Abstract
Many contemporary logicians acknowledge a plurality of logical theories and accept that theory choice is in part motivated by logical evidence. However, just as there is no agreement on logical theories, there is also no consensus on what constitutes logical evidence. In this paper, I outline Jean Piaget’s psychological theory of reasoning and show how he used it to diagnose and solve one of the paradoxes of material implication. I assess Piaget’s use of psychology as a source of evidence for logical theory in light of reservations raised by psychologism, and I highlight some ramifications for exceptionalism and anti-exceptionalism about logic by considering his use of psychology as logical evidence in the framework of genetic epistemology, Piaget’s research programme. I conclude that Piaget’s psychological theory of reasoning not only plausibly serves as a source of evidence for logical theory but also makes a strong case for anti-exceptionalism about logic.
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Notes
Following Hjortland (2019, Sec. 2; see also 2017, Secs. 3 & 4), I will use ‘logical theory’ to denote an account of logical properties such as validity, consistency, formality, truth preservation, provability, etc.
However, I will continue to use ‘logic’ in the singular rather than the plural to refer to logical theories in a generic way despite logical pluralism.
Since the logical operators are simply alternative expressions for disjunctions of conjunctions, the 16 logical operators are the operands of the grouping (cf. Seltman and Seltman 1985).
Piaget was not well acquainted with contemporary developments in mathematical logic (Grize 2013, p. 149).
Shapiro (2000, pp. 108–9) draws attention to changes in the meaning of ‘analyticity’ introduced by Frege and I use the term here in this sense.
The examples come from (Restall 2006, p. 65).
Like p → q and p ⊃ q, p ↔ q denotes the formal truth of the logical operator p≡q.
In ‘Paradoxes of Material Implication—a Piagetian Perspective’, I also conclude that CL and Piaget’s logical theory would constitute rival logical theories.
Referring to natural language intuitions as a source of logical evidence, Priest (2016, p. 44) requires them to be robust; i.e., purged of performance errors. However, there is no independent criteria for their robustness; the people making the mistakes simply recognised them when the error is pointed out.
Piaget (Piaget and Grize 1972, pp. 15:7–8) comes to the same conclusion about logic but by considering logic itself.
According to Priest (2016, pp. 40–1), logic is a social science; theory and subject matter in logic may not therefore enjoy the same independence as in the natural sciences.
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This article belongs to the topical collection "Anti-Exceptionalism about Logic", edited by Ben Martin, Maria Paola Sforza Fogliani, and Filippo Ferrari.
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Winstanley, M.A. A psychological theory of reasoning as logical evidence: a Piagetian perspective. Synthese 199, 10077–10108 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03237-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03237-x