Abstract
I argue that a tripartite analysis of simple statements such as “Bucephalus is a horse”, according to which they divide into two terms and a copula, requires the notion of a repeatable: something such that more than one particular can literally be it. I pose a familiar dilemma with respect to repeatables, and turn to Avicenna for a solution, who discusses a similar dilemma concerning quiddities. I conclude by describing how Avicenna’s quiddities relate to repeatables, and how both quiddities and repeatables may contribute to a tripartite analysis of predication.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Cf. Forrest 1993, p. 46: “Repeatables are properties and relations which are not constrained by their category so that they cannot be multiply instantiated.” In contrast to Forrest, I do not identify repeatables with properties or relations, and I say that a repeatable is what multiple particulars may be said to be, rather than instantiate.
Armstrong identifies repeatables with universals, which he defines as things that can be strictly identical across multiple tokens (1989, p. 7). When I say that both Bucephalus and Secretariat are a horse, I do not wish to imply that what Bucephalus is is identical to (i.e. numerically the same as) what Secretariat is.
This is to say that repeatables occupy none of the corners of the “ontological square” in Lowe 2006, p. 22.
One way of doing this is to declare that “Bucephalus is a horse” really means “Bucephalus instantiates (the kind) horse”, which, for a Fregean, will boil down to “Bucephalus has the feature of instantiating (the kind) horse”.
This is directed against the version of Platonism that was current in Baghdad at the time (cf. Arnzen 2011). Translations are generally my own.
For our purposes it is not necessary to compare quiddities to essences, and given the variety of views on what essences are, this would be a major undertaking. I prefer to introduce the term “quidditiy” from scratch, as it were. Like the Arabic māhiyya, “quiddity” literally means “what-ness”.
See also Benevich 2015, p. 117, for discussion.
See Bäck 1996, p. 103-4, for Avicenna’s general views on how to parse statements involving “in itself”.
Lyons 1999, p. 91 − 4, for discussion.
Note that what I am going to point out will be helpful independently of whether I am right about any given feature of actual Persian.
Ibrahim writes that “Horse” refers to a species, but when B says “when Horse is ready”, he is clearly not taking him to refer to the species equus ferus caballus.
Earlier in his book, Ibrahim accordingly paraphrases the bare noun may (“wine”) in may nūshīdam as an incorporated noun (“I was wine-drinking”; Ibrahim 1841, p. 24).
I leave out the indefinite article to indicate that the noun in the Persian is bare.
References
Armstrong, D. M. (1989). Universals: An Opinionated Introduction. Westview Press
Arnzen, R. (2011). Platonische Ideen in der arabischen Philosophie. Berlin: De Gruyter
Avicenna (1960). Al-Shifā’: al-Ilāhiyāt. ed. Anawati et al. Cairo: al-Maṭbaʻa al-Amīriyya
Avicenna (2005). The Metaphysics of the Healing, tr. Marmura. Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press
Bäck, A. (1996). On Reduplication. Logical Theories of Qualification. Leiden: Brill
Benevich, F. (2015). Die ‘göttliche Existenz’: Zum ontologischen Status der Essenz qua Essenz bei Avicenna. Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, 26, 103–127
Clark, R. (1986). Predication and Paronymous Modifiers. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 27(3), 376–392
Cohen, S. M. (2008). Kooky Objects Revisited: Aristotle’s Ontology. Metaphilosophy, 39(1), 3–19
Farkas, D. F., & de Swart, H. (2003). The Semantics of Noun Incorporation. Henriëtte: CSLI Publications
Forrest, P. (1993). “Just like Quarks? The Status of Repeatables.”. In J. Bacon, et al. (Ed.), Ontology, Causality, and Mind. Cambridge University Press
Hennig, B. (2020). Review of Janos, Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity. Philosophical Quarterly, online (https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqaa079)
Hopper, P. J., Sandra, A., & Thompson (1984). The Discourse Basis for Lexical Categories in Universal Grammar. Language, 60(4), 703–752
Ibrahim, M. M. (1841). A Grammar of the Persian Language. London: W. H. Allen & Co
Janos, D. (2020). Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity. Berlin: De Gruyter
Lejewski, C. (1984). “On Lésniewski’s Ontology”. In T. J. Jan, Srzednicki, et al. (Eds.), Lésniewski’s Systems. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff
Lowe, E. J. (2006). The Four-Category Ontology. Oxford: Clarendon Press
Lyons, C. (1999). Definiteness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Martin, R. M. (1953). On Truth and Multiple Denotation. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 18(1), 11–18
Matthews, G. (1982). “Accidental Unities.” In: Malcolm Schofield and Martha C. Nussbaum (eds.), Language and Logos. Cambridge University Press
Mithun, M. (1984). The Evolution of Noun Incorporation. Language, 60(4), 847–894
Modarresi, F. (2014). Bare Nouns in Persian: Interpretation, Grammar and Prosody. PhD thesis, University of Ottawa and HU Berlin
Sommers, F. (1982). The Logic of Natural Language. Oxford: Clarendon Press
Sousedik, S. (2006). Identitní teorie predicace. Prague: OIKOYMENH
White, N. P. (1971). Aristotle on Sameness and Oneness. The Philosophical Review, 80(2), 177–197
Wiggins, D. (1984). The Sense and Reference of Predicates: A Running Repair to Frege’s Doctrine and a Plea for the Copula. The Philosophical Quarterly, 34(136), 311–328
Woodger, J. H. (1951). Science Without Properties. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2(7), 193–216
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Publisher’s Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Hennig, B. Quiddities and repeatables: towards a tripartite analysis of simple predicative statements. Synthese 200, 216 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03627-9
Received:
Revised:
Accepted:
Published:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03627-9