Skip to main content

Advertisement

SpringerLink
Log in

Commercial interests, agenda setting, and the epistemic trustworthiness of nutrition science

  • S.I.: Philosophy of Epidemiology
  • Published:
Synthese Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

The trustworthiness of nutrition science has been questioned recently. According to the critics, the food industry has corrupted scientists in the field. I argue that the worries that commercialization threatens the epistemic trustworthiness of nutrition science are indeed well-founded. However, it is problematic that the discussion has revolved around how funding can threaten the integrity of researchers and the methodological quality of the studies. By extending Wilholt’s (Br J Philos Sci 64(2):233–253, 2013) account of epistemic trustworthiness, I argue that when assessing the epistemic trustworthiness of research that forms the basis for different health policy measures, it is necessary to evaluate research at the macro-level and whether agenda setting advances the goals that are assigned to the field. The prevalence of commercial funding becomes problematic if it leads to a situation where the body of available evidence that is used for making health policy decisions does not reflect the shared sense of what epistemic and non-epistemic goals of the inquiry are important.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. I borrow the notion of the state of the research from David Hopf (Hopf, D. 2018. The Public Epistemic Trustworthiness of Science Concerning the State of Research. A paper presented at PSA2018, Seattle, 3.11.2018.).

  2. Epistemic aims of research include, for instance, developing theories that are consistent with accepted theories in other fields, gaining understanding of natural phenomena, and revoking flawed beliefs. Non-epistemic aims include, for instance, developing useful applications such as treatments for previously untreatable diseases.

  3. For an illustrative example of how methodological rules do not determine how meta-analyses are conducted, see Stegenga (2011).

  4. Inductive risk is the risk of inferring a false positive or false negative, i.e., accepting a false hypothesis or rejecting a hypothesis when in fact it is true (Rudner 1953; Douglas 2000; Elliott and Richards 2017).

  5. On challenges related to drug development, testing, and approval, see, e.g., La Caze and Osimani (Eds.), forthcoming.

  6. I thank an anonymous reviewer for stressing this point.

  7. As an anonymous reviewer remarks, resource allocation in nutrition is decentralized and many actors take part in the complex processes through which institutions, projects, and professional associations get their funding. See Nestle (2018).

  8. I thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this case to my attention.

  9. I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting using this case.

  10. See Nestle (2015) for a detailed analysis of the soda industry influence on nutrition research and health policy.

  11. In traditional philosophy of science, it was common to make a distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification. The context of discovery involves generation of new ideas, hypotheses and theories, as well as factors that may have an impact on it, such as resource allocation. In the context of justification, in turn, those ideas, hypotheses and theories are tested and validated. More recently, the possibility of making a clear distinction between the contexts of discovery and justification has been questioned. See, e.g., Schickore and Steinle (2006).

References

  • Austin, J., & Overholt, C. (1988). Nutrition policy: Building the bridge between science and politics. Annual Review of Nutrition, 8(1), 1–21.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bes-Rastrollo, M., Schulze, M. B., Ruiz-Canela, M., & Martinez-Gonzalez, M. A. (2013). Financial conflicts of interest and reporting bias regarding the association between sugar-sweetened beverages and weight gain: A systematic review of systematic reviews. PLoS Medicine, 10(12), e1001578.

    Google Scholar 

  • Biddle, J. (2007). Lessons from the Vioxx debacle: What the privatization of science can teach us about social epistemology. Social Epistemology, 21(1), 21–39.

    Google Scholar 

  • Blair, S., Hand, G., & Hill, J. (2015). Energy balance: A crucial issue for exercise and sports medicine. British Journal of Sports Medicine, 49, 970–971.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bueter, A. (2015). The irreducibility of value-freedom to theory assessment. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 49, 18–26.

    Google Scholar 

  • Byers, T. (1999). The role of epidemiology in developing nutritional recommendations: Past, present, and future. The American Journal of Clinical Nutrition, 69(6), 1304s–1308s.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carrier, M. (2017). Facing the credibility crisis of science: On the ambivalent role of pluralism in establishing relevance and reliability. Perspectives on Science, 25(4), 434–439.

    Google Scholar 

  • Caryn Rabin, R. (2018). It was supposed to be an unbiased study on drinking. They wanted to call it ‘Cheers’. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/18/health/nih-alcohol-study.html. Accessed 24 April 2019.

