Abstract
Predicates of personal taste (PPT) have attracted a great deal of attention from philosophers of language and linguists. In the intricate debates over PPT, arguably the most central consideration has been which analysis of PPT can best account for the possibility of faultless disagreement about matters of personal taste. I argue that two models of such disagreement—the relativist and absolutist models—are empirically inadequate. In their stead, I develop a model of faultless taste disagreement which represents it as involving a novel incompatibility relation between preferences that I call type-noncotenability. This model is available to all parties in the ongoing debates about PPT, but it points up an advantage enjoyed by expressivist accounts of PPT. In closing, I consider four objections against the model that, while failing to fully undermine it, open up promising avenues of inquiry about the nature of disagreement.
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16 August 2021
A Correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03357-4
Notes
In recent years, expressivist analyses of PPT have also gained traction, and in § 4, we’ll see that they indeed deserve a great deal of attention. For discussion of expressivist accounts, see Barker (2010), Buekens (2009a, 2009b, 2011), Clapp (2015), Eriksson (2016), Gutzmann (2016), Kölbel (2002, ch. 4, 2004a, § V), Lasersohn (2005, §4.3), MacFarlane (2014 §§ 1.3, 7.3), Richard (2008, ch. 5), and Zouhar (2019). See also Hirvonen et al. (2019) and Huvenes (2012, 2014).
Proponents of contextualism about PPT include Barker (2013), Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009, ch. 4), Capraru (2016), Glanzberg (2007), Hîncu (2015), Huvenes (2012), López de Sa (2008, 2015), Marques (2015), Marques and García-Carpintero (2014), Pearson (2013), Schaffer (2011), Silk (2016), Snyder (2013), Sundell (2011), and Zouhar (2018). See also Recanati (2007, 91–94) and Moltmann (2010).
Strictly speaking, contextualists can take (1)’s semantic content to be a temporally neutral proposition; however, we can safely set aside issues related to tense for present purposes.
In what follows, I'll use angle brackets to denote propositions.
I here categorize both non-indexical contextualism (defended by Kölbel (2004a, 2009, § 2.1) and assessment-sensitivism (defended by Lasersohn (2005, 2013, 2017) and MacFarlane (2014)) as species of relativism. Dan Zeman (2013, 2015) has also offered notable defenses of relativism, and see also the allied proposal by Diaz-Legaspe (2013).
For data which corroborate the hypothesis that ordinary speakers would take Jill and Paul to faultlessly disagree, see Beebe (2014, Fig. 1, pp. 172–6), Beebe et al. (2015, Table 3, Fig. 2), Beebe and Sackris (2016, Fig. 1), Cova and Pain (2012), Foushee and Srinivasan (2017, Fig. 2 , pp. 383–4), Goodwin and Darley (2008, Tables 1 and 2, Fig. 1, 2012, p. 252), Kaiser and Rudin (2020), Kuhn et al. (2000, p. 318, Table 4), and Solt (2018, Fig. 1). Regarding young children, cf. Foushee and Srinivasan (2017, Figs. 4 and 5).
Of course, some theorists have argued that faultless disagreement is impossible; see the references in Wyatt (2018, n. 17). Rather than directly rebutting their arguments, our strategy will be to construct a novel model of faultless taste disagreement and to then show how it withstands a variety of objections. It should be profitable for future studies to reassess their arguments in connection with this model.
See Barker (2013), Huvenes (2012, 2014), Marques (2015), Marques and García-Carpintero (2014), Parsons (2013), Plunkett and Sundell (2013), Schaffer (2011, p. 219; cf. pp. 218–19, 219–20), Sundell (2011, 2016, 2017), Zakkou (2019a, 2019b), and Zouhar (2018). The model developed by López de Sa (2007. 2008. 2010. 2015, §§ 2–3) contains some additional subtleties that won’t be pertinent to what follows. Cp. Moltmann (2010, § 5.3). Pearson (2013, § 4.1). and Silk (2016, ch. 7).
