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Pathways of influence: understanding the impact of philosophy of science in scientific domains

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Abstract

Philosophy of science has the potential to enhance scientific practice, science policy, and science education; moreover, recent research indicates that many philosophers of science think we ought to increase the broader impacts of our work. Yet, there is little to no empirical data on how we are supposed to have an impact. To address this problem, our research team interviewed 35 philosophers of science regarding the impact of their work in science-related domains. We found that face-to-face engagement with scientists and other stakeholders was one of the most—if not the most—effective pathways to impact. Yet, working with non-philosophers and disseminating research outside philosophical venues is not what philosophers are typically trained or incentivized to do. Thus, there is a troublesome tension between the activities that are likely to lead to broader uptake of one’s work and those that are traditionally encouraged and rewarded in philosophy (and which are therefore the most consequential for careers in philosophy). We suggest several ways that philosophers of science, either as individuals or as a community, can navigate these tensions.

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Notes

  1. The survey data are reported and discussed in Plaisance et al. (2019), though we draw on those data in this paper to highlight points of convergence between the survey and interview findings.

  2. Note that these questions were posed in a semi-structured way and followed a sequential design based on the framework proposed by Small (2009).

  3. Notably, purposeful sampling is not meant to be representative (which is why we separately collected quantitative data via the survey), but it is best for understanding context and identifying processes and pathways (our primary goal for this study). While a full discussion of sampling methods is beyond the scope of this paper, readers interested in current best practices can consult Creswell and Poth (2018).

  4. Our study was reviewed by and received clearance from the Office of Research Ethics at the University of Waterloo (ORE #21711/30938).

  5. Note that gender was determined based on participants’ pronouns at the time of the interview. In cases where a participant used gender non-binary pronouns or where their pronouns had changed, we asked which category they felt better reflected their gender identity at the time of the interview. We decided not to list the specific number of non-binary individuals that we interviewed in order to protect participants’ identities. Furthermore, we chose not to associate demographic information with participant quotations when reporting our findings as doing so would likely have made certain individuals easier to identify.

  6. For methodological overviews, see Miles et al. (2013), Aurini (2016), and Saldaña (2018).

  7. As an example of analyzing scientific disagreement, an anonymous reviewer suggested that philosophers of science could identify specific scientific controversies that turn on different philosophical assumptions and show how philosophical reflection clarifies these controversies. Examples include examining the scientific status of string theory, analyzing conceptions of race and species, and illuminating conflicting notions of reductionism in chemistry. Indeed, some philosophers have been doing exactly this sort of work.

  8. Fisher and Schuurbiers (2013) use this term a bit differently, with “upstream” referring to the research conceptualization and design phase, “downstream” referring to research outcomes, and “midstream” referring to everything in between. We have chosen to distinguish these stages at slightly different points along the research trajectory, though we note that neither delineation is perfect (e.g., research outputs for one project can become part of the research design for another). Our main goal in drawing these distinctions is to show how much impact happens separately from traditional publications themselves.

  9. See Holbrook (2019) for more on the role of serendipity in designing high-impact research.

  10. Our survey data suggested that co-authoring with scientists was pretty common, with just over half of respondents reporting that they had experience co-authoring manuscripts with scientists. The survey sample was skewed towards tenured professors, but the relatively high amount of cross-disciplinary collaboration was nevertheless surprising, especially given the common narrative of philosophy as a ‘solo author’ discipline (e.g., Frodeman and Briggle 2016).

  11. For a detailed case of the broader impacts of teaching, see Shrader-Frechette (2010).

  12. Notably, this study only looked at citation patterns with respect to peer-reviewed articles. While its findings are in line with our interview data, there is some evidence that books written by philosophers are given broader uptake relative to philosophy journal articles (e.g., Heather Douglas’s (2009) book on Science and Values and Helen Longino’s (1990) Science as Social Knowledge).

  13. This is taken from sociologist Duncan Watts’ (2011) book, Everything is Obvious: Once You Know the Answer.

  14. See Plaisance (2020) for an in-depth discussion of how immersing oneself in a scientific community can lead to socio-epistemic benefits that include increased uptake of one’s work.

  15. This framework is also referred to as ‘SIAMPI’, as it arose from a project on “Social Impact Assessment Methods for research and funding instruments through the study of ‘productive interactions’ between science and society” (Spaapen and van Drooge 2011, p. 212).

  16. Spaapen and van Drooge (2011) actually identify three types of productive interactions, adding financial interactions to the list. We have left those out here, as they are rarely (if ever) relevant when it comes to philosophical work.

  17. We’re grateful to Adam Briggle for bringing this concept to our attention.

  18. Notably, we recently received a grant to conduct this next phase, which will include interviews with scientists who have collaborated with philosophers.

  19. Personal communication, Ruth Knechtel, Office of Research, University of Waterloo.

  20. One of our participants, a prominent philosopher of science, noted that despite being incredibly prolific in philosophy, they were unable to successfully publish in relevant science journals. They attributed this to the challenges of writing according to the norms of that scientific discipline. Notably, this participant had not attempted to co-author with practicing scientists.

  21. We strongly advise those who are unfamiliar with these techniques to reach out to research librarians at their institution.

  22. Notably, Dotson (2012) pushes back against the entire “culture of justification” (see Plaisance et al. (2019) for a more detailed discussion of how her argument relates to our findings).

  23. Indeed, as mentioned above, that is precisely the next stage of our research project, which focuses on ways of increasing knowledge flow between philosophy and STEM fields.

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Acknowledgements

We have many people to thank for helping us bring this project to fruition—it was truly a collaborative effort. First and foremost, we owe a debt of gratitude to the participants for being so generous with their time and for sharing their views and experiences with us. We would also like to thank those who provided input on our study design, analysis, and draft manuscripts. While many people contributed valuable insights, we’re especially grateful to Carla Fehr and two anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful questions and comments. This research was funded by an Insight Development Grant through the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) of Canada (Grant No. 430-2016-01137). It has been reviewed by and received ethics clearance through a University of Waterloo Research Ethics Committee (ORE #21711/30938).

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Correspondence to Kathryn S. Plaisance.

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Plaisance, K.S., Michaud, J. & McLevey, J. Pathways of influence: understanding the impact of philosophy of science in scientific domains. Synthese 199, 4865–4896 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-03007-1

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