Abstract
I will assume here the defenses of epistemic infinitism are adequate and inquire as to the variety standpoints within the view. I will argue that infinitism has three varieties depending on the strength of demandingness of the infinitist requirement and the purity of its conception of epistemic justification, each of which I will term strong pure, strong impure, and weak impure infinitisms. Further, I will argue that impure infinitisms have the dialectical advantage.
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Aikin, S.F. Meta-epistemology and the varieties of epistemic infinitism. Synthese 163, 175–185 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9196-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9196-3