Some versions of the contextualist model integrate non-doxastic attitudes and, in that respect, resemble expressivist models of faultless taste disagreement. For additional discussion of expressivist models, see Barker (2010), Beddor (2019, § 4), Buekens (2009a, 2009b, 2011), Clapp (2015), Eriksson (2016), Gutzmann (2016), Kölbel (2002, ch. 4, 2004a, § 5), Lasersohn (2005, § 4.3, 2017), MacFarlane (2014, §§ 1.3, 7.3), Richard (2008, ch. 5), Smith (2010, pp. 199–200, §§ 5–6), and Wyatt (2018). Cp. the model proposed by Diaz-Legaspe (2015, 2016). In § 3, we’ll say more about the possibility of appealing to non-doxastic attitudes in thinking about faultless taste disagreement.
Cova and Pain’s findings are corroborated in numerous additional studies. These include Beebe (2014, Fig. 1, pp. 172–6), Beebe et al. (2015, Table 3, Fig. 2), Beebe and Sackris (2016, Fig. 1), Cohen and Nichols (2010, Figs. 1 and 2), Foushee and Srinivasan (2017, Fig. 2, pp. 383–4), Goodwin and Darley (2008, Tables 1 and 2, Fig. 1, 2012, p. 252), Kuhn et al. (2000, p. 318, Table 4), and Solt (2018, Fig. 1). See also Cova et al. (2015, p. 930), Kuhn et al. (2000, p. 323) and Nichols and Folds-Bennett (2003, Table 1, p. B28 and Table 2, p. B30). Regarding young children, cf. Foushee and Srinivasan (2017, Figs. 4 and 5). For some suggestive remarks to the contrary, see Hirvonen (2016, § 3.1). I also discuss Cova and Pain’s findings in Wyatt (2018), though here, I use these findings to assess both the relativist and the absolutist models.
In what follows, we’ll make use of a rather minimal notion of an MPT that preserves neutrality as to the metaphysics of MPT (e.g. whether their nature is purely subjective or is, to some extent, objective). In the minimal sense, an MPT is simply a subject matter, or topic, about which one speaks when using unembedded PPT, as in (1) above. It’s natural to say that someone who assertively utters (1) speaks about a topic such as whether sauerkraut is tasty, or whether sauerkraut’s flavor is pleasing to their tastes. Whether sauerkraut is tasty and whether sauerkraut’s flavor is pleasing to a given person’s tastes will then count as examples of MPT.
Note that (D) should be read synchronically, rather than diachronically. Note also that strictly speaking, we need only assume that (D) holds in most cases; an irrational or confused person, for instance, might fail to behave in accordance with (D).
I would emphasize that Cova and Pain’s findings don’t indicate that we tend to lack beliefs of any sort about MPT. It’s compatible with their findings, taken together with (D), that we do tend to believe relativized propositions about MPT, e.g. 〈sauerkraut's flavor is pleasing to Jill’s tastes at t〉. What their findings indicate, rather, is that if we do tend to have beliefs about MPT, then they aren’t beliefs in absolute propositions, but beliefs in propositions of some other sort(s).
Note that despite the ingenuity of his analysis of PPT, it won’t help relativists or absolutists to bring in Kindermann (2019, § 6)’s notion of ‘n-belief,’ insofar as doing so would be tantamount to appealing to beliefs in relativized propositions.
Admittedly, though, it may be possible in the face of the above considerations to craft an appealing doxastic model of faultless taste disagreement. Andy Egan, for instance, has developed an explicitly de se version of the relativist model that may be compatible with Cova and Pain’s findings. I would point out, though, that in developing this model, Egan (2014, pp. 95–6) suggests that the best account of how we can disagree in thought about MPT will invoke our non-doxastic attitudes regarding MPT. Accordingly, Egan should find value in the theoretical resources that I detail below.
