Abstract
Radical scepticism contends that our knowledge of the external world is impossible. Particularly, radical scepticism can be motivated by the closure principle (i.e., if one knows that P and one can competently deduce Q from P, then one is in a position to know that Q). Several commentators have noted that a straightforward way to respond to such arguments is via externalist strategies, e.g., Goldman (Justification and knowledge, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1979, Epistemology and cognition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1986), Greco (Putting skeptics in their places, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2000), Bergmann (Justification without awareness, Oxford University Press, New York, 2006). However, these externalist strategies are not effective against a slightly weaker form of the argument, a closure principle for rationally grounded knowledge, \({closure}_{RK.}\) The sceptical argument, framed around the \(\hbox {closure}_{\mathrm{RK}}\) principle (i.e., if S has rationally grounded knowledge that P, and S competently deduces Q from P, thereby forming a belief that Q on this basis while retaining her rationally grounded knowledge that P, then S has rationally grounded knowledge that Q), targets rationally grounded knowledge. Although externalist strategies are ineffective against this form of argument, its conclusion can nonetheless be resisted by combining, in a novel way, the resources of Wittgenstein and Davidson. In particular, I argue that the sceptic is assuming an unrestricted way of using the \(\hbox {closure}_{\mathrm{RK}}\) principle, which is incorrect. Alternatively, I argue for The Conditionality of Rational Support Thesis, i.e., the thesis that rational support via competent deduction is conditional. In particular, rational support must be provided within an evaluative system in which hinge propositions are presupposed and contentful beliefs are being evaluated. In the end, we can resist the \(\hbox {closure}_{\mathrm{RK }}\)-based sceptical argument while retaining the \(\hbox {closure}_{\mathrm{RK}}\) principle.
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Notes
Apart from the closure-based sceptical argument, the underdetermination-based sceptical argument is also a crucial way to motivate radical scepticism. See discussions of this approach in Brueckner (1994) and Pritchard (2005a). For a discussion of the relationship between the closure-based sceptical argument and the underdetermination-based sceptical argument, see Brueckner (1994), Cohen (1998), Pritchard (2005a) and Wang (2014).
Very roughly, I contend that the Wittgensteinian response is insufficient in that it is possible that rationally supported beliefs are massively false. This is because we have no reasons to believe hinge propositions true, and therefore the adoption of hinge propositions could be arbitrary. Hence beliefs supported by hinge propositions, although being rationally supported, can be massively false. The addition of Davidson, especially his semantic externalism, can help argue for the veridical nature of our beliefs or (its weakened version) that we must believe the veridical nature of our beliefs. At least for Davidson, basic beliefs are in its nature true because they owe their content to the external world directly. Hence, a combined Wittgensteinian–Davidsonian response should be favoured. This combined response is also superior to Davidson’s own anti-sceptical proposal. The simple reason is that, even if we grant that Davidson establishes the conclusion that belief is in its nature veridical, true beliefs still fall short of knowledge. See this worry expressed by Ludwig (1992) and Pritchard (2013). Hence, the addition of Wittgenstein helps Davidson to give an account of how true beliefs gain rational support so that knowledge is possible.
This formulation is from Pritchard (2005a, p. 38).
This is from Pritchard (2005a, p. 38).
Note that here epistemic internalism is understood along accessibilist line. Accessibilism states that, what S can know by reflection alone constitutes S’s internalist epistemic support for S’s belief. However, internalist can also endorse mentalism, which says that one’s mental states constitute one’s internalist epistemic support for one’s beliefs. For accessibilism, see Chisholm (1977). For mentalism, see Conee and Feldman (2004).
One’s denial of the sceptical hypothesis can be rational if one possesses an evidential reason to rule out the sceptical hypothesis. In most cases, this piece of evidential reason amounts to that one can discriminate the cases where the sceptical hypothesis obtains and the cases where it doesn’t.
I concede that this way of understanding the internalist/externalist distinction is contentious, but it suffices for current discussion.
For example, Greco (1999, p. 287) maintains that S’s belief that p is justified in case S’s believing that p results from stable and reliable dispositions that make up S’s cognitive character. Bergmann (2006, p. 505) argues that ‘justification depends on the belief’s being formed by properly functioning cognitive faculties.’
This is only a crude account provided by Goldman (1986). Defenders of reliabilism have provided many amendments and clarifications.
