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Why epistemologists are so down on their luck

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Abstract

It is nearly universally acknowledged among epistemologists that a belief, even if true, cannot count as knowledge if it is somehow largely a matter of luck that the person so arrived at the truth. A striking feature of this literature, however, is that while many epistemologists are busy arguing about which particular technical condition most effectively rules out the offensive presence of luck in true believing, almost no one is asking why it matters so much that knowledge be immune from luck in the first place. I argue that the best explanation for the consensus that luck undermines knowledge is that knowledge is, complications aside, credit-worthy true believing. To make this case, I develop both the notions of luck and credit, and sketch a theory of knowledge in those terms. Furthermore, this account also holds promise for being able to solve the “value problem” for knowledge, and it explains why both internal and external conditions are necessary to turn true belief into knowledge.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK, 73019, USA

    Wayne Riggs

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  1. Wayne Riggs
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Correspondence to Wayne Riggs.

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The arguments and ideas in this paper have been in development for a while, and I would like to thank a number of people for their contribution to that development. For many helpful discussions on these topics, In d’like to thank Steve Ellis, Linda Zagzebski and the students in my graduate epistemology seminar—Mary Gwin, Ben Hagy, Matthew Hodge, Robert Johnson and Shyam Patwardhan. And thanks to Karen Antell for her comments on an earlier draft

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Riggs, W. Why epistemologists are so down on their luck. Synthese 158, 329–344 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9043-y

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