Notes
Throughout we follow Richard in defining ‘is false’ as ‘has a true negation’.
See Kraut (1993) for an opposing view.
See Field (2008, Chap. 16) on Schema T and truth predicates as devices of endorsement.
There are other paradoxes associated with truth, but Richard focuses on the liar.
See Schroeder (2010) for criticism of the idea that denial can always be lexicalized in this way.
For example, if sentence δ is ‘<δ> is not appropriate’.
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Scharp, K., Shapiro, S. On Richard’s When Truth Gives Out . Philos Stud 160, 455–463 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9796-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9796-0