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Excuse validation: a study in rule-breaking

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We do not call anything wrong unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be punished in some way or other for doing it.

—John Stuart Mill.

Abstract

Can judging that an agent blamelessly broke a rule lead us to claim, paradoxically, that no rule was broken at all? Surprisingly, it can. Across seven experiments, we document and explain the phenomenon of excuse validation. We found when an agent blamelessly breaks a rule, it significantly distorts people’s description of the agent’s conduct. Roughly half of people deny that a rule was broken. The results suggest that people engage in excuse validation in order to avoid indirectly blaming others for blameless transgressions. Excuse validation has implications for recent debates in normative ethics, epistemology and the philosophy of language. These debates have featured thought experiments perfectly designed to trigger excuse validation, inhibiting progress in these areas.

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Notes

  1. Thanks to Laurie Rudman for proposing the explanation.

  2. Thanks to Ori Friedman for helpful discussion on this point.

  3. Hauser et al. (2007, p. 15) report that a large and diverse group of subjects tested on versions of trolley cases “generally failed to provide justifications that could account for the pattern of their judgments.”

  4. Tobia et al. (2013) report findings which suggest that professional philosophers are susceptible to framing effects when making moral judgments. Schwitzgebel and Cushman (2012) report that professional philosophers, even those specializing in ethics, are susceptible to order effects, and they speculate that a philosopher’s “skill at moral reasoning” is primarily a tool for “post hoc rationalization.” Indeed, Schwitzgebel and Cushman observed that non-philosophers were less susceptible to ordering effects.

  5. Indicates paragraph break on the participant’s screen.

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Acknowledgments

For helpful feedback and conversations, we thank Mark Alfano, Wesley Buckwalter, Gerry Callaghan, Fiery Cushman, Michael Devitt, Mathieu Doucet, Chris Eliasmith, Ori Friedman, Joshua Knobe, Bertram Malle, David Rose, Laurie Rudman, Paul Thagard, and Angelo Turri. Thanks also to audiences at the University of Waterloo (September 2012), the 39th meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology (Brown University, June 2013), and the 6th Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress (University of Colorado, Boulder, August 2013). This research was kindly supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and an Early Researcher Award from the Ontario Ministry of Economic Development and Innovation.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Philosophy Department, University of Waterloo, 200 University Avenue West, Waterloo, ON, N2L3G1, Canada

    John Turri & Peter Blouw

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  1. John Turri
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  2. Peter Blouw
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Correspondence to John Turri.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Experiments 1–5

(Baking) Brenda just entered a natural baking contest. She is in the kitchen where the contest is being held, and is starting to prepare her dish. The rules of the contest say that the only sweetener contestants are allowed to use is natural sugar, so Brenda was careful to buy only sweetener clearly labeled “natural sugar.” But the label on the package is wrong, because there was a mix-up at the factory: an artificial sweetener that looks just like sugar, SweeTooth, was accidentally packed in a package labeled “natural sugar,” without anybody noticing. Brenda isn’t aware that this happened. As a result, Brenda is actually using SweeTooth.

  1. 1.

    What kind of sweetener does Brenda think she is using? [Sugar/SweeTooth]

  2. 2.

    Is it reasonable for Brenda to think that she is using that kind of sweetener? [Yes/No]

  3. 3.

    What kind of sweetener is allowed? [Sugar/SweeTooth]

  4. 4.

    What kind of sweetener is Brenda using? [Sugar/SweeTooth]

  5. 5.

    Should Brenda be criticized for using that sweetener? [Yes/No]

  6. 6.

    Is there a sense in which it is incorrect for Brenda to use that sweetener? [Yes/No]

(Farming) Ori just entered the organic farming business. Today Ori received a letter from the agriculture department explaining the rules for organic farming. It says, “Farmers are allowed to use the fertilizer GreenFeed, but not CleanFeed.” But Ori’s neighbour Carl is also an organic farmer, and he doesn’t want Ori competing with him. So Carl sabotaged Ori by intercepting Ori’s letter and changing the text. The actual official organic farming rules say, “Farmers are allowed to use the fertilizer CleanFeed, but not GreenFeed.” Ori isn’t aware that Carl did this. As a result, Ori fertilizes his crops with GreenFeed.

  1. 1.

    What kind of fertilizer does Ori think is allowed? [Green-Feed/CleanFeed]

  2. 2.

    Is it reasonable for Ori to think that? [Yes/No]

  3. 3.

    What kind of fertilizer is allowed? [CleanFeed/GreenFeed]

  4. 4.

    What kind of fertilizer does Ori use? [GreenFeed/CleanFeed]

  5. 5.

    Should Ori be criticized for using that fertilizer? [Yes/No]

  6. 6.