Bob Beddor (2019) has also recently put forward a highly original view of faultless taste disagreement. A signature claim of this view (ibid. § 5) is that there are no objective facts about whether speakers stand in taste disagreement. Rather, Beddor proposes that in theorizing about such disagreement, we should, in essence, shift from the material to the formal mode and provide truth-conditions for various sorts of disagreement ascriptions. Some of these ascriptions are true and some aren’t, and which ones come out as true, Beddor argues, depends on facts about the syntax of English—as well as, presumably, facts about the syntax of other natural languages that we might study. Beddor contends, then, that we should give up on trying to understand the nature of taste disagreement and opt instead for the syntax-driven, language-relative analysis that he develops. Beddor’s arguments are subtle, and I lack the space to evaluate them in detail here (though in §§ 3.1 and 5.2, we’ll discuss two concerns that are based on his work). I should say, however, that I take the plausibility of the model that I’ll detail in §§ 3.3 and 5 to constitute evidence that we can in fact construct a satisfactory account of the nature of taste disagreement which doesn’t advert to syntactic facts.
Cp. Huvenes (2012, § 7).
Henceforth, we’ll mostly omit the ‘other things being equal’ qualifier, though it should still be mentally inserted.
See Egan (2014) for a doxastic account of taste disagreement that proceeds along similar lines.
In effect, then, the content of pAN is the sort of content that the Lewisian account considered just above would assign to pJill and pPaul. It would also be suitable to describe pAN as having the generic content that one do a1, rather than a2. López de Sa (2015, p. 159) floats a similar notion, but the details are sketchy.
It should be carefully observed, especially in connection with the Lewisian account mentioned above, that we are using anonymized variants to fulfill a specific theoretical goal—namely, generating an account of the nature of taste disagreement. In so fulfilling this goal, we need not assume that anonymized variants feature in human psychology. Rather, it may be that the best description of human psychology appeals to non-anonymized preferences such as (6) and (7).
The reason for the qualification is that there may be other reasons why they are faultless. For instance, if contextualism about PPT is correct, then they may also be faultless insofar as they both assert and believe true (relativized) propositions.
Given that speakers like Jill and Paul tend to appreciate that it is rational for them to hold their respective preferences, the TNC model also looks to deliver an account of what is often called parity in connection with taste disagreement. For a recent discussion of some important subtleties related to parity, see Ferrari (2016).
The conclusions that I advance in this section extend the complementary conclusions that have been drawn by Beddor (2019, § 6), Belleri and Palmira (2013, § 4), Furey (2017, esp. p. 525), Huvenes (2012, p. 179), Lopes (2017, § 3.3), López de Sa (2015, § 3; 2017, § 2.2.1), Palmira (2015, § 6.3, 2017, pp. 311–12), Plunkett and Sundell (2013, p. 18), and Stojanovic (2017, § 1). See also the suggestive remarks by Dreier (2009, pp. 106–7). My conclusions are also similar to, though more concessive than, those forwarded by Anthony (2016, § 3).
Thanks to J. Adam Carter and Hwan Ryu for discussion of this objection.
In thinking about d, we’ve considered only a basic case that serves to motivate its introduction. Erich Rast (2018) has compellingly argued that precisely articulating d will require more mathematical subtlety, given the possibility of what he calls ‘perspectival disagreement.’ Also, I’ve assumed in Fig. 2 that d is symmetric. If this assumption proves to be questionable, then we can easily insert more boxes on the far right. Additionally, note that given our reflections in § 5.4 below, we’ll need to amend the threshold described here when considering exocentric preferences.
It is presumably the case that disagreement involving credences is similarly graded, as e.g. Palmira (2017, p. 302) argues. See also Rowbottom (2018, § 3).
Cp. the germinal ideas in López de Sa (2015, p. 159), MacFarlane (2014, p. 123), Marques (2015, pp. 6–7, 2016); Rovane (2012, p. 246), and Schaffer (2011, p. 212). Note that this definition allows that we can experience conflict over matters other than MPT.
Also, note that conflict is distinct from the relation that Belleri (2014) calls ‘dispute’ and from the activity of disagreeing, as characterized by e.g. Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009, pp. 60–1), Kinzel and Kusch (2018), and MacFarlane (2014, § 6.1). On the latter, cp. also Rowbottom (2018, § 5).
