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Nikolai Lossky and Henri Bergson

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Abstract

The twentieth century Russian philosopher Nikolai Lossky was one of the earliest and most important proponents—but also critics—of Bergson’s philosophy in Russia at a time when many Russian philosophers were preoccupied with the same complex of philosophical questions and answers that Bergson was addressing. Thus, if only from the standpoint of intellectual history, Lossky is central to the study of the reception of Bergson in Russia. In this article, I present the principal historical links, points of agreement between Bergson and Lossky, such as their respective anti-Kantianism, intuitivism, ontological realism, vitalism, organicism, Neo-Platonism, as well as their points of disagreement, including some of Lossky’s key criticisms of Bergson, with special emphasis on the issues of intuition, ideal being, substance and change, time, and sensible qualities. This paper is meant as an introduction to the translations of Lossky’s “Heдocтaтки гнoceoлoгiи Бepгcoнa и влiянie иxъ нa eгo мeтaфизикy” (The Defects of Bergson’s Epistemology and Their Consequences on His Metaphysics) (1913) and his review of Bergson’s, Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion (1932), which are published in the present issue of Studies in East European Thought.

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Notes

  1. “Одно непосредственное влияние на развитие моих взглядов я могу указать точно. С. А. Алексеев, беседуя со мною, однажды указал на то, что связь душевных процессов с телесными рассмотрена французским философом Бергсоном в духе, благоприятном для разработки моего интуитивизма. Я тотчас выписал „Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience“ и „Matière et mémoire“” (Lossky 1968, p. 127). Askoldov (1870–1945), who was also a philosopher, was the son of Aleksei Kozlov—a Neo-Leibnizian who was Lossky’s earliest philosophy mentor. By “relation between psychic and physical processes” Askoldov may have had in mind Bergson’s article “Le paralogisme psycho-physiologique” (1904).

  2. The book is kept at the Fonds Bergson de la Bibliothèque littéraire Jacques Doucet, 8 Place du Panthéon, 75005 Paris.

  3. The Lossky archives are kept at the Institut d’Études Slaves, 9 Rue Michelet, 75006, Paris.

  4. А. Бергсонъ, “Философская интуицiя,” переведено П. С. Юшкевичъ, Новыя идеи въ философiи, Сворник № 1, 1912, pp. 1–28. According to Frances Nethercott, between Lossky and Radlov “it was Losskij who was largely instrumental in selecting texts” (Nethercott 1991, p. 210), which suggests that it was most probably he who solicited a translation of Bergson’s “L’intuition philosophique.”

  5. “Получив приглашение прочитать несколько публичных лекций в Москве, я изложил в них сущность философии Бергсона и отличие ее от моих взглядов” (Lossky 1968, p. 128).

  6. In Воспоминания, Lossky says—in all appearances, mistakenly—that the book appeared for the first time in 1913: “I published these lectures in the booklet The Intuitive Philosophy of Bergson (published by Путь, Moscow 1913)” [Эти лекции напечатаны были мною в брошюре «Интуитивная философия Бергсона» (издательство «Путь», Москва 1913)] (Lossky 1968, p. 128).

  7. For the claim that Valentina A. Flerova (née Žulkovskaya) studied with Lossky, I am relying solely on Nethercott (1995, p. 158). Nethercott says that Flerova was a student of Lossky at the Бестужевские курсы (Bestužev Courses) in St. Petersburg, where she studied philosophy, but no evidence is provided to support that claim. On Flerova, see also: Nethercott (1995, pp. 303–305).

  8. For the claim that Hartmann studied with Lossky, see Herbert Spiegelberg’s interview notes with Lossky, where he wrote that “the link with Nicolai Hartmann, who studied under L[ossky] in St. Petersburg, was strong” (Spiegelberg 1960) as well as Nethercott (1995, p. 132, note 1).

  9. For the claim that Sesemann studied with Lossky, see Thorsten Botz-Bornstein, who, having consulted the Sesemann family for biographical data, writes that “From 1903 to 1909 Sesemann studied at the University of St. Petersburg […]. Among his teachers was the Russian intuitive philosopher N. O. Lossky” (Botz-Bornstein 2006, p. 10). See also: Lesourd and Maslin (2010, p. 774) and Sverdiolas (2010, p. xv).

  10. “auf ihn [i.e., Bergson] ist, glaube ich, Hartmann schon sehr früh aufmerksam geworden, bereits in Petersburg. Unter seinen dortigen Lehrern nämlich hatte Losski von Bergson neben manch anderem auch den Einfall übernommen, dass wir den Gegenstand nie in seinem wirklichen Reichtum, sondern, je nach unseren Lebensbedürfnissen, immer nur selektiv verarmt erkennen. Es ist dieser Gedanke, der später bei Hartmann, abgewandelt, in seiner Version des Verhältnisses von erkennendem Bewusstsein und Ansichseiendem wiederkehrt” (Harich 2004, pp. 138–139).

