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Grounding the normative: a problem for structured non-naturalism

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Abstract

Many non-naturalists about the normative want to endorse the view that some normative facts hold in virtue of both non-normative facts and normative principles. In this paper, I argue that non-naturalism is inconsistent with this thesis, due to the nature of normative principles and their grounds. I then consider two ways in which the nonnaturalist position could be modified or expanded to solve this problem. No solution, it turns out, is without its problems. I end by considering how the non-naturalist can deny that normative facts obtain partially in virtue of principles.

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Notes

  1. See, most prominently, Rosen (2010), Schaffer (2009), Fine (2012) and Correia and Schneider (2012).

  2. See Berker (2018), as well as Dancy (1981).

  3. I here treat grounding as a relation between facts—as opposed to, say, a sentential operator—though this is not essential to any of my arguments.

  4. Both examples are from Rosen (2010, p. 110).

  5. See Fine (2012), as well as deRosset (2015).

  6. Of course, as with everything, these have been questioned. Those critical of irreflexivity include Wilson (2014) and Correia (2014). Schaffer (2012) is critical of transitivity. Raven (2013) and Litland (2013) defend these principles.

  7. See Rosen (2010, pp. 111–112).

  8. Shafer-Landau (2003, p. 55), Smith (2013, p. 28) and McPherson (2012). However, non-naturalism is often defined as the claim that there are irreducibly normative properties/facts--see Parfit (2011, p. 464) and Enoch (2011, p. 1). See also Ridge (2014) and Cuneo (2007).

  9. Bader (2017).

  10. Maguire (2015, p. 194).

  11. See Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014, pp. 401–403), though the authors speak in terms of truth-making, not grounding.

  12. Brink (1989, 6.5, 7.1). See also FitzPatrick’s (2008) criticism of Shafer-Landau’s (2003: 74–79) view.

  13. Scanlon (2014, p. 40).

  14. Maguire (2015, p. 194).

  15. See Enoch (2011, pp. 144–145) and FitzPatrick (2008, pp. 186–192).

  16. Shafer-Landau (1997) and (2003, p. 268, fn. 2).

  17. For a novel way of reading generalizations that differs from this, see Fine (2015, 2016). I don’t consider this approach simply for reasons of space.

  18. See Fine (2012, p. 38) and Rosen (MS).

  19. See Berker (2018, §4).

  20. Fine (2010) has shown that this is not generally true, but Litland (2015) shows how it can be properly restricted, and the restricted version would still work for my purposes here.

  21. I rely on the principle that when Φa obtains, Φa < ∃xΦx, which Kramer (2013) presents a problem for. But the problem cases involve self-grounding, which my case doesn’t.

  22. Maguire (2015, p. 195).

  23. Enoch (2011, p. 148) and Scanlon (2014, pp. 2, 40–41).

  24. Maudlin (2007, pp. 17–18).

  25. For all I’ve said, Rosen (channeling Russell) might be right that generalizations can’t be fully grounded in their instances (Rosen 2010: 118). Even so, it will turn out that proponents of Structure will be committed to a violation of irreflexivity.

  26. Rosen (2010, p. 119).

  27. See Bennett (2011). The basis for this argument is in Schaffer (2010, p. 40).

  28. Bader (2017).

  29. Thanks to an anonymous referee for this objection.

  30. See Bennett (2011) and deRosset (2013).

  31. Because of the lessons of Sect. 3.2, I speak here and in diagrams in shorthand, assuming that grounding-facts would have to be grounded in particular grounding-facts.

  32. Litland (2017). Litland treats the term “ground” as an operator connecting sentences. I adapt the account here, simply to fit my approach.

  33. Fine (2012, pp. 48–50).

  34. See Fine (2012, pp. 47–48).

  35. Rosen (2010). See also Dasgupta (2014), which endorses a broader sort of view, and explores some of the consequences of Rosen’s particular version of it.

  36. Rosen (MS).

  37. Leary’s (2017) view introduces some nuance into the essence-facts, but since her view is committed to such essence-facts standing outside the grounding order, I return to it in the final section of the paper.

  38. If, for example, we thought that the fact that A ‹ B was grounded in both A and B, then the structured non-naturalist would again be committed to denying irreflexivity.

  39. See McPherson (2012) for a Humean sort of worry that would apply here.

  40. See Litland (2017), Sider (2011, §7.2, 8.2.1), deRosset (2013, p. 3) and Bennett (2011, p. 27).

  41. Raven (2016).

  42. See Maudlin (2007, pp. 17–18). Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this objection.

  43. Dasgupta (2014, 2016).

  44. Dasgupta defines fundamentality differently, but this is irrelevant here.

  45. See Fine (2012, pp. 37–40). See also Rosen (MS).

  46. Some question such entailment, such as Skiles (2015). I put such worries aside here, since without any such entailment, it becomes unclear how normative and metaphysical grounding are distinct, which would undermine the whole response here.

  47. See, e.g., McPherson (2012), Dreier (1992), Ridge (2007), Scanlon (2014, p. 3), Enoch (2011, ch. 6) and Shafer-Landau (2003, pp. 76–77). I don’t claim that all these authors endorse the specific formulation of supervenience given here, only that some form of supervenience across all metaphysically possible worlds is agreed on.

  48. Fine (2012, section 1).

  49. See McPherson (2012), as well as Bader (2017) for discussion.

  50. Rosen (MS) and Fine (2002).

  51. Bader (2017). Bader thinks non-naturalists are committed to normative facts being normatively grounded in the non-normative, which would raise the same problems that StructureN does. But I take this feature of his view to be independent of the one I propose here.

  52. Leary (2017).

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    Justin Morton

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Morton, J. Grounding the normative: a problem for structured non-naturalism. Philos Stud 177, 173–196 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1184-6

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