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Mechanisms meet structural explanation

  • S.I. : Mechanistic & Topological
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Abstract

This paper investigates the relationship between structural explanation (SE) and the New Mechanistic account of explanation. The aim of this paper is twofold: firstly, to argue that some phenomena in the domain of fundamental physics, although mechanically brute, are structurally explained; and secondly, by elaborating on the contrast between SE and mechanistic explanation (ME) to better clarify some features of SE. Finally, this paper will argue that, notwithstanding their apparently antithetical character, SE and ME can be reconciled within a unified account of general scientific explanation.

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Notes

  1. Kuhlmann and Glennan (2014) though have recently adopted a more explicitly pluralistic position.

  2. Of course I am not denying here the existence of basic unexplained facts at the bottom of our scientific explanations. That some fundamental phenomena are structurally explained does not mean that all of them are.

  3. The slope of S\(^{\prime }\) depends on its velocity relative to S.

  4. This is a straightforward consequence of Eq. 3.

  5. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing that out to me.

  6. Depending on the specific definition of mechanism adopted, and on the role of counterfactual dependencies in such definition, ME might in this case collapse to a counterfactual theory of explanation.

  7. For the distinction between causal production and causal relevance, see Hall (2004) and Sober (1984).

  8. See also i.e., Glennan (2011), and, for a general overview (Illari and Russo (2014), Chap. 12).

  9. Following Dorato and Felline (2010), here we are relying on the standard formulation of the Uncertainty Principle. It is to be said that the validity of such a formulation is still object of some debate (Uffink 1990); however, such disputes are out of the scope of this paper.

  10. See Uffink (1990).

  11. For the distinction between principle and constructive explanation, see Felline (2009).

  12. It is my opinion that the same can be said of the other most notable examples in the literature about non-causal explanation (i.e., Pincock 2014; Lange 2012), but the discussion of these cases would bring us off topic, so I will not argue this point.

  13. I don’t want to defend here the claim that space–time geometry is a feature of our representation of reality as opposed to reality itself. I just want to leave open the possibility of various interpretations (e.g., conventionalist) of space–time geometry, and stress that given the view of models and representation to which we make reference, the geometry of space–time can play an explanatory role, whatever interpretation one provides for it.

  14. One of the clearest endorsements of such view is put forward in Craver (2007), and Illari and Williamson (2010).

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Acknowledgments

Thanks to the great 2013 Mechanisms Reading Group in Barcelona for helping me outlining the basic ideas at the core of this paper. Thanks to Marta Cadoni, Angelo Cei, Michel Ghins, Stephen Mahoney, Peter Machamer, Matteo Morganti, Federica Russo, Charles Wolfe for comments on earlier drafts of this paper. A special thanks to Stuart Glennan and Carl Hoefer for encouraging me during difficult times and motivating me to work at this paper.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Roma Tre University, Via Ostiense 234, 00145, Rome, Italy

    Laura Felline

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  1. Laura Felline
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Correspondence to Laura Felline.

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Felline, L. Mechanisms meet structural explanation. Synthese 195, 99–114 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0746-9

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