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Abstract

It has long been noticed that there is no predetermined meaning of legal terms. Rather, meaning depends on the context and the interpreter (Engberg in Brook J Int Law 29:1135, 2003. https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil/vol29/iss3/6). While this assertion holds true for both unilingual and multilingual legal environments, the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter: CJEU) openly acknowledges it, by stating that no legal consequences can be based on the terminology used. Accordingly, by virtue of the principle of equal authenticity, when interpreting EU law courts cannot rely on a single language version. Adjudicating legal disputes involving linguistic matters in a multilingual environment-i.e. cases of discrepancies between different language versions of an EU legislative text-the CJEU has been given a fascinating role insofar as its interpretative moves include linguistic comparison, which in turn bears ramifications on uniformity and equal authenticity, as well as on effectiveness of EU law. With a view to unmasking the nature of the linguistic comparison carried out by the CJEU, this study examines settled case law, asking the following questions: What are the central moves of linguistic comparison? What role does it play in the process of CJEU’s decision-making? Has it changed over time?

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Notes

  1. ECJ, Case 30/77, Regina v Bouchereau [1977] ECR 1999.

  2. Case 19-67, Bestuur der Sociale Verzekeringsbank v J. H. van der Vecht [1967] ECR 00345.

  3. Case C-219/95, Ferriere Nord SpA v Commission of the European Communities [1997] ECR I-04411.

  4. As convincingly argued by Brand [7], EU law is not enforced coute que coute and its uniformity may be sacrificed in the interests of divergence and ultimately unity.

  5. According to the Court’s case-law, all language versions have the same standing in principle (para. 11), with the result that no inferences can be drawn from the fact that the majority of the language versions use a certain variant of the provision. Where there is divergence between the language versions of an EU legal text, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part (para. 12). ECLI:EU:C:2018:624.

  6. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en (Accessed: 7 November 2019).

  7. Interestingly, the search has identified 30 opinions of Advocates General (hereinafter: AGs) pertaining to linguistic comparison in the same period. Other research into language cases focused on identifying the languages consulted in these cases or, to elicited the best translation strategies from the Court’s methods of resolving language discrepancies [1]. Most scholars agree that it is however, impossible to predict which interpretative methods and which languages the court uses. Baaij [1] points to the special role of English in interpretation and advocates institutionalizing English as the principal EU language. Van der Jeught [28] says French was used in all language cases (according to his investigation, in a total of 13 cases in 2017). Baaij [1] reports that the Court compared language versions in merely 4.2% of preliminary rulings between 1960 and 2010. Furthermore, in the same period the Court compared all language versions only in 1.4% of all judgments [1].

  8. See para. 25 of case C-627/17 ZSE Energia a.s. v RG. ECLI:EU:C:2018:941.

  9. CJEU Case 29/69 Stauder v City of Ulm [1969] ECR 419, ECLI:EU:C:1969:57. Also see [2, 3].

  10. See Cilfit and Others (283/81, EU:C:1982:335), para. 18:

    1. 1.

      Community legislation is drafted in several languages and the different language versions are all equally authentic. An interpretation of a provision of Community law thus involves a comparison of the different versions.

    2. 2.

      Community law uses terminology which is peculiar to it.

    3. 3.

      Legal concepts do not necessarily have the same meaning in Community law and in the law of the various Member States.

    4. 4.

      Every provision of Community law must be placed in its context and interpreted in the light of the provisions of Community law as a whole, regard being had to the objectives thereof and to its state of evolution at the date on which the provision in question is to be applied.

    See also EMU Tabac and Others (C-296/95, EU:C:1998:152, para. 36); Givane and Others (C-257/00, EU:C:2003:8, para. 36); and Kyocera (C-152/01, EU:C:2003:623, para. 32).

  11. Case C-239/17 Gert Teglgaard and Fløjstrupgård I/S v Fødevareministeriets Klagecenter. ECLI:EU:C:2018:597.

  12. The Commission confirmed that the year during which the supervisory authority became aware of a breach must be regarded as the year of the finding of non-compliance with cross-compliance rules to which the penalty resulting therefrom must be applied (para. 25). Subsequently, the paying agency reduced the direct payments received by the appellants in the year during which the non-compliance with the cross-compliance rules was found by the supervisory authority (2011) (para. 26). The appellants then turned to the Eastern Regional Court alleging the invalidity of those decisions (para. 28).

