Abstract
Although competent (vs mediocre) subordinates, while better contributors to dictator success, are also more prone to treason, it remains unclear empirically how (and even whether) dictators address this loyalty–competence tradeoff. To throw light on this issue, we use a biographical dataset of Chinese Communist Party Central Committee (CC) members from 1945 to 1982 to investigate the tradeoff faced by Mao Zedong in selecting his senior officials. Our results suggest that during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), the foundation and consolidation of the new regime lowered the payoff from subordinate competence, leading to the purging of competent CC members and their replacement by mediocre substitutes. Additional analyses of the competing mechanisms proposed by different theoretical models indicate further that capable young subordinates are more likely to be purged, possibly because they have more outside options (e.g., future hiring by the dictator’s successor) and, hence, expend less effort on loyalty.
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Notes: The numbers of PSC members, Politburo members, and full and alternate members of the CC are reported in the brackets; the numbers of members that survived the purge are reported in parenthesis, and the numbers of members newly selected into the CC are underlined
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Notes
Several theoretical models advance similar arguments based on different dynamics. For instance, Glazer (2002) defines subordinate competence as a double-edged sword in light of the fact that although competent subordinates can produce benefits for the dictator, they simultaneously may acquire too much political power by rent seeking inside the organization.
Zakharov (2016) summarizes the large-N empirical studies. Besides such systematic evidence studies, anecdotes also abound, as reviewed by Egorov and Sonin (2011) and Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2011). Moreover, some empirical works address the tradeoffs in the context of public agencies (Wagner 2011).
The Gang of Four (Siren Bang in Chinese) was a political faction composed of Jiang Qing (Mao’s wife), Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan and Wang Hongwen, who came to prominence during the CR. Their radical ideas, however, clashed with those of influential elders. So with the support of Ye Jianying, they were arrested, charged with a series of treasonous crimes, and imprisoned.
“Appendix 1” describes our data-collection process, while “Appendix 2” shows the annual changes in the size of each CC formed during 1945–1982.
Of the 204 CC members at the Seventh and Eighth NPCs, only 24 had exited the CC by 1966, the year of the CR’s inception, primarily because of death from natural causes.
“Appendix 3” compares CC members’ years of schooling with the national average.
“Appendix 4”, Fig. 7a shows the annual changes in the average years of schooling for CC members.
In a detailed historical analysis, Ouyang (2008) shows that the 1955 awarding of ranks was based on a very high and strict standard. The awarded performance-based military ranks deliberately were set below the position-based military ranks.
We also include a category for “other military officer”, coded 0. “Appendix 4”, Fig. 7b shows the annual changes in the average ranks of the military CC members.
These data are taken from the Directory of the PLA Generals and Marshals (Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun jiangshuai minglu, 1987–1988), published by Xinghuo Liaoyuan Publishing House.
We define the kernel density estimator as \(\hat{f}(Q) = \frac{1}{n}\sum\nolimits_{j = 1}^{n} {\frac{1}{h}\phi } \left( {\frac{{Q_{j} - Q}}{h}} \right)\), where \(\phi ( \cdot )\) is the standard normal density function.
“Appendix 5” provides descriptive evidence on the distribution of the average percentiles (\(Q_{jt}\)) across birth cohorts for each CC for civilian and military members, respectively.
“Appendix 7” provides the descriptive statistics on these individual characteristics for each CC.
The observations on each CC member’s work experience, compiled by Shih et al. (2010), were downloaded from http://bit.ly/2jEAy6L.
Mao was born in 1893 and therefore belonged to the 1890–1894 cohort.
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Acknowledgements
We are grateful to Sacha Becker, James Kai-sing Kung, Margaret Levi, Konstantin Sonin, Daniel Treisman, Jing Zhan, and workshop/conference participants at the EEA Annual Congress 2013, Peking University and Tsinghua University.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Dataset construction
We collect the biographical data on each CC member serving in 1945–82 from the Dictionary of Past and Present CCP Central Committee Members 1921–2003 (Zhongguo gongchandang lijie zhongyang weiyuan da cidian) published in 2003 by the Central Organization Department and Party History Research Center of the CCP CC. We illustrate the construction of our individual-level dataset below:
Appendix 2: Changes in CC size, 1945–1982
To illustrate the overall replacement patterns, we summarize and plot the changes in CC membership size from 1945 to 1982. As Fig. 5 shows, before the CR, CC membership more than doubled from 76 members in 1945 to 180 in 1966. No significant replacement occurred until the launch of the CR, after which the size of the CC changed frequently, characterized by large-scale removals of old members and the mass promotion of new members. These mass replacements did not stop the CC from expanding, however, and its membership doubled again in 1982 to 348. These trends remain similar even after we divide CC members into four groups based on status or rank, which are, from top to bottom, Politburo Standing Committee member, Politburo member, full member, and alternate member.
