Model of Deep Disagreement.’ Metaphilosophy. 53 (3–4). July 2021. pp. 416–431 p. 1, 4. https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12500.
Lyotard, J-F. trans. George van den Abbeele. The Differend: Phrases in Dispute. Manchester University Press. Manchester.1988. p. xi.
Fricker, M. Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford University Press. Oxford. 2007. p. 1.
Lagewaard, T. J. ‘Epistemic Injustice and Deepened Disagreement’. Philosophical Studies. 178. 2021. pp. 1571–1592.
Much analytic philosophy of disagreement has consisted of investigating what this background consists in, and how it should be understood – whether in terms of ‘hinge commitments’, ‘beliefs’, ‘preferences’, and so on. Lyotard responds to this in terms of ‘phrase regimen’, ‘genres of discourse’ and a philosophy of communication which accounts for the different ways epistemic injustice can take place on the level of disagreement.
This puts Lyotard, to some degree, in accord with Fogelin: some disputes cannot be resolved because the conditions for their resolution at the time are absent, and certain things must be agreed upon or shared for productive discussion to take place.
Rinalli, C. ‘What is Deep Disagreement?’ Topoi. 40. 2021. pp. 983–998.
It should be noted that neither family of views “form[s] a homogenous group” (Lavorerio 2021, 6) and there is controversy within both camps, especially over what ‘hinges’ are.
Lynch, M. P. ‘After the Spade Turn: Disagreement, First Principles and Epistemic Contractarianism.’ International Journal for the Study of Skepticism. Vol. 6, no. 2–3. 2016. pp. 248–259. p. 250.
Wittgenstein, L. On Certainty. Anscombe, G. E. M. and Von Wright, G. H. (Eds.) Trans. Pauld, D. and Anscombe, G. E. M. Basil Blackwell. Oxford. 1969.
The key passage being the following: “The questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn. […] We just can’t investigate everything and for that reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.” (Wittgenstein 1969, 341).
Pritchard, D. ‘Wittgensteinian Hinge Epistemology and Deep Disagreement.’ Topoi. 40. Special issue on ‘Disagreement: Perspectives from Argumentation Theory and Epistemology.’ 2018. p. 3. Emphasis added.
Pritchard, D. ‘Wittgenstein and the Groundlessness of Our Believing.’ Synthese. Vol. 189, no. 2. November 2012. pp. 255–272. p. 257.
Lyotard uses ‘litigation’ to mean something close to what Fogelin calls a ‘normal disagreement’: a dispute which either can be settled because both sides agree on a common criterion by which their dispute can be judged, or where productive communication and argument can continue.
Wittgenstein, L. trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte. Philosophical Investigations. Wiley-Blackwell. Oxford. 2009. p. 15.
References
Fogelin, R. J. (2005). The Logic of Deep Disagreements Informal Logic. Vol. 25 no. 1. p. 3–11. p. 8. (First published in Informal Logic. Vol. 7 no. 1. 1985. p. 1–8.)
Fricker, M. (2007). Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Lagewaard, T. J. (2021). Epistemic Injustice and Deepened Disagreement. Philosophical Studies, 178, 1571–1592
Lavorerio, V. The Fundamental Model of Deep Disagreement. Metaphilosophy. 53 (3–4). July 2021. pp. 416–431 p. 1, 4. https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12500
Lyotard, J. F. trans (Ed.). (1988). George van den Abbeele. The Differend: Phrases in Dispute. Manchester: Manchester University Press
Lynch, M. P. (2016). After the Spade Turn: Disagreement, First Principles and Epistemic Contractarianism. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism. Vol. 6, no. 2–3. pp. 248–259
Pritchard, D. Wittgenstein and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. Synthese. Vol. 189, no. 2. November 2012. pp. 255–272
Pritchard, D. (2018). Wittgensteinian Hinge Epistemology and Deep Disagreement. Topoi. 40. Special issue on ‘Disagreement: Perspectives from Argumentation Theory and Epistemology.’
Rinalli, C. (2021). What is Deep Disagreement? Topoi. 40. pp. 983–998
Turner, D., & Wright, L. (2005). Revisiting Deep Disagreement. Informal Logic vol, 25(1), 25–35
Wittgenstein, L. (1969). On Certainty. Anscombe, G. E. M. and Von Wright, G. H. (Eds.) Trans. Pauld, D. and Anscombe, G. E. M. Basil Blackwell. Oxford.
Acknowledgements
I presented an earlier version of this paper at the 2021 International Wittgenstein Symposium, hosted by the University of Zagreb. I’m very grateful to the organisers for the opportunity, and to the participants for their comments, questions, and feedback. I would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers for this article for their incisive and robust criticism, which really helped me to sharpen my arguments and present Lyotard’s contribution to the philosophy of deep disagreement in the most compelling way I could.
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Cartlidge, J. Lyotard, the differend and the philosophy of deep disagreement. Synthese 200, 359 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03841-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03841-5