Abstract
In a context in which there is manifest multiplicity in women’s daily lives, feminists have struggled to identify what it uniquely means to be a woman, without falling prey to charges of essentialism. Conscious, however, of the role which collective gender identity plays in providing coherence and motivation to feminist activity, a number of theorists have sought to find a way to retain group cohesion in the face of internal diversity. In this article, the merits and demerits of pre-existing attempts in this regard will be discussed. Having done so, an alternative approach, which builds on Wittgenstein’s concept of ‘family resemblances’, will be put forward and defended.
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With the usual caveats, thanks to Sharon Cowan, Alan Norrie, John Stanton-Ife and John Tasioulas for their comments on an earlier version of this article.
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Munro, V. Resemblances of identity: Ludwig Wittgenstein and contemporary feminist legal theory. Res Publica 12, 137–162 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-006-9000-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-006-9000-0