Source: The Dictionary of Past and Present CCP Central Committee Members
Annual changes in the size of the CC, June 1945–September 1982.
Appendix 3: Relative competence of CC members across birth cohorts, by CC
Figure 6a shows the average years of schooling across birth cohorts for three groups: the population, members of the pre-CR Eighth CC, and members of the first CR period Ninth CC. The gap between the CC members and the population in the same cohort suggests the former’s relative competence. Thus, given the gradual increase in the national average education, it further suggests a decrease in competence from the Eighth CC to the Ninth CC, especially among cohorts younger than that of 1895–1899.Footnote 18
Sources: (1) The Dictionary of Past and Present CCP Central Committee Members. (2) China’s 1982 census data; (3) Who’s Who of General Officers of the People’s Liberation Army
a Average years of schooling: eighth and ninth CCs. b Average years of schooling: ninth to twelfth CC. c average military ranks.
We also compare the national average years of schooling with that of CC members during and after the CR. As Fig. 6b shows, the members of the Ninth CC selected in the first CR period generally had the lowest average level of education. The second-lowest level was that of the members of the Tenth CC selected in the second CR period. Although the members of the post-CR Eleventh CC had a similar average education to that of the members of the Tenth CC, its younger cohorts were obviously more highly educated. The highest average education level was for members of the Twelfth CC. all of which supports the finding that CC members’ average education decreased in the first CR period and gradually increased afterwards.
Figure 6c shows the average military ranks across birth cohorts for six groups: the population and five sets of CC members. Similar to the changes in CC members’ average education, the average military rank declined from the pre-CR Eighth CC to the first CR period Ninth CC, with the average military rank of the 1920–1924 cohort in the Ninth CC being even lower than the overall average. After the second CR period, however, the average military ranks show no significant changes across CCs.
Appendix 4: Annual changes in CC members’ average competence
Figure 7a shows the annual changes in CC members’ average years of schooling, a value that decreases sharply during the first CR period. Specifically, the CC members selected in 1966, when the CR began, averaged around 11.63 years of schooling (almost the level of senior high school). The value bottomed out in 1969, when the Ninth NPC was convened, at about 10.31 years (between middle and high school). It increased to 10.69 years by 1973 in the second CR period and to 11.03 years by 1977 after the CR. By 1982, the average had reached about 12.31 years (senior high school), a return to the pre-CR level. When looking exclusively at the changes in the average years of schooling of civilian CC members, we find a larger range of change but similar general patterns.
Source: The Dictionary of Past and Present CCP Central Committee Members
a CC members’ average years of schooling, January 1, 1959–January 1, 1983. b Average military rank granted in 1955, January 1, 1959–January 1, 1983.
Figure 7b shows the annual changes in the average military rank of CC military members. Like educational averages, the average military rank also declined sharply in the first CR period, from about 3.286 (higher than general) before the CR to 1.855 (lower than lieutenant general) in 1969. After that, no significant changes are observable.
Appendix 5: Average education percentiles: civilian versus military
Given that education levels are more strongly related to the quality and performance of civilian officials, we repeat the previous exercises exclusively for civilian CC members. As Fig. 8a shows, the patterns are not only very similar to those for all CC members but are even more salient, with average education percentiles decreasing to as low as around the 70th percentile for the first CR period Ninth CC. Although the average percentiles of military CC members also decreased significantly for the Ninth CC, no obvious changes occurred afterwards (see Fig. 8b).
Sources: The Dictionary of Past and Present CCP Central Committee Members and 1982 China census data
a Civilian CC members. b Military CC members.