  11. It is noteworthy that Sesemann remained rather theoretically close to Lossky throughout his career—he translated Lossky’s voluminous Логика into German (Handbuch der Logik, 1927), he contributed to Lossky’s Festschrift (Sesemann 1932), and he also gave lectures on Lossky’s philosophy in the Siberian gulag where he was sent from 1950 to 1956 for suspected anti-Soviet activities. On Sesemann and Bergson in relation to Lossky, see: Botz-Bornstein (2006, Chap. 4), Sverdiolas (2010, pp. xxiii–xxiv and xxvi).

  12. “антиплатонизм Бергсона, его гносеологический дуализм, иррационализм, учение о чувственных качествах, как сгущениях, производимых субъектом, далее, его учение о свободе воли, не дающее ясного решения вопроса, были мною отвергнуты” (Lossky 1968, pp. 127–128).

  13. “une philosophie s’hypertrophie en théorie de la connaissance dans la mesure où elle n’a pas de contact avec l’Être. Kant est à la charnière d’un monde qui a perdu l’éternel et n’a pas encore conquis le temps. […] il sait que la philosophie a perdu l’Être en soi et par soi, sans avoir encore pris possession du devenir du concret” (Barthélemy-Madaule 1966, p. 63).

  14. “преодоление «Критики чистого разума» Канта и оправдание метафизики, как науки” (Lossky 1968, p. 121).

  15. “une école philosophique intuitionniste, parallèle à celle de Bergson en France” (Gurvitch 1926, p. 254).

  16. “In 1900. At that time, I was already on my way to intuitivism” (“в 1900 г. В то время я был уже на пути к своему интуитивизму”) (Lossky 1968, p. 97).

  17. “Il est tout à fait clair qu’ici Lossky ne s’inspirait pas d’une lecture de Bergson: […] il introduit la notion d’intuition bien avant sa rencontre de l’œuvre de son homologue français” (Nethercott 1995, p. 123).

  18. We know that Lossky was greatly influenced by Aleksei Kozlov, who in turn was influenced by Teichmüller, who offers a lengthy discussion of the concepts of “intuition,” and more specifically of “intellectual intuition,” in Die wirkliche und die scheinbare Welt: Neue Grundlegung der Metaphysik (1882), Kap. 2, §. 4. For a comparison between Teichmüller and Lossky, see: Schwenke (2006, Kap. 5, pp. 263–286).

  19. On the question of Lossky’s concept of intuition, and for further references on this issue, see also: Matern (2015), Tremblay (2016, pp. 153–155).

  20. See: Lossky (1904a, b, c, d, 1905a, b, c).

  21. “The main motive of this change of title was the consideration that my theory was original and contained an organic synthesis of traditional empiricism and rationalism, and therefore should be called by an entirely new term” (Главным мотивом этого изменения заглавия было соображение, что моя теория есть направление своеобразное, заключающее в себе органический синтез традиционного эмпиризма с рационализмом, и потому должна быть названа совершенно новым термином) (Lossky 1968, p. 123).

  22. On this, see: Lossky (1968, p. 126).

  23. On this, Sergei Tomkeieff comments that: “Lossky is in perfect agreement with Bergson’s view that intuition gives us an immediate knowledge of an object, but he thinks that the methodology of his system is not quite perfect, because Bergson approaches the question of knowledge partly from the metaphysical, partly from the physiological point of view” (Tomkeieff 1922–1923, p. 390).

  24. For Lossky’s intuitivism, see: Lossky (1914b, 1919, 1928a, b, 1935, and 1947).

  25. “ressaisissons le monde extérieur tel qu’il est” (Bergson 1911a, p. 827).

  26. “наше восприятие «не относительно и субъективно, по крайней мере, постольку, поскольку в составе его есть чистое восприятие. В чистом восприятии», говорит Бергсон, «мы в самом деле поставлены вне самих себя и, действительно, касаемся реалности предмета в непосредственной интуиции». «Внешние предметы воспринимаются мною там, где они находятся, в них самих, а не во мне»” (Lossky 1922a, p. 47).

  27. Jankélévitch translated Lossky’s Условия абсолютного добра: основы этики into French—Des conditions de la morale absolue: fondements de l’éthique (1948).

  28. “Sa philosophie est littéralement un retour aux choses elles-mêmes […]. Bergson en cela tend la main non seulement au néoréalisme anglo-saxon, mais encore à ce réalisme russe qui est en quelque sorte une philosophie autodidacte et une nouvelle innocence: Bergson se serait reconnu dans le réalisme de Losski” (Jankélévitch 1959, p. 288). For Lossky’s realism, see, e.g.: Lossky (1925a, b, 1928b).

  29. On the theory of the élan vital as an alternative explanation for evolution, see: Lossky (1922a, p. 75).

  30. Bergson acknowledged affinities with Plotinus in L’évolution créatrice, e.g., p. 229, n. 1. On Bergson and Plotinus, see: DeLaunay (1919), Bréhier (1949), Mossé-Bastide (1960), Rutten (1960), Pigler-Rogers (1991), and Riquier (2012).