  • Dixon, V. (2016). Why corporations make it hard to trust nutrition studies. Two words: Funding bias. Eater. Retrieved from https://www.eater.com/2016/1/15/10769590/nutrition-research-corporate-funded. Accessed April 6, 2018.

  • Douglas, H. (2000). Inductive risk and values in science. Philosophy of Science, 67(4), 559–579.

    Google Scholar 

  • Douglas, H. (2009). Science, policy, and the value-free ideal. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Elliott, K. C., & Richards, T. (2017). Exploring inductive risk. Case studies of values in science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • European Commission. (2010). Science and technology report. Special eurobarometer 340/wave 73.1-TNS opinion and social. http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_340_en.pdf. Accessed 24 April 2019.

  • Folker, A. P., Andersen, H., & Sandøe, P. (2008). Implicit normativity in scientific advice. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, 51(2), 199–206.

    Google Scholar 

  • Folker, A. P., Holm, L., & Sandøe, P. (2009). ‘We have to go where the money is’—Dilemmas in the role of nutrition scientists: An interview study. Minerva, 47(2), 217–236.

    Google Scholar 

  • Freidberg, S. (2016). Wicked nutrition: The controversial greening of official dietary guidance. Gastronomica: The Journal of Critical Food Studies, 16(2), 69–80.

    Google Scholar 

  • Funk, C. (2017). Real numbers: Mixed messages about public trust in science. Issues in Science and Technology, 34(1). http://issues.org/34-1/real-numbers-mixed-messages-about-public-trust-in-science/. Accessed 24 April 2019.

  • Gunnarsson, A., & Elam, M. (2012). Food fight! The Swedish low-carb/high fat (LCHF) movement and the turning of science popularisation against the scientists. Science as Culture, 21(3), 315–334.

    Google Scholar 

  • Holman, B., & Bruner, J. (2017). Experimentation by industrial selection. Philosophy of Science, 84(5), 1008–1019.

    Google Scholar 

  • Huovila, J., & Saikkonen, S. (2015). Establishing credibility, constructing understanding: The epistemic struggle over healthy eating in the Finnish dietetic blogosphere. Health, 20(4), 383–400.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ioannidis, J. P. (2013). Implausible results in human nutrition research. BMJ, 347, f6698.

    Google Scholar 

  • Irzik, G., & Kurtulmus, F. (2018). What is epistemic public trust in science? The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axy006.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jallinoja, P., Jauho, M., & Mäkelä, J. (2016). Newspaper debates on milk fats and vegetable oils in Finland, 1978–2013: An analysis of conflicts over risks, expertise, evidence and pleasure. Appetite, 105, 274–282.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jauho, M. (2016). The social construction of competence: Conceptions of science and expertise among proponents of the low-carbohydrate high-fat diet in Finland. Public Understanding of Science, 25(3), 1–14.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jukola, S. (2015). Meta-analysis, ideals of objectivity, and the reliability of medical knowledge. Science and Technology Studies, 28(3), 101–120.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jukola, S. (2019). On the evidentiary standards for nutrition advice. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 73, 1–9.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kearns, C., Glantz, S., & Schmidt, L. (2015). Sugar industry influence on the scientific agenda of the National Institute of Dental Research’s 1971 National Caries Program: A historical analysis of internal documents. PLoS Medicine. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1001798.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kiljunen, P. (2016). Tiedebarometri 2016. Helsinki: Tieteen tiedotus. Available http://www.tieteentiedotus.fi/files/Tiedebarometri_2016.pdf. Accessed 24 April 2019.

  • La Caze, A. & Osimani, B. (Eds.) (Forthcoming). Uncertainty in pharmacology. Epistemology, methods, decisions. Berlin: Springer.

  • Lee, C., Sugimoto, C., Zhang, G., & Cronin, B. (2013). Bias in peer review. Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology, 64(1), 2–17.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lesser, L. I., Ebbeling, C. B., Goozner, M., Wypij, D., & Ludwig, D. S. (2007). Relationship between funding source and conclusion among nutrition-related scientific articles. PLoS Medicine, 4(1), e5.

    Google Scholar 

  • Longino, H. (1990). Science as social knowledge. Values and objectivity in scientific inquiry. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mann, J. I. (2010). Evidence-based nutrition: Does it differ from evidence-based medicine? Annals of Medicine, 42(7), 475–486.

    Google Scholar 

  • Merton, R. (1942). The normative structure of science. In The sociology of science. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 267–278.

