Abstract
The neo-Fregean project of basing mathematics on abstraction principles faces “the bad company problem,” namely that a great variety of unacceptable abstraction principles are mixed in among the acceptable ones. In this paper I propose a new solution to the problem, based on the idea that individuation must take the form of a well-founded process. A surprising aspect of this solution is that every form of abstraction on concepts is permissible and that paradox is instead avoided by restricting what concepts there are.
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Linnebo, Ø. Bad company tamed. Synthese 170, 371–391 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9265-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9265-7