Abstract
Sharon Street has argued that we should reject theism because we can accept it only at the cost of having good reason to doubt the reliability of our judgments as to what moral reasons there are. The success of her argument depends on the assumption that no realist account of normative reasons that validates commonsense morality has a tenable secular epistemology. I argue that even given this (obviously contentious) assumption Street’s argument does not succeed.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
See also 176. All page references are to this article.
In, for example, Street (2006). See also the other works of hers that she references.
Hereafter I will leave this qualification implicit.
References
Street, S. (2006). A darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value. Philosophical Studies, 127, 109–166.
Street, S. (2014). If everything happens for a reason, then we don’t know what reasons are: Why the price of theism is normative skepticism. In M. Bergmann & P. Kain (Eds.), Challenges to moral and religious belief: Disagreement and evolution (pp. 172–192). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Pegan, P. Sharon Street’s unsuccessful argument against theism. Int J Philos Relig 86, 17–24 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-018-9696-8
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-018-9696-8