    Mr Teglgaard relied on the wording of Art. 6(1) of Regulation No. 1782/2003 to argue that the year of reduction of the direct payments is that of the non-compliance with the cross-compliance rules, whereas Regulation No. 73/2009 cannot serve as the basis for a request to reduce aid resulting from events occurring before its entry into force (para. 29). He further argues that there would be unpredictable consequences for him in that the penalty could be increased by a considerable sum due to the increase of the area eligible for direct payments between the year of that non-compliance and the year of the finding thereof (ibid.).

    Fløjstrupgård submits that Art. 23 of Regulation No. 73/2009 does not indicate clearly whether the reduction in direct payments must relate to those received in the year during which the non-compliance with the cross-compliance rules occurred or to those received in the year in which the non-compliance was found (para. 30).

  13. Case 13/61 Kledingverkoopbedrijf de Geusen Uitdenbogerd v Robert Bosch GmbH and Maatschappij tot voortzetting van de zaken der Firma Willem van Rijn [1962] ECR 47, 70.

  14. See for a poignant argumentation (paras. 47–55 of the Judgment, and paras. 87-101 of the AG’s Opinion). That said, AG’s linguistic analysis additionally clarifies the rationale of the Court’s decision. In her trenchant analysis of the words ‘compute’ and ‘impute’ (para. 60), that are central to the interpretation of the meaning of the word ‘applied’, AG Sharpston contests the Commission’s interpretation of ‘applied’ as meaning both ‘computed’ and ‘imputed’. Seeing no linguistic reason for such a reading, AG Sharpston puts forward that ‘applied’ as a general and abstract word can mean impute to, but also compute. However, it cannot be said to mean both compute and impute to (para 76). While AG used these words in answers to the questions of the referring court (see para. 109 of Opinion), the Court only mentions ‘calculate’. We believe that the answers of the AG offer a more nuanced view and provide for more clarity and understanding, which is in line with the AG’s duty under Article 252 TFEU—to make reasoned submissions. Unlike judgments that are written in a formal and terse language relying on standard phrases and borrowing wordings from earlier judgments [16], opinions read like academic documents citing sources of law and legal scholarship inter alia [17].

  15. Case T-770/16 Janusz Korwin-Mikke v European Parliament. ECLI:EU:T:2018:320.

  16. As the Advocate General notes in point 40 of his Opinion, while the English- and French-language versions of recital 20 of Directive 2011/7 appear to reserve the right to a fixed sum to cover internal recovery costs (‘remboursement forfaitaire pour les seuls frais internes de recouvrement’) as opposed to reimbursement of ‘other’ recovery costs which they incur (‘autres frais de recouvrement’), such a formal distinction between internal costs and ‘other’ recovery costs does not appear in the other language versions of that recital, such as the versions in Italian (‘diritto al pagamento di un importo forfettario per coprire i costi interni … esigere anche il risarcimento delle restanti spese di recupero sostenute’) or Dutch (‘het recht op betaling van een vast bedrag ter dekking van interne invorderingskosten … recht hebben op terugbetaling van de overige invorderingskosten die ontstaan’) (para. 35).

  17. Case C-90/17. Turbogás Produtora Energética SA v Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira. Judgment of 7 March 2018 ECLI:EU:C:2018:498.

  18. Conversely, the reference to the differences between the language versions is more nuanced in the AG’s opinion as it compares the Spanish version of Directive 2003/96 with the French, English, German and Polish. Para. 17 of the Opinion of AG Szpunar reads as follows: “First, in my understanding, apart from the Portuguese language version of Directive 2003/96, the phrase ‘these small producers’ appears only in the Spanish version thereof. In particular, it certainly does not appear in the French, English, German or Polish versions. Thus, a literal interpretation of the provision in question, which takes into account not one, but all language versions, does not allow the argument put forward by Turbogás to be accepted.”.

  19. Joined cases C-688/15 and C-109/16 Agnieška Anisimovienė and Others v bankas “Snoras” AB, in liquidation and Others. ECLI:EU:C:2018:209.

  20. Bearing in mind the objective of Directive 97/9, and the broad definition of the term ‘investor’ under Article 1(4) as any person who has entrusted money or instrument to such a firm in connection with investment business. (para. 79).

  21. Case C-561/16 Saras Energía SA v Administración del Estado. ECLI:EU:C:2018:633.

  22. See paras. 62–64 of Opinion of AG Kokott delivered on 12 April 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:236.

