Notes
See: Beitz (1979/1991).
See, for instance: Griffin (2008: 207–208), where the human right to work is dismissed as non-genuine.
See: Rawls (1999: 78–82).
These considerations make up Beitz’s recommended ‘schema’ for justifying claims about the content of human rights (111–112, 137–138). That Beitz understands human rights violations to serve as a pro tanto justification for a host of international remedial actions, including aid, assistance, advocacy, and punitive sanction, differentiates him from other theorists who endorse a solely intervention-based practical conception of human rights, i.e. Raz (2010) and Rawls (1999).
Griffin (2008: 37–39).
Article One, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948).
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Acknowledgments
My thanks to John Tasioulas, Roger Crisp, Kimberley Brownlee, and S. Matthew Liao, who read and provided helpful comments on earlier versions of this review article.
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Etinson, A.D. To be or not to be: Charles Beitz on the Philosophy of Human Rights. Res Publica 16, 441–448 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-010-9121-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-010-9121-3