    Is there a sense in which it is incorrect for Ori to use that fertilizer? [Yes/No]

(Asserting) Recently Robert started collecting coins. Today Robert made a purchase for an 1804 US silver dollar at a local coin shop, and put the coin in a display in his dining room. He is having dinner guests over tonight, and he plans to tell them about his new acquisition. But the coin dealer cheated Robert: the coin Robert purchased is actually a 1904 US silver dollar that has been tampered with so that it looks like it says ‘1804’ on it. Robert isn’t aware that the dealer did this. As a result, Robert tells his guests, “There is an 1804 US silver dollar in this display.”

  1. 1.

    What kind of coin does Robert think is in the display? [1804/1904]

  2. 2.

    Is it reasonable for Robert to think that? [Yes/No]

  3. 3.

    Robert tells his guests that a _______ coin is in the display. [1804/1904]

  4. 4.

    Robert’s statement to his guests is ______. [False/True]

  5. 5.

    Should Robert be criticized for making that statement? [Yes/No]

  6. 6.

    Is there a sense in which it is incorrect for Robert to make that statement? [Yes/No]

(Driving) Doreen just had her car serviced and is driving home from the mechanic’s shop. She wants to get home without unnecessary delay, but she does not want to break any traffic laws. The traffic law sets the speed limit at 55 miles per hour, so she looks down to see how fast she is going. The speedometer says that she is going 55 miles per hour. But the mechanic intentionally tampered with a setting on the speedometer, so that it often cannot correctly measure the car’s speed. Doreen isn’t aware that the mechanic did that. As a result, Doreen is actually driving 60 miles per hour.

  1. 1.

    How fast does Doreen think she is driving? [50/55/60] mph

  2. 2.

    Is it reasonable for Doreen to think that she is driving that fast? [Yes/No]

  3. 3.

    What is the speed limit? [55/60] mph

  4. 4.

    How fast is Doreen driving? [60/55] mph

  5. 5.

    Should Doreen be criticized for driving that speed? [Yes/No]

  6. 6.

    Is there a sense in which it is incorrect for Doreen to drive that speed? [Yes/No]

(Chess) Nicolas just accepted an invitation to participate in a special chess tournament. The invitation explains the tournament’s special rule, known as “the rook rule.” The invitation says, “A player is not allowed to take more than 60 seconds when moving the rook.” But Nicolas’s fierce competitor, Vladimir, is also in the tournament and wants to sabotage Nicolas. Vladimir intercepted Nicolas’s invitation and tricked him by changing the text. The actual official rook rule says: “A player is not allowed to take more than 30 seconds when moving the rook.” Nicolas isn’t aware that Vladimir did this. As a result, during the first match, Nicolas takes 45 seconds to move the rook.

  1. 1.

    How much time does Nicolas think the rook rule allows? [60/30 seconds]

  2. 2.

    Is Nicolas’s belief about the rook rule reasonable? [Yes/No]

  3. 3.

    How much time does the rook rule actually allow? [60/30 seconds]

  4. 4.

    How much time does Nicolas take to move his rook? [45/30 seconds]

  5. 5.

    Should Nicolas be criticized for taking that much time? [Yes/No]

  6. 6.

    Is there a sense in which it is incorrect for Nicolas to take that much time? [Yes/No]

Appendix 2: Experiments 6–7

(Vessel: Significant/Insignificant Harm) Andrew is a technician on a [military/commercial] vessel. When the vessel performs certain exercises, he is expected to notify [nearby adversaries/corporate headquarters] by sending certain signals, as detailed in the vessel’s rule manual. If the vessel performs an exercise without sending the right signal, the consequences [could/will] be [significant/insignificant]: [it could be interpreted as an act of war/headquarters will have to update its database manually]. ¶Footnote 5 Today the vessel’s captain orders the crew to perform exercise Omega, which they had never done before. Andrew consults the copy of the vessel’s rule manual that he was given, and it says, “If the vessel performs exercise Omega, send signal N001.” But Andrew’s copy of the manual contains a misprint. The actual official rule says, “If the vessel performs exercise Omega, send signal M100.” Andrew isn’t aware of the misprint. As a result, Andrew sends signal N001. ¶ Soon after the vessel finishes its exercise, headquarters updates its database manually. [The captain approaches Andrew and says, “You broke the rules [unintentionally].”]

  1. 1.

    The rules officially require Andrew to send signal _____. [M100/N001]

  2. 2.

    Andrew sent signal _____. [N001/M100]

  3. 3.

    Did Andrew break the rules [unintentionally]? [Y/N]

    ≫page break≪ (the following two questions were also presented in Experiment 6)

  4. 4.

    Did Andrew unintentionally break the rules? [Y/N]

  5. 5.

    Should Andrew be criticized for breaking the rules? [Y/N]

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Turri, J., Blouw, P. Excuse validation: a study in rule-breaking. Philos Stud 172, 615–634 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0322-z

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