Appendix 6: Birth cohort analysis: changes in years of schooling or military rank across CCs
Dependent variable | Average education All CC members | Average education All civilians | Average education All military officers | Average rank All military officers | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
(1.1) | (1.2) | (2.1) | (2.2) | (3.1) | (3.2) | (4.1) | (4.2) | |
RE | FE | RE | FE | RE | FE | RE | FE | |
Ninth CC (1969) | − 1.079*** | − 0.874** | − 1.238*** | − 0.993*** | − 0.700 | − 0.797* | − 0.530*** | − 0.475** |
(0.355) | (0.336) | (0.359) | (0.292) | (0.450) | (0.424) | (0.203) | (0.207) | |
Tenth CC (1973) | − 0.651** | − 0.406 | − 1.135*** | − 0.810*** | 0.228 | 0.124 | − 0.567*** | − 0.493** |
(0.305) | (0.291) | (0.308) | (0.238) | (0.363) | (0.372) | (0.146) | (0.157) | |
Eleventh CC (1977) | − 0.215 | 0.049 | − 0.404 | − 0.055 | 0.081 | − 0.046 | − 0.590*** | − 0.535*** |
(0.255) | (0.267) | (0.262) | (0.265) | (0.349) | (0.352) | (0.160) | (0.166) | |
Twelfth CC (1982) | 1.219*** | 1.568** | 1.353*** | 1.866** | 0.469 | 0.276 | − 0.329 | − 0.268 |
(0.431) | (0.593) | (0.435) | (0.666) | (0.313) | (0.314) | (0.238) | (0.231) | |
Constant | 11.592*** | 11.273*** | 11.497*** | 11.056*** | 11.858*** | 12.021*** | 2.577*** | 2.691*** |
(0.243) | (0.247) | (0.275) | (0.224) | (0.302) | (0.276) | (0.472) | (0.143) | |
Number of observations | 232 | 232 | 217 | 217 | 144 | 144 | 135 | 135 |
Number of birth years | 61 | 61 | 61 | 61 | 42 | 42 | 38 | 38 |
R-squared (within) | 0.33 | 0.33 | 0.35 | 0.35 | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0.22 | 0.22 |
Appendix 7: Individual-level data: descriptive statistics
Eighth CC (1) | Ninth CC (2) | Tenth CC (3) | Eleventh CC (4) | Twelfth CC (5) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Total number of CC members | 193 | 279 | 319 | 332 | 348 |
Education (years of schooling) | 11.689 | 10.323 | 10.675 | 11.033 | 12.415 |
(2.567) | (3.327) | (3.160) | (2.980) | (2.169) | |
Percentile of education | 97.429 | 90.312 | 90.722 | 92.852 | 97.455 |
(5.216) | (14.517) | (14.248) | (12.383) | (4.121) | |
Military ranks | 3.311 | 1.812 | 1.787 | 1.916 | 1.641 |
(0.992) | (1.219) | (1.268) | (1.150) | (1.264) | |
Percentile of military ranks | 90.604 | 65.793 | 62.438 | 70.099 | 60.809 |
(13.942) | (30.916) | (32.047) | (29.534) | (34.331) | |
Military officers (dummy) | 0.316 | 0.470 | 0.339 | 0.325 | 0.230 |
(0.466) | (0.500) | (0.474) | (0.469) | (0.421) | |
Gender (female = 1) | 0.041 | 0.082 | 0.129 | 0.114 | 0.069 |
(0.200) | (0.276) | (0.335) | (0.319) | (0.254) | |
Birth year | 1905 | 1917 | 1921 | 1920 | 1922 |
(7.027) | (11.778) | (12.902) | (11.936) | (8.000) | |
Year of joining the CCP | 1928 | 1939 | 1943 | 1942 | 1942 |
(3.697) | (12.347) | (13.654) | (13.218) | (9.448) | |
Long March experience (dummy) | 0.497 | 0.416 | 0.313 | 0.337 | 0.155 |
(0.501) | (0.494) | (0.465) | (0.474) | (0.363) | |
Tie with Liu Shaoqi (dummy) | 0.238 | 0.097 | 0.085 | 0.102 | 0.089 |
(0.427) | (0.296) | (0.279) | (0.304) | (0.285) | |
Tie with Deng Xiaoping (dummy) | 0.166 | 0.136 | 0.119 | 0.111 | 0.092 |
(0.373) | (0.344) | (0.324) | (0.315) | (0.289) | |
Tie with Lin Biao (dummy) | 0.280 | 0.272 | 0.182 | 0.193 | 0.147 |
(0.450) | (0.446) | (0.386) | (0.395) | (0.354) |
Appendix 8: Conditional logit analysis: changes in competence’s effect on selection likelihood
Competence measured by education and military rank (in absolute value) | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
Education * Ninth CC (1969) | − 0.231*** | − 0.350*** | − 0.310*** | − 0.325*** | − 0.302*** | − 0.274*** |