Note that Stevenson’s use of ‘divergent’ diverges a bit from ours.
We’ll refine the latter claim just below, in § 5.4.
We’re assuming, of course, that Hsiangyun believes that she is fully located within Taipei and that Charles believes that he is not even partially located within Taipei.
Disagreement pluralism has a strong foothold in contemporary discussions; my aim here is to offer a sharpened formulation of the view, as it pertains to doxastic and taste disagreement. For relevant discussion, see Baker (2014), Diaz-Legaspe (2015, 2016), Egan (2012, pp. 575–6, 2014, pp. 95–7); Eriksson (2016, § 8), Huvenes (2012, § 7), López de Sa (2015, § 2), MacFarlane (2014, ch. 6), Marques (2014), Marques and García-Carpintero (2014), Moruzzi (ms); Osorio and Villanueva (2019), Palmira (2017), Ridge (2013), and Sundell (2011, §§ 2 and 3). See also Davis (2015, n. 6) and Stojanovic (2019, § 5), as well as Baker and Woods (2015, § III)’s helpful remarks on ‘A-type’ and ‘B-type discordance.’.
It may be, for instance, that R is stronger than type-noncotenability insofar as it requires that A and B’s beliefs concern the same circumstance of evaluation c, i.e. that the truth-conditions of their beliefs involve the same parameters (world, time, location, etc.). This condition isn’t met the Taipei case, and this may suffice to explain why Charles and Hsiangyun fail to stand in doxastic disagreement. Alternatively, it may be that doxastic disagreement involves an incompatibility relation that differs in kind from type-noncotenability, as e.g. Belleri and Palmira (2013), Marques (2014), and Palmira (2017) have argued.
This is familiar territory for veterans of other pluralism debates, e.g. those concerning truth, logical consequence, or epistemic justification. For instance, on the unity challenge for truth pluralism, see Pedersen and Lynch (2018, § 20.3.2). For additional articulations of the unity challenge for disagreement pluralism, see Palmira (2017, p. 297), Ridge (2013, 2014: ch. 6); and Zeman (2020a, § 5).
Of course, it may be that doxastic disagreement comes in a plurality of forms, as Palmira (2017) has recently argued. In this case, the unity challenge becomes even more pressing, as we have more relations to consider.
Cp. Baker (2014, p. 41), Dugas (2018, pp. 138, 146), Huvenes (2012, p. 178), Ridge (2013, pp. 55–6, 59–60, 2014, pp. 187, 189–190), and Wright (2001, p. 53, 2006, p. 38). Zeman (2020b) has recently advanced what he calls a ‘minimal’ notion of disagreement, which is meant to play essentially the same role as (GD). While I lack the space to discuss this notion in detail, I would note that it comes with the requirement (ibid. § 3) that attitudes α and β have the same content. Insofar as it is free from this requirement, (GD) is even more minimal than Zeman’s notion. Given the discussion in his § 2, I take it that he would regard this as a virtue.
We should mention a few caveats regarding (GD). First, it may be that there are ‘mixed’ instances of disagreement, in which α and β are attitudes of different kinds (this wouldn’t be so surprising, insofar as pluralist theories and ‘mixing cases’ seem to go hand in hand). If there are, then we’ll need to amend (GD) accordingly. Secondly, it may be that A and B can be in disagreement in virtue of one of them having, while the other lacks, an attitude of a certain kind; see e.g. Worsnip (2019, § 3.2). If so, then we can easily amend (GD) to accommodate this possibility. Thirdly, it may be that we ultimately want a generic notion of disagreement that applies not only to individuals, but also to groups (on group disagreement, see e.g. Carter (2016)). (GD) can be generalized to cover group disagreement, given a plausible account of the conditions under which a group counts as having (or lacking) a particular attitude α. Fourthly, note that (GD) is meant to deliver a generic notion of synchronic, rather than diachronic, disagreement (for helpful remarks on diachronic agreement, see Rowbottom (2018, § 4)).