  23. Case C-250/17 Virgílio Tarragó da Silveira v Massa Insolvente da Espírito Santo Financial Group, SA. ECLI:EU:C:2018:398.

  24. Having regard to the case-law cited at paragraph 20 of this judgment and the differences emerging from the various language versions of Article 15 of Regulation No 1346/2000, the interpretation of that article cannot be based only on its wording (para. 22). Although the wording of that article is not without ambiguity, the context and the objectives of the article require an interpretation to the effect that its scope of application cannot be limited to ongoing proceedings concerning a specific asset or right of which the debtor has been divested (para. 23).

  25. Case C-554/16 EP Agrarhandel GmbH v Bundesminister für Land-, Forst-, Umwelt und Wasserwirtschaft. ECLI:EU:C:2018:406.

  26. See paras. 16–18: Article 2(4) of Decision 2001/672, in its initial version, provided: ‘The information contained in the list mentioned in paragraph 2 is introduced in the national database for bovine animals at the latest seven days after the date when the animals are moved to the pasture. It was amended as follows: ‘The information contained in the list mentioned in paragraph 2 shall be reported to the competent authority in accordance with Article 7(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1760/2000 at the latest 15 days after the date when the animals were moved to the pasture…’.

  27. It should be noted that the terms used here are rather general and open to interpretation.

  28. Case C-123/16 P Orange Polska SA v European Commission. ECLI:EU:C:2018:590.

  29. Case C-5/16 Republic of Poland v European Parliament and Council of the European Union. ECLI:EU:C:2018:483.

  30. Case C-256/16 Deichmann SE v Hauptzollamt Duisburg. ECLI:EU:C:2018:187.

  31. Case C-627/17 ZSE Energia a.s. v RG. ECLI:EU:C:2018:941.

  32. Case C-15/17 Bosphorus Queen Shipping Ltd Corp. v Rajavartiolaitos. ECLI:EU:C:2018:557. At issue is the French version of Article 220(6) of the Montego Bay Convention which refers to ‘littoral’, whereas Article 1(1) of the Convention relating to Intervention on the High Seas 1969 uses the term ‘côtes’.

  33. See a recent case C-477/17 Raad van bestuur van de Sociale verzekeringsbank v D. Balandin and Others ECLI:EU:C:2019:60 Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 24 January 2019, para. 31.

  34. Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 10 July 2019. Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen und Verbraucherverbände—Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband e.V. v Amazon EU Sàrl. Case C-649/17. ECLI:EU:C:2019:576. “That issue is not resolved by the analysis of different language versions of Article 6(1)(c) of Directive 2011/83. Although the majority of those versions, in particular the versions in English (‘where available’), French (‘lorsqu’ils sont disponibles’), Dutch (‘indien beschikbaar’), Italian (‘ove disponibili’), Polish (‘o ile jest dostępny’) and Finnish (‘jos nämä ovat käytettävissä’) suggest that, under that provision, the obligation imposed on traders to inform consumers of their telephone and fax numbers applies only where those traders have such means of communication, the fact remains that other versions of that provision, in particular those in Spanish (‘cuando proceda’) and German (‘gegebenenfalls’), do not allow the circumstances to be determined in which that obligation does not apply.” (para. 36).

  35. In particular, detailed reasoning as to whether and how the purpose and the general scheme can be deduced from all language versions, for the court sometimes refers to recitals and other times accepts the Commission’s pleas [27].

  36. As underscored by [22], protection of the individual rights and the full force and effect of EU law are two sides of the same coin.

  37. Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629.

  38. Such as the multilingual corpus of EU case law: EUCLCORP. https://llecj.karenmcauliffe.com/euclcorp/ (accessed 4 December 2019).

  39. Albeit earlier research demonstrated a limited level of ambition on the part of the national courts in examining foreign languages in their interpretation (see [10], Chs 6–9). However, it is to be expected that things might have changed in the meantime owing to increased training activities of national judges aimed at EU law and language skills organized by the European Judicial Training Network, and pursued in the form of justice projects (e.g. Training Action for Legal Practitioners: Linguistic Skills and Translation in EU Competition Law, HT: 4983, co-financed by the European Commission).

  40. https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2019-03/cp190039en.pdf.

  41. [Cf. 19, 20].

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Funding was provided by Hrvatska Zaklada za Znanost (Grant No. UIP-2017-05-7169).

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Bajčić, M. Linguistic Comparison within CJEU’s Decision-Making: A Debunking Exercise. Int J Semiot Law 34, 1433–1449 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-020-09751-4

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