  • Musschenga, A., vanderSteen, W., & Ho, V. (2010). The business of drug research: A mixed blessing. In H. Radder (Ed.), The commodification of academic science (pp. 110–131). Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nestle, M. (2001). Food company sponsorship of nutrition research and professional activities: A conflict of interest? Public Health Nutrition, 4(5), 1015–1022.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nestle, M. (2015). Soda politics: Taking on big soda (and winning). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nestle, M. (2016). Corporate funding of food and nutrition research: Science or marketing? JAMA Internal Medicine, 176(1), 13–14.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nestle, M. (2018). Unsavory truth. How food companies skew the science of what we eat. New York: Basic Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • O’Connor, A. (2015). Coca-Cola funds scientists who shift blame for obesity away from bad diets [Blog post]. Retrieved from https://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/08/09/coca-cola-funds-scientists-who-shift-blame-for-obesity-away-from-bad-diets/.

  • Penders, B., Wolters, A., Feskens, E. F., Brouns, F., Huber, M., Maeckelberghe, E. L., et al. (2017). Capable and credible? Challenging nutrition science. European Journal of Nutrition, 56(6), 2009–2012.

    Google Scholar 

  • Reiss, J., & Kitcher, P. (2009). Biomedical research, neglected diseases, and well-ordered science. THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia, 24(3), 263–282.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rudner, R. (1953). The scientist qua scientist makes value judgments. Philosophy of Science, 20(1), 1–6.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schickore, J., & Steinle, F. (Eds.). (2006). Revisiting discovery and justification: Historical and philosophical perspectives on the context distinction (14th ed.). Berlin: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shapin, S. (2007). Expertise, common sense, and the Atkins diet. In J. Porter & P. W. B. Phillips (Eds.), Public science in liberal democracy (pp. 174–193). Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Slaughter, S., & Leslie, L. (1999). Academic capitalism. Politics, science, and the entrepreneurial university. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Solomon, M. (2001). Social empiricism. Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stegenga, J. (2011). Is meta-analysis the platinum standard of evidence? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 42(4), 497–507.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stegenga, J. (2018). Medical nihilism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Subar, A. F., Freedman, L. S., Tooze, J. A., Kirkpatrick, S. I., Boushey, C., Neuhouser, M. L., et al. (2015). Addressing current criticism regarding the value of self-report dietary data. The Journal of Nutrition, 145(12), 2639–2645.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tirado Gilligan, H. (2015) Nutritional science isn‘t very scientific. Slate. Retrieved from http://www.slate.com/articles/life/food/2015/04/nutritional_clinical_trials_vs_observational_studies_for_dietary_recommendations.html. Accessed October 28, 2017.

  • US Department of Health and Human Services. (2015). 2015–2020 Dietary guidelines for Americans. Washington (DC): USDA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wilholt, T. (2009). Bias and values in scientific research. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 40(1), 92–101.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wilholt, T. (2013). Epistemic trust in science. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 64(2), 233–253.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wilholt, T. (2017). Climate models and non-epistemic values. Paper presented at EPSA17, Exeter, UK.

  • Wissenschaft im Dialog (2017). Science Barometer 2017. https://www.wissenschaft-im-dialog.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Projekte/Wissenschaftsbarometer/Dokumente_17/Einzelgrafiken/Sciencebarometer2017_brochure_web.pdf.

  • Worland, J. (2015). Anti-obesity group backed by Coca-Cola to shut down. Time. Retrieved from http://time.com/4131078/anti-obesity-coke-group/. Accessed October 1, 2018.

  • Wyatt, W. J., & Midkiff, D. M. (2006). Biological psychiatry: A practice in search of a science. Behavior and Social Issues, 15(2), 132–151.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

This research was funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation)—Project 254954344/GRK2073. I thank the anonymous reviewers as well as Stefano Canali, Martin Carrier, David Hopf, Marie Kaiser, Rui Maia, Cornelis Menke, Anja Pichl, Rose Trappes, and Roel Visser for their helpful comments and criticism.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Bielefeld University, Postfach 100131, 33501, Bielefeld, Germany

    Saana Jukola

  2. Department of Philosophy, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa

    Saana Jukola

Authors
  1. Saana Jukola
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Saana Jukola.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Jukola, S. Commercial interests, agenda setting, and the epistemic trustworthiness of nutrition science. Synthese 198 (Suppl 10), 2629–2646 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02228-3

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02228-3

Keywords

Search

Navigation