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Implicit biases in visually guided action

  • S.I.: Between Vision and Action
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Abstract

For almost half a century dual-stream advocates have vigorously defended the view that there are two functionally specialized cortical streams of visual processing originating in the primary visual cortex: a ventral, perception-related ‘conscious’ stream and a dorsal, action-related ‘unconscious’ stream. They furthermore maintain that the perceptual and memory systems in the ventral stream are relatively shielded from the action system in the dorsal stream. In recent years, this view has come under scrutiny. Evidence points to two overlapping action pathways: a dorso-dorsal pathway that calculates features of the object to be acted on, and a ventro-dorsal pathway that transmits stored information about skilled object use from the ventral stream to the dorso-dorsal pathway. This evidence suggests that stored information may exert significantly more influence on visually guided action than hitherto assumed. I argue that this, in turn, supports the notion of skilled automatic action that is nonetheless agential. My focus here will be on actions influenced by implicit biases (stereotypes/prejudices). Action that is biased in this way, I argue, is in an important sense intentional and agential.

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Fig. 1
Fig. 2

From Binkofski and Fink (2005). (Color figure online)

Fig. 3

From McIntosh and Lashleya (2008)

Fig. 4

From Chechlacz (2018)

Fig. 5

From Takemura et al. (2016). Reprinted with permission

Fig. 6

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. There are auditory, tactile and emotional dual streams that parallel the dual visual streams (Romanski et al. 1999; Reed et al. 2005; Brogaard et al. 2017). However, most research has focused on vision. Here the main focus will also be on vision.

  2. Milner and Goodale's claim that conscious vision is associated with representations in allocentric space is not universally accepted. On the attended intermediate-level representation theory of consciousness (AIR), advocated by Jesse Prinz (2000, 2012), conscious experiences are attended intermediate-level representations. Intermediate-level representations differ from representations in allocentric space. Representations in allocentric space represent abstract viewpoint-independent features of three-dimensional objects that are generated by abstracting away from the vantage point of view and surface details. Intermediate-level representations, by contrast, represent objects and the features they instantiate from the perceiver’s point of view. Because they reflect the retinal imprint (when veridical) yet capture information about Gestalt grouping, e.g., depth and orientation, they are also referred to as ‘2½-D sketches’ in David Marr’s (1982) terminology.

  3. It should be noted that the hypothesis that properties like the size and location of an object are computed in the dorsal stream in the absence of visual awareness should not be taken to imply that these properties are not consciously available. One possibility consistent with Milner and Goodale’s two-stream hypothesis is that the size and location of an object are also computed in the ventral stream, where they can be consciously accessed. On the three-stream hypothesis, which we will introduce below, information about the size and location of an object needed for the action system to generate a motor representation may be computed in the ventral stream before entering the action system.

  4. There has been a lot of debate about whether these kinds of influences count as instances of cognitive penetration of the action system. See e.g. Nanay (2013a, b), Mahon and Wu (2015), Burnston (2017a, b), Toribio (forthcoming). There is a parallel debate about whether the perceptual system in the ventral stream is cognitively penetrable (see e.g. Toribio 2018b for one stance in this debate). As there appear to be substantial cross-communication between the perception/cognition system in the ventral stream and the action system in the dorsal streams, even in online activities, these debates may well be interconnected. I will not take a stance on the question of cognitive penetration here. However, it is arguable that the more philosophically interesting question is that of whether the activation of implicit biases can bias how we act. Here I argue that it probably can bias how we act by modulating our intentions as opposed to modulating our motor representations or actions directly.

  5. While both future- and present-direct intentions are in some sense future-directed, present-directed intentions are intentions occurring immediately prior to the onset of the whole action or intentions occurring during (or in) action.

  6. Others have made similar distinctions. For example, Wilfrid Sellars distinguishes between intentions for the future and volitions, where volitions are what intentions for the future become when it’s time to act (Sellars 1966: p. 110). John McDowell (2010) argues that when ‘volition’ is understood in this way, then it cannot be used to refer to intentions that arise for the first time when it’s time to act. For that reason, he prefers to distinguish the notion of intentions in action, where the latter can be volitions in Sellars’ sense or novel present-directed intentions, which he prefers to express as ‘I am (willfully) ϕ-ing’ rather than ‘I will ϕ now’. For example, ‘I am raising my hand’ as opposed to ‘I will raise my hand now’ or ‘my hand is rising’.

  7. On the distinction between conscious and unconscious intentions, see also Anthony Marcel (2003) and Alfred Mele (2010).

  8. Skilled unreflective actions are actions that (1) involve mastery of a given skill, such as turkey carving, swimming or driving a car; and (2) unfold without the agent explicitly thinking about what she is doing (Brownstein 2014; see also Marcel 2003; Velleman 2008; Railton 2009; Annas 2011).

  9. For details of this type of view, see e.g. Gendler (2011), Holroyd (2012, 2015) and Sullivan-Bissett (2015).

  10. On this model, implicit biases do not encompass implicit prejudices understood as affective responses. I take stereotypes to accommodate evaluative responses, like Muslims are dangerous or Blacks are aggressive (see Haslanger 2012, 2013). On an alternative model, implicit biases are clusters of co-activating representational and affective components (‘aliefs’ in Tamar Gendler’s 2008a, b sense; see also Gendler 2011, 2012; Amodio 2014; Madva and Brownstein 2018; Brogaard 2020).

  11. Doris (2015) offers an appealing, compatibilist account of “accountability” (or “responsibility”) in terms of “agency.” To a first approximation, an agent exercises (full-blown rather than mere causal) agency when her action is an expression of her values. Whether all implicitly intentional, discriminatory actions will turn out to be expressions of agential values is a question I will leave for a future occasion.

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Acknowledgements

For helpful comments or discussion of issues addressed in this paper, I am grateful to three anonymous reviewers for this journal, Bartek Chomanski, Jonathan Cohen, Andy Cui, John Doris, Dimitria E. Gatzia, Sally Haslanger, Aleks Hernandez, Bob Kentridge, Casey Landers, Azenet Lopez, Eric Mandelbaum, Chris Peacocke, Jesse Prinz, David Rosenthal, Mark Rowlands, Michael Slote, Thomas Alrik Sørensen, and audiences at the 2017 Meeting of the SPP, the 2018 Meeting of the SSPP, Duke University, NYU, Stanford University, University of Miami, University of Missouri, St. Louis, University of Oslo, University of Aalborg, University of Washington University, St. Louis, Aarhus University, and the Center for Humanities Fellowship Recipients, University of Miami 2018–2019.

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    Berit Brogaard

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Brogaard, B. Implicit biases in visually guided action. Synthese 198 (Suppl 17), 3943–3967 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02588-1

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