  31. In Воспоминания, Lossky recalls that he encountered Plotinus as a student while reading Eduard Zeller’s six volumes of History of Ancient Philosophy and that Plotinus and Proclus made a particularly strong impression on him (Lossky 1968, p. 100). Lossky’s philosophical system is sometimes characterized as a Neo-Platonism. This characterization has been corroborated by the Plotinus-scholar William R. Inge, who acknowledged Lossky as a “modern Neoplatonist” in his book The Philosophy of Plotinus (Inge 1918, p. 168, note 1). Inge would later confirm his earlier judgment in a review of Lossky’s World as an Organic Whole: “Professor Lossky has now made it clear that his philosophy is unadulterated Neoplatonism” (Inge 1927, p. 751). We may also mention the American philosopher John S. Marshall, who said that: “It is quite clear that the metaphysics of this [i.e., of Lossky’s] axiology are a transfigured Neo-Platonism” (Lossky and Marshall 1935, p. 161).

  32. As Natalie Duddington says, “on the whole Christian Neo-Platonism is the keynote of Russian philosophy” (Duddington 1933, p. 233). On the Neo-Platonic leanings of Russian philosophy in general, see: Dobieszewski (2010).

  33. On Sergei Tomkeieff, see: The University of Sydney Library (1974). See also Spiegelberg’s unpublished interview notes, where he writes: “After my brief explanation of my main purpose in visiting him, he [i.e., Lossky] began by outlining his direct intuitive realism, which is comparable to Bergson’s, but rejects his dualism and his hostility to concepts” (Spiegelberg 1960).

  34. “on pourrait dire, en un certain sens, que nous naissons tous platoniciens” (Bergson 1908, p. 53).

  35. “L’intelligence ne se représente clairement que le discontinu” (Bergson 1908, p. 168); “le stable et l’immuable sont ce à quoi notre intelligence s’attache en vertu de sa disposition naturelle. Notre intelligence ne se représente clairement que l’immobilité” (Bergson 1908, p. 169).

  36. “признать, что и разсудокъ есть не что иное, какъ видъ интуицiи: это есть способность созерцанiя идей (в платоновскомъ смыслѣ), это есть видѣнiе безвременныхъ началъ, лежашихъ в основѣ временного мiра” (Lossky 1913, p. 234). See also Lossky’s History of Russian Philosophy: “discursive thinking is not the opposite of intuition, but a species of it” (1952, p. 253).

  37. “Живое видение творчески изменчивого бытия, присущее Бергсону, освежающе действует на современную философии, но в целом система его мало удовлетворительна, потому что у него нет понимания идеального бытия в платоновском смысле этого слова” (Lossky 1968, p. 194). On this, see also Tomkeieff, who says: “The analysis of mind does not destroy the object—it only abstracts the needed parts, whereas Bergson opens up an impassable gulf between intuition and intellect, and thinks that scientific knowledge is only a symbolic representation, a copy of the real. Science and metaphysics are separated by Bergson; Lossky tries to reunite them” (Tomkeieff 1922–1923, p. 390). For Lossky’s theory of intellectual intuition and ideal being, see: Lossky (1934).

  38. “Choses et états ne sont que des vues prises par notre esprit sur le devenir. Il n’y a pas de choses, il n’y a que des actions. […] la chose résulte d’une solidification opérée par notre entendement” (Bergson 1908, pp. 269–270).

  39. “Il y a des changements, mais il n’y a pas de choses qui changent: le changement n’a pas besoin d’un support. Il y a des mouvements, mais il n’y a pas nécessairement des objets invariables qui se meuvent: le mouvement n’implique pas un mobile” (Bergson 1911b, p. 24).

  40. “Но нельзя согласиться съ Бергсономъ тогда, когда онъ подходитъ къ вопросу о субстанцiи” (Lossky 1917, p. 46).

  41. “il n’y a pas de perception qui ne soit pas imprégnée de souvenirs. Aux données immédiates et présentes de nos sens nous mêlons mille et mille détails de notre expérience passée” (Bergson 1903, p. 20).

  42. “ce que par suite nous en connaissons, ce n’est pas un double (miniature, phénomène ou simulacre) filtré par les sensoria organiques, c’est la res ipsa, c’est l’«original» lui-même (podlinnik). Il n’y aurait, en ce sens, que des qualités «primaires»” (Jankélévitch 1959, p. 102). For Lossky’s theory of sensible qualities, see: Lossky (1933, 1936).

  43. For supplementary material on the relation between Bergson and Lossky, see: Nethercott (1991, p. 214, 1995), and Fink (1999).

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Acknowledgements

Thanks are due to Thomas Nemeth and Frederick Matern for commenting on earlier versions of this article. Part of the research leading to this paper has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Program (FP7/2007-2013—MSCA-COFUND) under Grant Agreement No. 245743—Post-doctoral program Braudel-IFER-FMSH, in collaboration with the Institut Jean Nicod, Paris.

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    Frédéric Tremblay

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Tremblay, F. Nikolai Lossky and Henri Bergson. Stud East Eur Thought 69, 3–16 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11212-017-9275-z

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