Lastly, I would note that Palmira (2017, pp. 312–13) suggests that if we treat doxastic and conative (e.g. preferential) disagreement as exemplifying a generic notion of disagreement, then since doxastic disagreement is importantly “normative,” conative disagreement should be as well. This suggestion is plausible, yet I suspect that the norms governing conative disagreement are fairly complex, insofar as they presumably depend upon facts about the context in which such disagreement occurs. Accordingly, I’ll defer investigation of these norms for the time being.
In this respect, (GD) improves upon certain recent attempts to offer a ‘minimal’ or ‘basic’ notion of disagreement, which cover only truth-evaluable attitudes such as beliefs. For discussion, see Baker (2014, pp. 41–2), Belleri and Palmira (2013), Coliva and Moruzzi (2014), Palmira (2015, p. 5, 2017, pp. 286, 304–5); Sundell (2011, § 2), and Zeman (2020a, 2020b).
There are also cases of what Beddor (2019, pp. 824 ff., 2020, p. 536) calls ‘speechless disagreement,’ in which subjects disagree although the disagreement is never voiced. The most natural way of accounting for such disagreements is in terms of the incompatible (doxastic or non-doxastic) attitudes of the subjects.
We can of course amend Fig. 3 if we determine that disagreement involving some other kind of attitude—e.g. credences or desires—consists in a further relation R´. Also, in fully developing disagreement pluralism, we will need to determine which relation is represented by the arrows in Fig. 3. As truth pluralists have investigated a number of relevant relations, that literature should be particularly helpful here. For an instructive overview, see Edwards (2018, ch. 7). See also Kim and Pedersen (2018), Newhard (2014), and Wyatt (2014, § 5.5).
See also Egan (2010, pp. 251–2).
Note, then, that we treat de nobis preferences as exocentric.
Note also that whereas it is plausible that autocentric uses of PPT, such as Jill and Paul’s respective uses in (2) and (3), express the speaker’s autocentric preference regarding an MPT, exocentric uses of PPT and exocentric preferences regarding MPT don’t seem to be similarly aligned. For instance, when he uses ‘tasty’ exocentrically in (16), Sebastian doesn’t seem to express his preference that Lulu experience the new food’s flavor, rather than not (perhaps he doesn’t care what flavors Lulu experiences as long as she’s content). Rather, he seems to attribute to Lulu the autocentric preference that Lulu experience the new food’s flavor, rather than not. This asymmetry between autocentric and exocentric uses of PPT is striking and will need to be explained by an adequate account of PPT.
Note that the refined model also handles cases in which A has the autocentric preference that they experience sauerkraut’s flavor, rather than not and B has the exocentric preference that A not experience sauerkraut’s flavor, rather than experiencing its flavor. A and B are classified as being in exocentric taste disagreement about A experiencing sauerkraut’s flavor, which is precisely what we want.
This confirms MacFarlane (2014, p. 123)’s sense that if (autocentric) taste disagreement involves incompatible non-doxastic attitudes such as preferences, then such disagreement is “rather thin.” Of course, MacFarlane takes the resulting ‘thinness’ to be problematic. However, once we are careful to order different varieties of disagreement according to their strength, we can happily allow that some such varieties are in fact ‘thinner’ (that is, weaker) than others.
This paper has benefitted from a great deal of feedback. In addition to the people mentioned above, thanks go to Dan Zeman and Mihai Hîncu, Matthew Chrisman, Graham Hubbs, Nikolaj Pedersen, Jisoo Seo, Tim Sundell, participants at the Workshop on Relativism in Epistemology and Semantics at the University of Vienna, participants at the Relativisms Workshop III at Yonsei University, my colleagues at the University of Waikato, and two anonymous referees for this journal.
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This article belongs to the topical collection “New Work on Disagreement”, edited by Dan Zeman and Mihai Hîncu.
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Wyatt, J. The nature of disagreement: matters of taste and environs. Synthese 199, 10739–10767 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03266-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03266-6