(0.040) | (0.045) | (0.076) | (0.048) | (0.076) | (0.081) | |
Education * Tenth CC (1973) | − 0.178*** | − 0.266*** | − 0.202*** | − 0.238*** | − 0.194** | − 0.163** |
(0.039) | (0.044) | (0.075) | (0.046) | (0.076) | (0.080) | |
Education * Eleventh CC (1977) | − 0.115*** | − 0.192*** | − 0.128* | − 0.164*** | − 0.120 | − 0.092 |
(0.039) | (0.043) | (0.075) | (0.046) | (0.076) | (0.080) | |
Education * Twelfth CC (1982) | 0.178*** | 0.131*** | 0.228*** | 0.162*** | 0.238*** | 0.272*** |
(0.042) | (0.046) | (0.079) | (0.049) | (0.080) | (0.084) | |
Military * Ninth CC (1969) | 8.373*** | 7.580*** | 9.208*** | 7.361*** | 7.134*** | |
(1.115) | (1.307) | (1.151) | (1.295) | (1.331) | ||
Military * Tenth CC (1973) | 7.445*** | 6.572*** | 8.474*** | 6.455*** | 6.301*** | |
(1.114) | (1.306) | (1.151) | (1.294) | (1.333) | ||
Military * Eleventh CC (1977) | 6.931*** | 5.594*** | 7.880*** | 5.467*** | 5.193*** | |
(1.113) | (1.306) | (1.149) | (1.294) | (1.332) | ||
Military * Twelfth CC (1982) | 6.103*** | 4.383*** | 7.160*** | 4.321*** | 4.212*** | |
(1.123) | (1.318) | (1.157) | (1.307) | (1.349) | ||
Military Rank * Ninth CC (1969) | − 3.090*** | − 2.374*** | − 3.238*** | − 2.330*** | − 2.334*** | |
(0.448) | (0.514) | (0.458) | (0.518) | (0.541) | ||
Military Rank * Tenth CC (1973) | − 3.164*** | − 2.301*** | − 3.304*** | − 2.270*** | − 2.250*** | |
(0.450) | (0.514) | (0.460) | (0.518) | (0.542) | ||
Military Rank * Eleventh CC (1977) | − 2.950*** | − 2.078*** | − 3.091*** | − 2.044*** | − 1.985*** | |
(0.449) | (0.515) | (0.459) | (0.519) | (0.542) | ||
Military Rank * Twelfth CC (1982) | − 3.384*** | − 2.104*** | − 3.526*** | − 2.075*** | − 2.004*** | |
(0.466) | (0.531) | (0.475) | (0.535) | (0.561) | ||
Tie with Liu * Ninth CC (1969) | − 2.093*** | − 0.687 | − 1.088* | |||
(0.403) | (0.526) | (0.650) | ||||
Tie with Liu * Tenth CC (1973) | − 2.245*** | − 0.589 | − 0.712 | |||
(0.389) | (0.521) | (0.651) | ||||
Tie with Liu * Eleventh CC (1977) | − 1.918*** | − 0.336 | − 0.307 | |||
(0.371) | (0.514) | (0.635) | ||||
Tie with Liu * Twelfth CC (1982) | − 2.226*** | − 0.821 | − 0.798 | |||
(0.371) | (0.534) | (0.657) | ||||
Tie with Deng * Ninth CC (1969) | − 0.853** | 0.312 | 0.558 | |||
(0.421) | (0.544) | (0.724) | ||||
Tie with Deng * Tenth CC (1973) | − 0.961** | 0.359 | 0.184 | |||
(0.408) | (0.540) | (0.724) | ||||
Tie with Deng * Eleventh CC (1977) | − 1.014** | 0.164 | − 0.194 | |||
(0.405) | (0.542) | (0.720) | ||||
Tie with Deng * Twelfth CC (1982) | − 1.098*** | 0.026 | 0.034 | |||
(0.414) | (0.564) | (0.768) | ||||
Tie with Lin * Ninth CC (1969) | − 1.020*** | 0.302 | 0.456 | |||
(0.355) | (0.490) | (0.726) | ||||
Tie with Lin * Tenth CC (1973) | − 1.602*** | − 0.162 | 0.456 | |||
(0.353) | (0.490) | (0.723) | ||||
Tie with Lin * Eleventh CC (1977) | − 1.406*** | − 0.136 | 0.175 | |||
(0.345) | (0.485) | (0.716) | ||||
Tie with Lin * Twelfth CC (1982) | − 1.732*** | − 0.321 | − 0.118 | |||
(0.352) | (0.504) | (0.754) | ||||
Year dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Personal characteristics * Year dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | |||
Working experiences * Year | Yes | |||||
Number of observations | 4165 | 4075 | 4075 | 4075 | 4075 | 4075 |
Number of individuals | 833 | 815 | 815 | 815 | 815 | 815 |
LR-χ2 | 241.5 | 500.3 | 1158.3 | 582.2 | 1166.4 | 1223.1 |
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Bai, Y., Zhou, T. “Mao’s last revolution”: a dictator’s loyalty–competence tradeoff. Public Choice 180, 469–500 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-019-00649-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-019-00649-9