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On Field’s Epistemological Argument Against Platonism

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Abstract

Hartry Field’s formulation of an epistemological argument against platonism requires knowledge to be causally constrained. Contrary to recent claims (e.g. in [6], [7]), it thus fails the very same criterion usually taken to discredit Benacerraf’s earlier version.

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References

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  1. Institut für Philosophie, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt, Grüneburgplatz 1, 60323, Frankfurt, Germany

    Ivan Kasa

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  1. Ivan Kasa
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Correspondence to Ivan Kasa.

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Kasa, I. On Field’s Epistemological Argument Against Platonism. Stud Logica 96, 141–147 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-010-9278-y

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-010-9278-y

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