This is an example of the ‘meta-incoherence’ objection to standard process reliabilism. By meta-incoherence, I mean that one’s beliefs can be externally reliably formed but one is internally unjustified in holding them. Other examples see True Temp in Lehrer (1990) and Norman the Clairvoyant in BonJour (1980). Regarding the ‘meta-incoherence’ objection to standard process reliabilism, see responses from Goldman (1986, 1992) and Lyons (2009). Goldman (1986)’s response is to distinguish prima facie justification from ultima facie justification. In Goldman (1992), his response is ‘two-stage reliabilism’. Lyons (2009)’s response is that reliably formed belief is not sufficient for prima facie justification.
Technically, reliabilism is a theory of justification. When recast as a theory of knowledge, the reliabilist could argue that reliable true belief does not entail knowledge. Rather, it’s reliable true belief in the absence of any defeaters. See discussions in Goldman (1979), Lyons (2009) and Beddor (2015).
Note that this thesis is ruling out epistemic constraints. These constraints are in contrast to practical constraints, such as time, opportunity cost, space and imagination.
Pritchard takes this distinction in hinges to be consonant with Wittgenstein’s own thinking because Wittgenstein claims that hinge commitments might change over time (see OC §§96–99), but changes happen at the periphery and at an inevitably slow rate.
A wholesale rational evaluation means evaluating all beliefs at once.
See a recent detailed discussion in Wang (2015).
Radical interpretation is interpretation in an extreme case. Say an isolated island or an aboriginal tribe. One tries to understand local residents by attributing beliefs to them and attributing meaning to their utterances.
The cause of the speaker’s belief could be an object in the external environment or in her brain. If we cannot determine whether the cause is exactly, the content of the belief would be unclear. Moreover, if the cause is in her mind or brain, it makes no sense that it causes my belief as well. Only objects that are in the external world could be the common cause of our beliefs.
When a sentence or a belief is about an object, this sentence/belief involves a concept. To say that understanding a concept involves understanding relevant beliefs is, therefore, to say that a sentence’s meaning is determined by relevant sentences.
See more discussion in Malpas (2014).
Note that I don’t intend to get involved in the debate regarding how to understand Davidson’s anti-sceptical strategies here. For this debate, see Sosa (2009) and Brueckner (2010). Central to the debate is the issue: how to spell out the anti-sceptical efficacy of Davidson’s idea that belief is in its nature veridical? And if Davidson succeeds, his conclusion is meant to undermine the sceptical assumption that our beliefs can be massively false. Note that this way of understanding Davidson is basically targeting at the first claim of the closure\(_{RK}\)-based sceptical argument. My approach, nonetheless, targets the second claim of the closure\(_{RK}\)-based sceptical argument. Hence, it is not necessary for me to address any objections that are levelled against Davidson’s claim that belief is in its nature veridical.
Roughly speaking, modest transcendental arguments have the following structure:
(1) X
(2) For X to be possible, we must be committed to Y.
(3) Hence, we must be committed to Y.
Note that, given the undoubted existence of X, modest transcendental arguments only aim to reveal necessary ways of thinking and believing (i.e., our theoretical commitment to Y) rather than the truth of Y. For proponents of this way of advancing transcendental arguments, see Stroud (1999) and Stern (1999).
Suppose one is to rationally evaluate one’s belief that there is an apple on the table. If one is not committed to the proposition that one’s faculties are generally reliable, then one would have a principled reason to doubt one’s perceptual evidence, regardless of whether the evidence is in favour of or against the belief in question.
I take commitments to be beliefs that are not based on evidential (rational) support.
For other readings of hinge commitments, see Pritchard (2015).
Hinge commitments are never the result of rational process in the sense that we cannot rationally evaluate hinge commitments by providing and weighing evidence for or against them. We simply assume them in order to make rational evaluations possible.
Davidson claims that interpretation is possible unless we adopt the principle of charity. According to this principle, we must believe that the speaker shares mostly true and coherent beliefs with the interpreter. This requirement amounts to that non-sceptical speaker and interpreter must both commit to that I am not in the sceptical scenario (BIV is a typical case), otherwise they both would be massively wrong about what is going on in the world and therefore become uninterpretable.
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Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Duncan Pritchard, Adam Carter and two anonymous referees for helpful discussions on this paper. My research is funded by the Humanity and Social Science Youth foundation of Ministry of Education of China.
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Wang, J. Scepticism, closure and rationally grounded knowledge: a new solution. Synthese 197, 2357–2374 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1337-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1337-8