Abstract
Adam Brandenburger and H. Jerome Keisler have recently discovered a two person Russell-style paradox. They show that the following configurations of beliefs is impossible: Ann believes that Bob assumes that Ann believes that Bob’s assumption is wrong. In [7] a modal logic interpretation of this paradox is proposed. The idea is to introduce two modal operators intended to represent the agents’ beliefs and assumptions. The goal of this paper is to take this analysis further and study this paradox from the point of view of a modal logician. In particular, we show that the paradox can be seen as a theorem of an appropriate hybrid logic.
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Special Issue Formal Epistemology II. Edited by Branden Fitelson
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Pacuit, E. Understanding the Brandenburger-Keisler Paradox. Stud Logica 86, 435–454 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-007-9069-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-007-9069-2